Why We Were In Vietnam [Hardcover]

Norman podhoretz (Author)

Product Details

• Hardcover: 240 pages
• Publisher: Simon & Schuster; 1ST edition (March 31, 1982)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0671445782
• ISBN-13: 978-0671445782
• Product Dimensions: 8.5 x 5.7 x 1.2 inches
• Shipping Weight: 13.6 ounces
• Average Customer Review: 4.2 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (6 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,415,323 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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39 of 42 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Indispensable, August 6, 2005

By 

S. Pollock (Ontario, Canada) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Why We Were In Vietnam (Hardcover)

This book does not attempt to argue that the US involvement in Vietnam was wise, well thought-out, or that it could have been successful. Indeed, he indicates that he believes none of these things. But that is not what the book is about. It is about how American policy towards Vietnam evolved and what the objectives and convictions of five administrations were.

I can remember watching Platoon and Apocalypse Now as a kid and wondering what in the hell the Americans were doing. Why were they there? What was the point? Why waste time and money doing ostensibly nothing? Were they all on drugs? Crazy? Stupid? Evil? The question fascinated me but Stone and Coppola didn't provide their audience with any answer. They didn't even attempt to provide a context or background for their stories. They conveyed one thing: American thugs brutalizing a civilian population (which we learn nothing about), and fighting an enemy (which we learn nothing about). That is not history, it is unintellectual silliness. And much the same is presented in the literature on the war.

The great value of Podhoretz's book is that it places the war in the proper context of Munich and the Cold War. When Truman articulated the doctrine of containment, it was unclear whether or not it would extend beyond Europe. When Truman decided to commit US forces to preserve a free and independent South Korea, it became evident that containment was a global strategy. Communist aggression would no more be tolerated against NATO member states than it would against SEATO member states.

They believed US credibility in terms of defending free and sovereign states against outright invasion and covert infiltration was at stake. Central to the thinking of many postwar American leaders was that appeasement and passivity at Munich had encouraged Hitler and led to the death of tens of millions.

They also believed in the "domino theory" of Communist expansion. While this theory has been much derided, the dominoes did fall. After South Vietnam came Laos, and then Cambodia (all of Indochina). The dozen years the Americans fought in Vietnam, the rest of non-Communist South-East Asia was given a breathing space in which to grow their economies and stabilize themsleves against Communist maneuvers. But in the subsequent five years no less than 11 nations moved into the Soviet camp. As Nixon argued, the Soviet Union was the big winner. (Shortly after the fall of South Vietnam, the Soviets established for themsevles a major base at Cam Rahn Bay, giving their navy a forward base reach into the Pacific that it had coveted for some 70 years. Soviet Bear D and F bombers began to fly recon missions over the US 7th Fleet and monitored US signals traffic in the region. The loss was not without negative consequences for America and the free world.

More central though, is the discussion of the antiwar movement and the critique of its assertions. He does not condemn the movement wholesale and his charges are discriminating and fair. Podhoretz is not a raving political hack, he is a serious intellectual and this is a serious, intelligent study. It makes a compelling case that as Reagan said, Vietnam was a "noble war", that it was idealistic, if not wise or constructive. It makes mincemeat out of the wild claims of the New Left and compares post-US events (such as the Cambodian holocaust) with statements by academics and journalists (such as that Cambodia would flourish under the enlightened rule of the Khmer Rouge). Their criminal stupidity is embarassing and they ought to be ashamed. Some were and are (Shawcross, McGovern), some weren't, aren't and never will be (Chomsky).

Podhoretz does not answer a question with a question, and after reading this book, you will be able to answer this question with some authority.

35 of 40 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars This book gives great justifications for going to Vietnam., March 3, 1999

By A Customer

This review is from: Why We Were In Vietnam (Hardcover)

Like Guenter Lewy's "America in Vietnam" and "Stolen Valor" by B.G. Burkett, it is a definitive piece of work on the subject of Vietnam. Also, it gives great justifications as to exactly why we went there in the first place.

I don't have a whole lot to say other than the fact that the arguments are based on Sound Scholarship, and to refute Norman Podhoretz is nothing but self-refuting since it would come from anti-american bias.

I don't know how to emphasis the importance of reading this book.

16 of 18 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars a tough read, but well written, well researched, and very much hardball, May 19, 2006

By 

Brian Carter (Baghdad, Iraq (Ermita, Philippines and San Antonio, Texas are home)) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Why We Were in Vietnam (Paperback)

For those seeking a detailed account of the domestic (US) political history of Vietnam: this is your book. Podhoretz, an acclaimed editor, covers the political debate (or lack thereof) at each stage of the US involvement in Vietnam; from refusing to enter to help the French, to providing assistance to the independent South, to entering combat, to drawing down, to negotiating an end to US involvement, to refusing to sell the South Vietnamese ammunition for their self-defense.

The author is meticulous in his research, quotes, and footnotes of the various sides at different times during the war. In fact, one of the drawbacks is that the reading is a bit thick due to the frequent in-depth quotes from sources with different styles. You may have to re-read a section once in order to make sure the context is correct. The book is well-organized though and the author's points are effectively made.

His biggest contention can probably be summed up as the Vietnam War was fought on the cheap. To elaborate his point, Kennedy and Johnson tried to fight the war below the radar of the general public. Therefore, even though most American's supported US efforts in Vietnam early-on, the Presidents never made the case for the war to the public. America was never put on a war-footing, and American's at home were not asked to make any sacrifices.

Later, when the public mood was shifting (not as you might imagine as the author points out), the political leaders failed to make the case for American involvement. By contrast, extremist elements opposed to the war (and any war, and the US itself), were able to gain broad support and mainstream acceptance of their `facts.' Johnson blundered in trying to "not dignify those allegations with a response." In trying to fight the war out of the public eye, and have his poverty programs simultaneously, he also squandered his credibility.

By the time Nixon was President, the issue of withdrawal was settled - even though there had never really been a debate - the only question was timing and method.

Podhoretz doesn't spare anybody in the book - he equally embarrasses those who favored involvement and those who favored withdrawal. He highlights hypocrisy on all sides, across all three administrations, and exposes hidden agendas and prejudices galore. He even points out fallacies and errors in his own articles, written during the war.

There is no question the author supported involvement (for the right reasons, in the right way), but he carefully draws the distinction between blind support of a poorly lead war effort by a leadership that squandered political opportunities, and support for those in South Vietnam who honestly wanted to remain free from North Vietnamese domination. This is not an easy book to read, and is not recommended for light reading - the reader has to really think about what is being said and the context.

If you want to learn more about politics surrounding the US involvement in Vietnam, this book provides critical balance missing in almost all histories of the war. If you enjoy political hardball and watching politicians and their shills being exposed, you will also enjoy this book.