Wilson's Ghost: Reducing the Risk of Conflict, Killing, and Catastrophe in the 21st Century (Hardcover)

by Robert S. McNamara (Author), James G. Blight (Author) "The end of the Cold War ushered in a brief period of optimism about prospects for world peace in the 21st century..." (more)
Key Phrases: moral blind alleys, multilateral imperative, communal killing, United States, Cold War, Security Council (more...)

Editorial Reviews

Amazon.com Review
The 20th century was the bloodiest in world history, and it is a moral imperative for humanity not to repeat the mistakes that made those hundred years so numbingly violent. In Wilson's Ghost, Robert S. McNamara, U.S. secretary of defense during the Vietnam War, and James G. Blight, an expert on international relations, look to Woodrow Wilson for inspiration. (Previously, McNamara and Blight collaborated on Argument Without End.) President Wilson, they say, "was one of the first leaders of the 20th century to sense that without radical political changes, the human race might destroy itself in ever greater numbers in what he called metaphorically the 'typhoon'--catastrophic wars of ever greater destructiveness." Wilson, however, "failed utterly" in his goal of making the United States and other countries "take a thoroughly multilateral approach to issues of international security."

McNamara and Blight offer advice on how to achieve Wilson's dream today. This makes them, to use the lingo of diplomats, foreign-policy idealists: "It seems to us that the realists are in fact unreal in their analysis of the world in the 21st century," they write. They call for "bringing Russia and China in from the cold," by which they mean Americans should treat the Russians and Chinese more like equals than they do currently. The United States, in short, must "not apply its economic, political, or military power unilaterally, other than in the unlikely circumstances of a defense of the continental United States, Hawaii, and Alaska." McNamara and Blight assert that developing antiballistic technologies will lead to "an increased risk of arms races, instability, and even nuclear war." Readers whose foreign policy runs left-of-center will appreciate the authors' efforts and find it a pleasing contrast to a recent right-of-center foreign-policy tome, Henry Kissinger's Does America Need a Foreign Policy? --John J. Miller

From Publishers Weekly
In the 20th century, 160 million people died in war and political violence, the bloodiest century on record. But, warn the authors, unless there is a radical change in the conduct of international affairs, the 21st century could see far more carnage. Drawing on the Wilsonian tradition in American foreign policy, former Secretary of Defense McNamara and Brown University international relations professor Blight (the two also coauthored Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy) offer two imperatives the U.S. should follow: a "Moral Imperative," to make it a major goal of U.S. foreign policy to avoid the violence of the previous century, and a "Multilateral Imperative," to disavow the unilateral use of U.S. economic, political and military power when confronting foreign crises or challenges. A moral imperative does not mean violence will never occur, but with such an imperative in place leaders will be far more cautious than in the past in resorting to violence. For the U.S., the moral imperative must be tied to a multilateral imperative. The U.S. is indeed powerful and must lead, but it is not omnipotent, say the authors. Multilateral action can help ensure that the U.S. does not act precipitously, in an ignorant and arrogant fashion. The authors amplify on these imperatives in separate vignettes on the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, where they were applied, and on the Vietnam War, where they were not (McNamara was a participant in both). Finally, the authors address in detail three major problems confronting U.S. foreign policy bringing Russia and China fully into the world community, reducing communal or ethnic violence, eliminating nuclear weapons. Deftly written and cogently argued, this is one of the best recent books on foreign policy. (On-sale: June 5) Forecast: The day before this book hits the stores, McNamara will appear on the Today Show, kicking off a tour to New York, D.C., Boston, Philadelphia, Los Angeles and San Francisco. Given McNamara's position and background, this will generate media attention, but is unlikely to bolster sales much beyond foreign policy-wonk circles.

Copyright 2001 Cahners Business Information, Inc.

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 240 pages
• Publisher: PublicAffairs; First Edition edition (June 5, 2001)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 1891620894
• ISBN-13: 978-1891620898
• Product Dimensions: 9.6 x 6.4 x 1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.4 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 4.3 out of 5 stars See all reviews (14 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #870,921 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

33 of 36 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Strategic Context for Understanding 11 Sep Attack on America, September 15, 2001

By	Robert D. Steele (Oakton, VA United States) - See all my reviews (TOP 50 REVIEWER)

Of all the books I have read or reviewed in the past two years, this is the only one that comes close to addressing the bitter truth about the fundamental disconnect between our perception of ourselves as "the beacon of truth", and the rest of the world's perception of us as "interventionist, exploitative, unilateralist, hegemonic, and hypocritical." Those that would seek to understand just how long our Dark Ages will last would do well to start with this book while also buying a copy of the map of "World Conflict and Human Rights Map 2000" available from the PIOOM Project at Leiden University. Beyond that, selected portions of the Shultz et al book on "Security Studies for the 21st Century", where detailed comments are made about both knowledge gaps among our policymakers and non-traditional threats, are recommended.

There is no question but that the Attack on America of 11 September 2001 has awakened and even frightened the American public. It has elicited conventional assurances from other nation states. What most Americans do not understand, what this book makes brilliantly clear, is that two thirds of the rest of the world is glad it happened. I quote from page 52: "...at least two-thirds of the world's people--Chinese, Russians, Indians, Arabs, Muslims, and Africans--see the United States as the single greatest threat to their societies. They do not regard America as a military threat but as a menace to their integrity, autonomy, prosperity and freedom of action."

Whether one agrees with their depiction of two-thirds or not (or whether they see the Attack as a well-deserved bloody nose or an atrocity beyond the pale), the fact is that the authors paint--together with the PIOOM map--a compelling picture of billions--not millions but billions--of impoverished dispossessed people suffering from failed states, crime, slavery, starvation, water shortages--and an abundance of media as well as propaganda showing the US fat and happy and living the consumer society dream on the backs of these billions.

Of all the policy people I have followed over the years, Robert McNamara and Bill Colby are the two that have in my view matured and broadened the most after leaving the halls of power. The deep insights that I find throughout this book-a partnership expert between McNamara with the global reality and power game insights, James Blight with the scholarly underpinnings-are extraordinarily applicable to the challenges that we face in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 Attack on America. In particular, their dissection of the United Nations-what works and what does not-and their recommendations for future initiatives that are multilateralist and focused on the prevention and amelioration of the root conditions that are spawning our terrorist challenges, are vital reading for policymakers, diplomats, warriors, and financial magnates.

I am very concerned by any effort to militarize our response to the terrorist challenge-this is a long war that requires a fundamental restructuring of national intelligence and counterintelligence; a $100 billion a year effort to address the root causes of instability worldwide and a redirection of US foreign and defense policy away from unilateralism (for instance, we must now support the International Tribunal and an international island prison for those convicted of war crimes as well as acts of terror). Our military is still needed, but it too must be restructured to provide for four major capabilities all equally capable: CINCWAR, CINCSOLIC, CINCPEACE, and CINCHOME. I can only hope that this book, which I recommend highly, is read and understood before we start to throw money at the problem in counterproductive ways.

13 of 13 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Sobering thoughts on peace, October 21, 2003

By	William C. Hunt (Somerset, WI United States) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

This review is from: Wilson's Ghost: Reducing the Risk of Conflict, Killing, and Catastrophe in the 21st Century (Paperback)

McNamara and Blight have crafted a clear and persuasive argument for avoiding the carnage of 20th century wars that took some 160 million lives, left many more injured, and caused hundreds of billions of dollars of destruction. They ask: How can we avoid a similar fate in the 21st century?

An analysis of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson vision for the 20th century in the aftermath of the First World War serves as a starting point. The authors endorse Wilson's realization of the unimaginable disaster that awaits humanity if we do not create the climate and institutions for peace. They also admire his moral approach, his notion of peace without defeat, and his multilateral approach envisioned in the League of Nations.

However, there is also Wilson's ghost - his promotion of fragmenting national self-determination, his sometimes patronizing moralism, and his failure to persuade the Senate and the American people to abandon a unilateral approach to foreign affairs.

McNamara and Blight adopt two imperatives. The moral imperative for U.S. foreign policy is to avoid in the 21st century the carnage caused by conflict in the 20th century. The multilateral imperative is to refrain from using our economic, political, or military power unilaterally, other than in defense of the United States itself.

The authors suggest three steps as essential to securing peace in the 21st century. First, we must prevent great power conflict. This can only come if we truly seek to understand and appreciate the perspectives of other nations, especially Russia and China - what the authors call empathy.

Second, we must reduce communal killing by intervening in "dangerous, troubled, failed, murderous states." This would involve a standing United Nations pacification military force of at least 10,000 trained troops on stand-by for immediate mobilization. It would also involve planning and cooperation with other nations that understand the roots of the conflict or have interests in the region. It would involve taking sides in conflicts on the side of human rights and the realization that it might take years, even decades, to stabilize a war-torn area rather than go for a quick fix. Finally, the policy would involve realization of the limits of military force in resolving some conflicts, that is, a realization that sometimes, external force only makes matters worse.

Third, the policy should be to avoid nuclear catastrophe by "moving steadily and safely to a nuclear-weapons-free world. The authors are realistic. In a world with no nuclear weapons there would always be the danger of cheating or breakout from nuclear restraints. However, the dangers of the present situation with thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert far surpass the dangers in a weapons-free world. The authors argue, that no matter how long it takes, our policy objective must be total elimination of nuclear weapons.

The book is somewhat repetitious. If you want the gist of the argument, go to the ten-page chapter 5 "Reducing Human Carnage, An Agenda for the 21st Century." On the other hand, McNamara's extended comments on the decision making involved in the Cuban missile crisis and the Vietnam War greatly enhance the value of this volume.

A sobering and challenging book that we would all do well to ponder.

5 of 6 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars A wake-up call, but not so original..., September 8, 2001

By	J. Michael Cole (Taipei, Taiwan) - See all my reviews

This book, which tackles a daunting series of challenges in less than 250 pages, probably would serve as a good introduction for the general public. To the uninitiated, some of its propositions will indeed sound shocking, novel, and, as the authors would have it, innovative.

For readers and students who have spent the last few years dealing with the issue of post-Cold war conflict, however, or for anyone whose political views lean towards the left-side of the spectrum, the propositions elaborated upon in this book will probably sound familiar, if not a little repetitious.

While I do not disagree with most of the ideas propounded by the authors, I would recommend that intermediary to advanced policymakers, or readers who already have some familiarity with security issues, instead turn to John Steinbruner's Principles of Global Security - which, interestingly enough, is quoted on a number of occasions in McNamara's and Blight's cooperative effort.

On the other hand what did strike me about this book is Mr. McNamara's willingness to admit mistakes he or the various groups he has been part of might have committed in the past, most luridly during the Vietnam War. This was unexpected, and I appreciated the authors' openness. Much can be learned from mistakes committed, hence the importance of history.

Hopefully the ideas contained in this book will seep into the consciousness of the general public, engender discussion, and ultimately awaken the western civilization from its prevailing political stupor and outrageous disinterestedness. Then and only then will a largely disenfranchised West be in a position to demand that its leaders - who for the moment are laughing in their ivory tower of politics, filled with dreams of defense shields and the militarization of space - abandon their antiquated Cold War policies and step with conviction - and vision - into the 21st century. The fate of civilization might depend on it.

Although this book probably won't add much to the ongoing debate in the academic realm, it certainly has a place with the general public. McNamara's statute probably will contribute to increased sales, which, in a way, is not a bad thing, as it might influence people who otherwise would not have come in contact with the arguments proposed in this book.