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Wilson's Ghost: Reducing The Risk Of Conflict, Killing, And Catastrophe In The 21st Century

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Of all the books I have read or reviewed in the past two years, this is the only one that comes close to addressing the bitter truth about the fundamental disconnect between our perception of ourselves as "the beacon of truth", and the rest of the world's perception of us as "interventionist, exploitative, unilateralist, hegemonic, and hypocritical." Those that would seek to understand just how long our Dark Ages will last would do well to start with this book while also buying a copy of the map of "World Conflict and Human Rights Map 2000" available from the PIOOM Project at Leiden University. Beyond that, selected portions of the Shultz et al book on "Security Studies for the 21st Century", where detailed comments are made about both knowledge gaps among our policymakers and non-traditional threats, are recommended.

There is no question but that the Attack on America of 11 September 2001 has awakened and even frightened the American public. It has elicited conventional assurances from other nation states. What most Americans do not understand, what this book makes brilliantly clear, is that two thirds of the rest of the world is glad it happened. I quote from page 52: "...at least two-thirds of the world's people--Chinese, Russians, Indians, Arabs, Muslims, and Africans--see the United States as the single greatest threat to their societies. They do not regard America as a military threat but as a menace to their integrity, autonomy, prosperity and freedom of action."

Whether one agrees with their depiction of two-thirds or not (or whether they see the Attack as a well-deserved bloody nose or an atrocity beyond the pale), the fact is that the authors paint--together with the PIOOM map--a compelling picture of billions--not millions but billions--of impoverished dispossessed people suffering from failed states, crime, slavery, starvation, water shortages--and an abundance of media as well as propaganda showing the US fat and happy and living the consumer society dream on the backs of these billions.

Of all the policy people I have followed over the years, Robert McNamara and Bill Colby are the two that have in my view matured and broadened the most after leaving the halls of power. The deep insights that I find throughout this book-a partnership expert between McNamara with the global reality and power game insights, James Blight with the scholarly underpinnings-are extraordinarily applicable to the challenges that we face in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 Attack on America. In particular, their dissection of the United Nations-what works and what does not-and their recommendations for future initiatives that are multilateralist and focused on the prevention and amelioration of the root conditions that are spawning our terrorist challenges, are vital reading for policymakers, diplomats, warriors, and financial magnates.

I am very concerned by any effort to militarize our response to the terrorist challenge-this is a long war that requires a fundamental restructuring of national intelligence and counterintelligence; a $100 billion a year effort to address the root causes of instability worldwide and a redirection of US foreign and defense policy away from unilateralism (for instance, we must now support the International Tribunal and an international island prison for those convicted of war crimes as well as acts of terror). Our military is still needed, but it too must be restructured to provide for four major capabilities all equally capable: CINCWAR, CINCSOLIC, CINCPEACE, and CINCHOME. I can only hope that this book, which I recommend highly, is read and understood before we start to throw money at the problem in counterproductive ways.

McNamara and Blight have crafted a clear and persuasive argument for avoiding the carnage of 20th century wars that took some 160 million lives, left many more injured, and caused hundreds of billions of dollars of destruction. They ask: How can we avoid a similar fate in the 21st century?

An analysis of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson vision for the 20th century in the aftermath of the First World War serves as a starting point. The authors endorse Wilson's realization of the unimaginable disaster that awaits humanity if we do not create the climate and institutions for peace. They also admire his moral approach, his notion of peace without defeat, and his multilateral approach envisioned in the League of Nations.

However, there is also Wilson's ghost - his promotion of fragmenting national self-determination, his sometimes patronizing moralism, and his failure to persuade the Senate and the American people to abandon a unilateral approach to foreign affairs.

McNamara and Blight adopt two imperatives. The moral imperative for U.S. foreign policy is to avoid in the 21st century the carnage caused by conflict in the 20th century. The multilateral imperative is to refrain from using our economic, political, or military power unilaterally, other than in defense of the United States itself.

The authors suggest three steps as essential to securing peace in the 21st century. First, we must prevent great power conflict. This can only come if we truly seek to understand and appreciate the perspectives of other nations, especially Russia and China - what the authors call empathy.

Second, we must reduce communal killing by intervening in "dangerous, troubled, failed, murderous states." This would involve a standing United Nations pacification military force of at least 10,000 trained troops on stand-by for immediate mobilization. It would also involve planning and cooperation with other nations that understand the roots of the conflict or have interests in the region. It would involve taking sides in conflicts on the side of human rights and the realization that it might take years, even decades, to stabilize a war-torn area rather than go for a quick fix. Finally, the policy would involve realization of the limits of military force in resolving some conflicts, that is, a realization that sometimes, external force only makes matters worse.

Third, the policy should be to avoid nuclear catastrophe by "moving steadily and safely to a nuclear-weapons-free world. The authors are realistic. In a world with no nuclear weapons there would always be the danger of cheating or breakout from nuclear restraints. However, the dangers of the present situation with thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert far surpass the dangers in a weapons-free world. The authors argue, that no matter how long it takes, our policy objective must be total elimination of nuclear weapons.

The book is somewhat repetitious. If you want the gist of the argument, go to the ten-page chapter 5 "Reducing Human Carnage, An Agenda for the 21st Century." On the other hand, McNamara's extended comments on the decision making involved in the Cuban missile crisis and the Vietnam War greatly enhance the value of this volume.

A sobering and challenging book that we would all do well to ponder.

This book, which tackles a daunting series of challenges in less than 250 pages, probably would serve as a good introduction for the general public. To the uninitiated, some of its propositions will indeed sound shocking, novel, and, as the authors would have it, innovative.

For readers and students who have spent the last few years dealing with the issue of post-Cold war conflict, however, or for anyone whose political views lean towards the left-side of the spectrum, the propositions elaborated upon in this book will probably sound familiar, if not a little repetitious.

While I do not disagree with most of the ideas propounded by the authors, I would recommend that intermediary to advanced policymakers, or readers who already have some familiarity with security issues, instead turn to John Steinbruner's Principles of Global Security - which, interestingly enough, is quoted on a number of occasions in McNamara's and Blight's cooperative effort.

On the other hand what did strike me about this book is Mr. McNamara's willingness to admit mistakes he or the various groups he has been part of might have committed in the past, most luridly during the Vietnam War. This was unexpected, and I appreciated the authors' openness. Much can be learned from mistakes committed, hence the importance of history.

Hopefully the ideas contained in this book will seep into the consciousness of the general public, engender discussion, and ultimately awaken the western civilization from its prevailing political stupor and outrageous disinterestedness. Then and only then will a largely disenfranchised West be in a position to demand that its leaders - who for the moment are laughing in their ivory tower of politics, filled with dreams of defense shields and the militarization of space - abandon their antiquated Cold War policies and step with conviction - and vision - into the 21st century. The fate of civilization might depend on it.

Although this book probably won't add much to the ongoing debate in the academic realm, it certainly has a place with the general public. McNamara's statute probably will contribute to increased sales, which, in a way, is not a bad thing, as it might influence people who otherwise would not have come in contact with the arguments proposed in this book.

The collaborative effort of Robert S. McNamara (educator, businessman, and Secretary of Defense to Presidents Jack Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson), and James G. Blight (Professor of International Relations, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University), Wilson's Ghost: Reducing The Risk Of Conflict, Killing, And Catastrophe In The 21st Century is a clear, hard look at the twentieth century as being the bloodiest era in the whole of human history, with over 160 million people worldwide as victims of wars and other armed conflicts. Studying the means of avoiding war and sustaining peace, and presenting a plan to realize Woodrow Wilson's dream of a peaceful planet, McNamara and Blight cogently set forth a radical means to reducing the bloodshed and progressing toward a more enlightened future. Wilson's Ghost is very highly recommended reading and a welcome addition to personal reading lists and academic Peace Studies reference collections.

In this book, former US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and two college professors put forth a vision of a future in which the USA fully embeds itself within international law and organizations, and uses these tools to push for world peace. Key to this is a dedication to empathy, for US leaders at all levels to put themselves into the shoes of people in other nations and empathize with their fears, wants, hopes and realities, and then create international policies with these in mind. The authors cite several key examples of US leaders empathizing with foreign rivals and enemies, and not doing so. Examples of the former include the Kennedy dialogue with Khruschev during the Cuban Missile Crisis, former President Wilson's dialogue with German leaders at the end of WWI, and the Marshall Plan post WW2. Examples of the latter include US relations with Vietnam during the Vietnam War, the spread of NATO eastward towards the borders of Russia, and US support of Taiwan over China's opposition. Through all of these examples, the authors of this book do a thorough job explaining the public moods of the countries opposed to US action, and how US leaders repeatedly fail to take these into account.

My first critique of this book is that it totally and completely fails to explain how the decision-making of US leaders is driven towards means and ends that often antagonize other nations. Central in this regard is the role of corporations, both US-based and multinational corporations, and how their business leaders often end up as officials in the US government, who then formulate and implement policies that benefit said corporations. For example, many of the former Soviet republics hold reserves of some important resources such as oil and gas. A key driver of the expansion of NATO was the unspoken desire to open up these countries' mineral wealth to western companies such as Chevron, Halliburton, Exxon-Mobil, etc... If these resources did not exist in these countries, NATO would have never expanded there. Another example is the Vietnam War, which became "hot" under President LBJ. A thorough reading of Robert Caro's trilogy on LBJ shows how LBJ's rise to political power came on the backs of key companies in the military-industrial complex, the same companies that profited handsomely of the Vietnam War. Lack of empathy? I doubt it; the Vietnam War comes down to war profiteering.

My second critique of this book is that the authors totally fail to propose concrete ways by which Americans and their leaders can empathize better with foreigners. Here are some ideas, ideas that the book's authors could have delved into. First, cut down on military spending and use some of the savings to send more American students to study abroad. Second, make it easier for foreigners to come study in America, whether it be undergraduate or postgraduate study. Maybe not cheaper, but reduce the paperwork and waiting time. Third, mandate 2nd language instruction as part of the US public school system, and require certain levels of 2nd language proficiency for college admissions. Fourth, stop subsidizing home ownership, which keeps Americans in America, and instead subsidize travel, especially to foreign countries. As more Americans travel abroad, whether it be for work, study or play, Americans will come to empathize with the rest of humanity.

My last critique of this book is that it does not even begin to mention how America became a nation that acts in ways most find repulsive at the very least. Some exploration of US dependence on oil would help here. Another would be a study of the CIA and FBI, and some of the vial deeds perpetrated by these agencies against Americans that have corrupted our political system to the point that our nation produces leaders that ignores basic morals and ethics in dealing not only with Americans, but with foreigners. Operations Ajax, PBSuccess, and Paperclip would be good starting points of discussion.

So overall, this book was a waste of time to read. The facts contained in it amount to an editorial along the lines of "the ugly American". And let me emphasis the term editorial; there is very little in terms of investigative reporting, eye-opening revelations, insightful analysis, subtle philosophy, etc... Don't bother to read this book.

The book is a pretty easy read and relies to a great extent on Blight's writing. However the main point that the authors make--that we must deploy strategic empathy and that this empathy can only be developed through our citizenry taking the time and effort to educate themselves on the cultures and histories of those who would seek to harm us--is invaluable. It goes to show that in a real democracy (or some form thereof) it is incumbent on the citizens to do the heavy lifting and keep ourselves informed. Not doing this will perpetuate the sort of disaster that the Iraq War has been. It's all too easy for those with an agenda to take advantage of an ignorant and fearful population and send us into a war that has no relation to the original event and which is fought at such great cost. This is McNamara's lesson from Vietnam and it is the one we failed to learn after 9-11.

In this short book, former Defense Secretary, Robert S. McNamara, and Brown University Professor James G. Blight provide a blueprint for future American foreign policy designed to avoid the carnage of the 20th century that left an estimated 160 million people dead. Using the metaphor of America being haunted by the ghost of President Woodrow Wilson, whose warnings were ignored after World War I (WWI), they, like Wilson, warn that the failure to insure harmonious international relations will cause a war of apocalyptic proportions. They propose a five-step program that includes:

Only multinational interventions by the U.S.

Full reconciliation with Russia and China

Restructuring the U.N.

Defining, deterring and punishing war crimes

The total elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide

What can a long dead president from a bygone era, the architect of America's failed policy in Vietnam, and/or a professor from academia contribute to real-world decision makers today? The Holy Bible says in the book of Proverbs, Chapter 20, Verse 29, "The glory of young men is their strength; of old men, their experience." The strong, young men of Wilson's day did not listen to him. As he predicted, a second world war, more deadly and destructive than the first, was the result. Wilson's warnings are more poignant today than after WWI. In 1919, the world had the capability of destroying continents. We now have the capability to destroy all life on this planet. McNamara and Blight, offer a plan to reduce the chance of genocide and nuclear holocaust. Given the explosive nature of international conflicts today, the proposals of these wise, old, men deserve serious consideration if mankind is to survive.

Mr. McNamara and Mr. Blight present the 21st century's three
major international problems to be solved if we are to have an
earth to live on. It is amazing how close we live with the possible daily nuclear destruction of our planet. This book shows the arrogance
America possesses in its international operations and what we must do to combat it.

I am not so sure what is being proposed by these two is in the realm
of reality. They have provided the road map for peace, but I know
of no nation or people that are politically ready to follow it. I'm sure
the ignorance of the world's people will lead to a nuclear holocost
and the dawn of a new race of homosapiens. This is an excellent
read and recommended for those of you interested in international
operations.

For many years as a theologian and student of international relations I have struggled with the postions of "idealism" and "political realism" of political thought and practice. Robert McNamara and James Blight have come to us with an impassioned plea for a new direction in human affairs to help prevent killing on a massive scale that was part of the 20th century and could be part of the 21st century unless humanity makes a purposeful and concerted effort to change.

I found the book engaging in format and offering a compelling vision for a new world order. Of course, there will be many who will suggest that such a vision is utopian madness. However, we need to keep in mind that before there can be any paradigmatic changes in world order there has to be a new vision for the world that inspires humanity to a more just and peaceful order. Otherwise, we will be mired in the past way of doing things and will tend to repeat the mistakes of the past. McNamara reminds us that to do that, in world of nuclear weapons, is to risk unprecedented catastrophe.

Whether you agree or disagree with the authors you should read this book. We need all the ideas we can muster to promote a new and saner world order. After all, is not the definition of insanity as that of doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results?

I do not know who wrote the prolog to this book, but it has got to be the most painful 20 minutes of my life. It was really bad, getting through it was like dragging a full size refrigerator loaded with lead blocks through a swap while wearing a chicken suit and snowshoes. The good new is that the rest of the book was nothing like the prolog. The book gave an interesting and I felt bit simplistic and idealist view of how American and the rest of the world (UN) should conduct foreign policy. The liberal in me was happy with the suggestions, but the realest in me just can not get around thinking that no matter how noble the ideas there would be someone out there that would take advantage of us.

McNamara fills the book with interesting stories about his time as Defense Secretary and I found these items the most enjoyable of the book. He covered a good deal of information on his view of the Cuban Missile crises and why we got into Vietnam in the first place. If there is value in the book then this is where it was. Overall the book was well written, except the prolog, and easy to read. The authors expressed their views well and with conviction. It was just that I kept thinking that this is never going to work in the real world. I would agree with another reviewer here that if you are looking to just get the highlights of the book chapter five is the place to start and finish.