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Wilson's War: How Woodrow Wilson's Great Blunder Led to Hitler, Lenin, Stalin, and World War II

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Mr. Powell's essential point is that Wilson's intervention in World War I, intended to lead to a stable and peaceful world, had in fact the opposite effect. It enabled France and Britain to achieve a decisive military victory over Germany and
Austria; then, at Versailles, the idealism that had led Wilson to intervene, coupled with his naivete, allowed his allies to impose upon Germany an humiliating and punitive treaty. The effects in Germany were economic chaos and social and political unrest, which Hitler exploited to gain power, and thus led to World War II. All this is familiar enought to anyone acquianted with the period; one need only to have read A.J.P. Taylor's "Origins of the Second World War", and a book like Charles Mee's "The End of Order". Mr. Powell, however, focuses upon how Wilson's personality, and particularly his idealism, contributed to his misguided intervention and its disasterous consequences. By doing so he adds much interesting detail to the story.

The main point this book makes that to me, at least, is new is the effect of the western allies' pressure on Kerensky's government to stay in the war. Mr. Powell argues that Kerensky's efforts to do so made it impossible for him to consolidate his power; the Bolsheviks were thus enabled to overthrow him, leading to the atrocities of the Soviet regime and ultimately the Cold War. One may wonder what Kerensky's chances were in any case, but he certainly could not afford unnecessary complications; and while Britain and France would in any case have tried to keep Russia fighting on the Eastern Front, without the hope offerred by the United States' intervention their efforts might have been less successful.

I should add that Mr. Powell is out to make a point: That idealism directed toward running other peoples' affairs is an unsound basis for foreign policy, and we ought to learn from Wilson's ill example to avoid it. Thus the book is politics, not history; it is nevertheless both entertaining and worthwhile
to read.

This is a good day I think for reviewing the legacy of Woodrow Wilson, since it's the ninety-first anniversary of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the eighty-sixth of the signing of the treaty of Versailles. "Wilson's War" is an excellent tool for sparking such a review. It's not a perfect book -- though not for the reasons many negative reviewers give. But as a presentation of the case against one of the two or three worst and most destructive presidents of the twentieth century, it's a pretty good start.

Like FDR's Folly: How Roosevelt and His New Deal Prolonged the Great Depression, Jim Powell's book about another president of inflated reputation, "Wilson's War" doesn't break a lot of new ground. What both books do, however, is the very important work of assembling facts and making connections that many historians and opinion leaders are all too interested in glossing over or explaining away.

Jim Powell is hardly the first person make these arguments. Personally, I had already come to largely the same conclusion Powell does from reading Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn's Leftism Revisited: From De Sade and Marx to Hitler and Pol Pot, Thomas Fleming's essential The Illusion Of Victory: America In World War I (Basic Books, 2003), and various histories of the rise of the National Socialists. Combine that with other books about the rise of the International Socialists, like Robert Service's Lenin: A Biography and Robert Conquest's histories of the USSR (both authors are quoted extensively in "Wilson's War"), and it gets pretty hard credibly to accuse Powell of flying off by himself someplace.

Where this book left me dissatisfied was in its balance in presenting causes and consequences. Powell does vital work in spelling out the horrors attendant to the red revolutions of 1917 and 1933. But I wish he had gone into still more depth presenting Wilson's dangerous combination of self-righteousness and ignorance, and how the messianic (in his own mind) Wilson was swung like a lariat by cleverer politicians both manipulating and being driven by nationalistic passions. It's easy to dismiss Powell by saying he hangs his argument on too slender a thread. Personally, I would have encouraged Powell to reduce the second half of the book by about fifty percent, and to double the length of the argument in the first half.

But that question of causes and consequences notwithstanding, "Wilson's War" makes an important argument. By questioning the premises on which American foreign policy has been based for the last four or five score years (certainly, Walter Hines Page telling Sir Edward Grey in 1913 that the US "will be here for two hundred years and it can continue to shoot men [in Mexico] until they learn to vote and to rule themselves" is an impressively twenty-first century view of American statesmanship), Powell guaranteed himself a rough reception from establishment historians and reviewers. But as I never tire of quoting K-L saying, the judgment of historians and the judgment of history are two very different things. The horrors of the twentieth century may not *all* have been Woodrow Wilson's fault, but Jim Powell has reminded us of just how much of it he does have to answer for.

This is a feisty revisionist look at one of America's most sacred cows---President Woodrow Wilson and his international crusading---its sources and its results. The distinguished historian John Lukacs said that Wilson was the most important man of the 20th century because his style and content have provided the main theme of U.S. history and much of world history ever since. This book is a good cure for the common American malady of President-worship and is very enlightening for those of us who are dubious about foreign adventurism in the name of "democracy."

In reviewing the pannings of "Wilson's War" (both by reviewers here and Publisher's Weekly), one notices a preponderance of disdainful denunciations aimed not at Jim Powell's book itself, but at Powell's supposed "libertarian philosophy" that underpins his historical writing in general. These potshots fail entirely to appreciate the unique value of "Wilson's War" as a critical thesis about World War I, outside of any ideology, and as an excellent complement to Niall Ferguson's always-intriguing "Pity of War" that tackles the Great War from a far different vantage point, yet reaches similar conclusions.

Powell's subject matter could not be more important both for historical discussion and for debates about modern policy, and critical treatments like his--which investigate the backdrop to the war and the blunders that led to it--are therefore essential. Although WWII receives the most attention in popular culture and military history dissertations, WWI was by far more influential in its effect on the modern world. From the rise of totalitarian regimes, to the resentments of Versailles leading to WWII, to industrialized warfare, to the embroilment of the West in Iraq and the Middle East (as Britain and France carved up the Ottoman Empire), to the Cold War, to the unsustainable human, material and financial damage which destroyed the British Empire (perhaps its most significant effect overall), World War I is the defining conflict of the modern era.

Powell's thesis is difficult to encapsulate in a single sentence but can be roughly summarized as follows: Woodrow Wilson's partly well-intentioned, partly less noble reasons for bringing the United States into WWI, were directly responsible for the immeasurable catastrophes which ensued in its wake, since Wilson denied the quarreling European powers of the essential respite of an armistice, to forsake the ambitions which were blinding them and accept the futility of the war. The European powers had stalemated each other so much by 1917 that, without American entry, they had little other choice but to negotiate an armistice which, while denying significant gains to any side, would have finally imparted to them the crucial lesson that the war would produce only losers on all sides. Whatever one's quibbles about Powell's emphasis on markets rather than bullets, his thesis is entirely reasonable and also suggested by conventional WWI historians such as Tuchman and Keegan, as well as in Thomas Fleming's elegant treatise, "Illusion of Victory": Like bruised and bloodied boxers who have pummeled each other for 12 rounds, the combatants were moving to forsake the possibility of a "knockout punch" as they gained mutual, mature respect for each other and tired of the conflict.

In citing Wilson's belief in "democratic militarism" in bringing the US into the war on the side of the Allies-a move which, even after the Lusitania and the Zimmermann Telegram, was deeply unpopular in the States-Powell affirms that Wilson effectively blocked this realization and precipitated the serial disasters that would engulf Europe and continue to threaten the world in the 21st century. Not only were Germany and Austria-Hungary saddled with the humiliating Versailles war guilt and reparations provisions that sowed the resentment leading to the Second World War; Britain and France were also tempted to carve up the Ottoman Empire and break their promises of freedom to the Arabs, the original acts of treachery which in large part underlie the Iraq War of the present. Thus, even the only "gain" for a devastated Britain and France--the territorial prizes of the Mideast--have transmogrified into an indisputable long-term disaster for both, and for the US.

Powell also shoots down many of the myths about Wilson's motivations for entering the First World War, noting for example that the Allies were just as intrusive as the Central Powers in interdicting and frustrating US trade. Like Fleming, he notes the extent to which base motivations of profit for arms manufacturers also greased the wheels of hawkish sentiment. Just as valuably, Powell also recognizes the hypocrisy in Wilson's claimed objectives, noting for example that even as Wilson claimed to seek freedom and self-determination for Serbs and Belgians, he was nonetheless ready to relegate Irish, Vietnamese, Indians and Africans to colonial servitude under their British and French colonial masters. Powell discusses the follies of Wilson's other interventions in Latin America, preceding US entry into WWI. Perhaps most importantly, Powell examines how Wilson's administration, while claiming to spread democracy abroad, also oversaw perhaps the worst infringements of civil liberties ever seen back home in the US. African, Irish, and German-Americans were all extensively persecuted, often with the tacit support of the government and press, while the Palmer Raids and Red Scares against supposed "Socialist subversives" foreshadowed and in some ways exceeded the repugnance of the McCarthy hearings in the 1950s.

Powell's book, in conclusion, provides a valuable critical examination of Wilson's basis for intervention in WWI and supplies a solid case for its folly. As can be seen with the current war in Iraq--a direct descendant of post-WWI territorial arrangements--Powell's considerations remain relevant today.

It is interesting to read the hostile comments regarding Jim Powell's book on Woodrow Wilson and the entry of the United States into World War I. People forget that Wilson promised during his re-election campaign in 1916 to keep the USA out of the war -- while he secretly was planning its entry.

We have been taught throughout our history classes that our involvement in that disastrous war somehow was inevitable -- that those dastardly Germans forced us into it. Moreover, there was not the great excitement to enter the conflict as many "distorians" would have us believe. One telling statistic is the small number of men who volunteered to fight after Congress declared war in April 1917. Seeing that American men were not willing to die in the trenches of Europe, Congress saw fit to enact conscription. Apparently, not too many Americans believed that Mexico constituted a Great Threat to our Republic or that we were in danger of losing California to the PRI.

World War I also brought marginal income tax rates upward of 70 percent and a near-complete government takeover of the economy. The economic consequences of our involvement still are with us today. This war was a disaster for civil liberties, including freedom of speech and freedom of the press, and it empowered government agencies to have control over the lives of people that had not been the case before.

Had the United States not entered that war, I have serious doubts that we then would have been invaded by Germany or anyone else. The "peace" that the United States helped to impose upon Europe following the war was hardly peaceful, and it did set the stage for World War II.

Jeez, could the editorial review at least pretend to suppress their bias towards pro-British interpretation of the history?

I have been an unabashed supporter of Wilson and his ideas - despite their dismal outcomes - since I thought - and still do - that with respect to his ideas, Wilson spoke passionately of the best virtues of American democracy and how he hoped that these would be passed on to the rest of the world. However, here historian Jim Powell has caused me to think anew whether or not I should adhere to a Wilsonian view of foreign affairs. At least in the first half of the book, Powell makes a very persuasive case as to how Wilson's eagerness to take the United States into World War I had unexpectedly fatal consequences with regards to the future histories of both Russia and Germany; in short, Powell contends that Wilson had a very naive, myopic view of World War I and was too willing to think of both Great Britain and France as the "good guys", when, in the end, they shared as much blame as Germany for starting this war. Powell excels in connecting the dots and making a persuasive case that Wilson's role in propping up Russia as an active ally and his acquiesence over the harsh terms meted out to Germany in the Treaty of Versailles guaranteed the ultimate success of Lenin and the Bolshevik Revolution and eventually the unexpected rise to power in Germany of Adolf Hitler and his Nazi party. He also argues that World War II is the unexpected outcome of Wilson's muddled foreign policy, adding more weight to his assessment of Woodrow Wilson as the worst president of the United States in the 20th Century.

However, the greatest weakness in this book is Powell's eagerness in connecting the dots. He notes how Bavarian government officials were too willing to give Adolf Hitler a relative slap on the wrist following his unsuccesful 1923 "beer hall Putsch" in Munich; if he had been given a much stiffer sentence, even Powell notes that Hitler may not have had sufficient time for effectively organizing the Nazis if he had stayed in prison until 1928 and thus fail to play a decisive role in German politics at the start of the Great Depression. I think Powell also glosses over too much the complex relationships which Stalin had with Lenin and the rest of the Old Bolsheviks in the Politburo. Nor does he mention that if the Allies had succeeded in their intervention in Russia following World War I, then perhaps Lenin's reign of terror would have ended prematurely with a "White" victory over the nascent Bolshevik regime.

Powell seems to come from the neo-isolationist wing of the contemporary American conservative movement. He strongly opposes any major role for the United States in world affairs, insisting instead that we should heed finally George Washington's advice that the United States should avoid getting involved in entangling foreign alliances of the kind which made World War I inevitable. I am surprised that Powell has ignored mentioning the Marshall Plan or the successful democratic transformations of both Germany and especially, Japan, into important, loyal allies of the United States. But I suspect that if he had mentioned them, they might prove rather inconvenient in his effort to portray Wilson as one of our most mediocre presidents. Powell notes correctly that World War II ended with millions more imprisoned by totalitarian dictatorships than at the start of the war, but here he misses the point that this war was waged in part to defeat the genocidal regimes led by Hitler and Tojo (If Eisenhower had listened to Patton's advice to advance American troops deeply into Central Europe, then I suspect that the Iron Curtain wouldn't have descended upon as many millions as it did subsequently.). Still, I think Powell has made some interesting arguments which deserve to be heard during current foreign policy debates in Washington, DC and elsewhere.

This book is not the ultimate work of historical scholarship about World War I, but it is an informative and well thought out look at one of the worst presidents in American history and another nail in the coffin of the cult of leadership (see also titles like "Lincoln Unmasked" and "Bully Boy", "The New Dealers War" and "The Bush Betrayal"). This is a welcome contribution to the new wave of popular historical interpretations that are attempting to give balance to a field long dominated by tax-funded, left wing academics who miss no chance to support, justify and glory in expansions of State power without regard to loss of life or econimic cost.

And don't be mislead when post-modernist, welfare statists, like the folks at Publisher's Weekly use the word "isolationist" to describe anything you're thinking of reading. It's mearly a naked attempt to smear any philosophy that would impose limits on the size and scope of government. Non-interventionism is not isolationism!

This is the first book I have ever seen that takes a Critical Stance on Wilson and his actions. Wilson's unknowledgable actions caused (Directly/Indirectly) many events in history, and caused the Most murderous dictators in history to gain power, through exploiting the suffering of their people.
Hitler, Stalin, Lenin, and the people Those 3 Eventually caused, I.E.; Mao Zedong, Pol Pot, Mussolini, Kim Ii Sung, Ho Chi Minh, Castro, etc. So thus through those Indirect ways, Wilson caused the majority of the Suffering throughout the 20th century, yet apparently, He had good intentions, yet he still caused them.
Adolf Hitler, when he reformed the German Workers Party into the NSDAP, and Got Elected Chancellor In 1933, He only was able to get up to that position through Amazing Charisma, Persuasive Decieving, and Sly Illegal Actions (Such as his Attack on Munich in 1925, and Other activities). The German People were suffering so much, through the incredible inflation, (By the 1920's, over 1 Trillin Marks = 1 US Dollar, and Kept on Rising and Falling unpredictably). Hitler often used personal stories of suffering from the people, in order to appeal to the emotions of the German People, and thus make them think voting for him will stop the economic disaster.
In 1917, After Wilson forced The Tzar to stay in the war, The Russian People finally were fed up, and revolted in Feburary 1917. The Provisional Goverment then was trying to use Democratic Principles, But due to the econmic disaster, and Once Wilson was willing to relieve the economic disaster in Russia by loaning money, but only under the condition that the Goverment stay in the War, It was a lose-lose situation for Russia. The Goverment accepted the money, and stayed in the war, which made the Russian People angry again. The Bolshevik Minority, During the class between the other parties, slyly captured several Important Goverment Buildings in Petersberg, and declared themselves the Goverment, in October/November 1917.

The Continued chain of events, all caused by WW1 and then the allies taking revenge after WW1, caused eventually death and suffering on a near unaccountable scale. One could loosely attach almost everything major in post-WW1 Europe and America to WW1. The Cold War, WWII, The Peacetime-Dying of the 1930's, and such.
One must rememeber these events, yet sadly though, these kind of books are almost never accepted by the General public, for they have been educated to love America, or if not to love all of america, at least then they are nearly forced Psychologically to Love FDR, Wilson, and The USA interventions in WW1 and WW2. This sad lying tradition must someday end, and these kind of books, if publicized enough, might just change the tradition a little.

I enjoyed FDR's Folly, and due to a gift certificate I got this book, Wilson's war. I like Powell's iconoclastic look at some venerated icons such as FDR and Wilson, and this book is no different--he clearly thinks that Wilson was a terrible president and was directly responsible for WWII and Hitler. He gives very good reasons for this and buttresses his thesis with extensive references. It's also a great source of information about Hitler and Lenin/Stalin.

I thought that the book was hard to follow in places, and this was mainly because he took the contents by theme rather than chronologically. That's fine, but I kept losing track of names, and had to backtrack to get the information.

Still, it's a fine book, and I highly recommend it.