Most Helpful Customer Reviews
|
|
45 of 45 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A Big Picture History of the Battle of Britain, January 10, 2009
Mr. Korda has made an invaluable contribution to our understanding of the Battle of Britain, the aerial duel between Germany and Britain that, in 1940, captured the attention and imagination of the world. This is big-picture history that places as much emphasis on how each side prepared for the confrontation as on skill and heroism of the battle's participants. And Mr. Korda skillfully tells the tale from both perspectives, giving equal time to the strategy, thought processes, successes and mistakes of both the British and the Germans.
If you are looking for stirring accounts of heated dogfights and stories of swashbuckling airmen who singlehandedly prevented a Nazi invasion of Mother England, then you will be disappointed. On the other hand, if you want to understand how political, technological, logistical and military decisions made during the 1930s affected the outcome of the battle and how the genius and vision of one man, Hugh Dowding, Chief of RAF Fighter Command, set the stage for Britain's triumph, then this book is for you. (You will also be surprised to learn that the infamous "appeasers," Messrs. Baldwin and Chamberlain, actually made important contributions to the outcome of the Battle of Britain by supporting the development of a defensive fighter force, a concept that was looked upon with disfavor by most senior aviation officers in the RAF.)
Mr. Korda weaves a fascinating tale with lucid prose. I can assure you that even if you are well versed in the history of the Battle of Britain, you will learn much from his book. Highly recommended.
|
|
|
15 of 15 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Here's the "Why?" instead of the tacka-tacka-tacka of war, January 22, 2009
It's tough to predict the future, especially because public attitudes and technology keeps changing and thus messing up the facts used to make predictions.
One emphasis of this book is the arguments in the 1930s about the need for fighters or bombers to defend Britain. A massive fleet of heavy bombers was sought by military experts as an aggressive retaliatory force to deter bomber attacks. Politicians who wanted to keep taxes low wanted fighters as cheaper defence against bombers.
Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain won the "cheap" arguments, which is why Britain had a large force of Hurricanes and Spitfires to defend the country in the summer of 1940. Luck? Foresight? Cost conscious wisdom in favour of low taxes? Or simple decency in not building an offensive force? Those issues of "Why?" are still open for debate.
This book deals decisions and personalities of leaders in Britain and Germany, and outlines the almost inevitable reasons that Germany couldn't win a war in the air against an equal opponent. Thus, a cross-channel invasion was impossible. The RAF simply made it unthinkable. Instead, Hitler settled for what he thought he knew best -- a foot soldier's invasion of Russia in the summer of 1941.
This isn't a tacka-tacka-tacka account of aerial warfare; instead, it examines the personalities and decisions that produced the Battle of Britain. There are plenty of books from both sides about the aerial combat; it's one of the few which analyze policy decisions.
After reading it I'm left with two impressions: 1) Hitler was a
bully who backed down if he couldn't terrorize people into submission; and 2) the British are a lot smarter than is ever portrayed in the "peace in our time" of the Munich-and-umbrella scenario.
The book solidifies the image of the German spur-of-the-moment war efforts, as seen in the aerial campaign to capture Crete in the spring of 1941 and later piecemeal reinforcements of the Afrika Krops. Bullies usually don't plan well or far in advance; Korda's book reinforces the image of Hitler as pure bully rather than military genius.
When backed into a corner, bullies become desperate which is why the war was so long and hard; on their own, as seen in the Russian campaign, they waste efforts on non-essential flailing instead of decisive blows. The same failing doomed the German effort in the skies over Britain. In other words, Hitler couldn't have won the war; he was limited to the vision and foresight of a corporal. But, given German ability to produce vast amounts of superb weapons, he did inflict a lot of damage.
Whether or not you share my assessment, it's a superb book and will give every reader due cause to think and re-consider everything they were taught or think they knew about the Battle of Britain. Instead of battles of numbers, miles per hour and other tech specs of equipment, it is a superb account of the personalities who won and those who were fated to lose.
(One further point: For anyone wanting a beautiful film of the Battle of Britain, get the superb 1969 'Battle of Britain' DVD with lots of tacka-tacka-tacka action and Spitfires and Hurricanes plus dozens of Rolls-Royce powered re-painted made-in-Spain Me-109s and He - 111s -- it's available from Amazon.com. It's simply the best 'Battle of Britain' film.)
|
|
|
21 of 24 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Masterful synthesis, January 14, 2009
Michael Korda's history of The Battle of Britain is a masterful synthesis of the myriad factors that constituted what was arguably the seminal military battle in the history of Western Civilization. He weaves together the technical and strategic aspects of the battle along with the personalities who directed it in a way that will give newcomers to this slice of the history of World War II a gripping and compelling view from 25,000 feet. He even breaks new ground by suggesting that the "appeasers" within the British government were at least responsible approving many of the technological and material innovations which aided Britain in its "finest hour". He quite rightly places Dowding as the man who should be most credited (along with Keith Park) with the success the RAF enjoyed during the Battle of Britain. And, refreshingly, Korda reinforces the idea that Dowding's dismissal from the head of Fighter Command was--in large part--due to the failure of Britain's night fighter defenses rather than the contraversy over "Big Wings" or other factors. Korda is perhaps on less solid ground when he suggests that Winston Churchill harbored a grudge against Dowding for standing up to him when the Prime Minister was seeking to send additional squadrons during the Battle of France. It is the view of this reviewer that Churchill supported Dowding to the hilt during the Battle of Britain itself and that Dowding's downfall was only a question of time given his strained relationship with the RAF hierarchy.
However, for those BoB enthusiasts who have perhaps read Wood and Dempster's "The Narrow Margin", Korda's book will not be as satisfying. It barely skims the surface of what the battle was like for "the few", although Korda does pay homage to Geoffrey Wellum's masterpiece "First Light" which, along with Pierre Clostermann's "The Big Show", is certainly one of the best--and most recent--first-hand accounts of what it meant to be strapped into the cockpit of a Spitfire and hurling oneself into aerial battles against attackers who outnumbered the defenders in many instances almost 10:1.
For those who want to read the most definitive work on The Battle of Britain, I would recommend highly Stephen Bungay's "The Most Dangerous Enemy"The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain. Bungay's work treats both the political and personal elements of the battle in a way that is deeply satisfying to the serious student of this phase of WWII.
|
|
|
Most Recent Customer Reviews
|