Customer Reviews

With Wings Like Eagles: A History of the Battle of Britain

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Mr. Korda has made an invaluable contribution to our understanding of the Battle of Britain, the aerial duel between Germany and Britain that, in 1940, captured the attention and imagination of the world. This is big-picture history that places as much emphasis on how each side prepared for the confrontation as on skill and heroism of the battle's participants. And Mr. Korda skillfully tells the tale from both perspectives, giving equal time to the strategy, thought processes, successes and mistakes of both the British and the Germans.

If you are looking for stirring accounts of heated dogfights and stories of swashbuckling airmen who singlehandedly prevented a Nazi invasion of Mother England, then you will be disappointed. On the other hand, if you want to understand how political, technological, logistical and military decisions made during the 1930s affected the outcome of the battle and how the genius and vision of one man, Hugh Dowding, Chief of RAF Fighter Command, set the stage for Britain's triumph, then this book is for you. (You will also be surprised to learn that the infamous "appeasers," Messrs. Baldwin and Chamberlain, actually made important contributions to the outcome of the Battle of Britain by supporting the development of a defensive fighter force, a concept that was looked upon with disfavor by most senior aviation officers in the RAF.)

Mr. Korda weaves a fascinating tale with lucid prose. I can assure you that even if you are well versed in the history of the Battle of Britain, you will learn much from his book. Highly recommended.

It's tough to predict the future, especially because public attitudes and technology keeps changing and thus messing up the facts used to make predictions.

One emphasis of this book is the arguments in the 1930s about the need for fighters or bombers to defend Britain. A massive fleet of heavy bombers was sought by military experts as an aggressive retaliatory force to deter bomber attacks. Politicians who wanted to keep taxes low wanted fighters as cheaper defence against bombers.

Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain won the "cheap" arguments, which is why Britain had a large force of Hurricanes and Spitfires to defend the country in the summer of 1940. Luck? Foresight? Cost conscious wisdom in favour of low taxes? Or simple decency in not building an offensive force? Those issues of "Why?" are still open for debate.

This book deals decisions and personalities of leaders in Britain and Germany, and outlines the almost inevitable reasons that Germany couldn't win a war in the air against an equal opponent. Thus, a cross-channel invasion was impossible. The RAF simply made it unthinkable. Instead, Hitler settled for what he thought he knew best -- a foot soldier's invasion of Russia in the summer of 1941.

This isn't a tacka-tacka-tacka account of aerial warfare; instead, it examines the personalities and decisions that produced the Battle of Britain. There are plenty of books from both sides about the aerial combat; it's one of the few which analyze policy decisions.

After reading it I'm left with two impressions: 1) Hitler was a
bully who backed down if he couldn't terrorize people into submission; and 2) the British are a lot smarter than is ever portrayed in the "peace in our time" of the Munich-and-umbrella scenario.

The book solidifies the image of the German spur-of-the-moment war efforts, as seen in the aerial campaign to capture Crete in the spring of 1941 and later piecemeal reinforcements of the Afrika Krops. Bullies usually don't plan well or far in advance; Korda's book reinforces the image of Hitler as pure bully rather than military genius.

When backed into a corner, bullies become desperate which is why the war was so long and hard; on their own, as seen in the Russian campaign, they waste efforts on non-essential flailing instead of decisive blows. The same failing doomed the German effort in the skies over Britain. In other words, Hitler couldn't have won the war; he was limited to the vision and foresight of a corporal. But, given German ability to produce vast amounts of superb weapons, he did inflict a lot of damage.

Whether or not you share my assessment, it's a superb book and will give every reader due cause to think and re-consider everything they were taught or think they knew about the Battle of Britain. Instead of battles of numbers, miles per hour and other tech specs of equipment, it is a superb account of the personalities who won and those who were fated to lose.

(One further point: For anyone wanting a beautiful film of the Battle of Britain, get the superb 1969 'Battle of Britain' DVD with lots of tacka-tacka-tacka action and Spitfires and Hurricanes plus dozens of Rolls-Royce powered re-painted made-in-Spain Me-109s and He - 111s -- it's available from Amazon.com. It's simply the best 'Battle of Britain' film.)

Michael Korda's history of The Battle of Britain is a masterful synthesis of the myriad factors that constituted what was arguably the seminal military battle in the history of Western Civilization. He weaves together the technical and strategic aspects of the battle along with the personalities who directed it in a way that will give newcomers to this slice of the history of World War II a gripping and compelling view from 25,000 feet. He even breaks new ground by suggesting that the "appeasers" within the British government were at least responsible approving many of the technological and material innovations which aided Britain in its "finest hour". He quite rightly places Dowding as the man who should be most credited (along with Keith Park) with the success the RAF enjoyed during the Battle of Britain. And, refreshingly, Korda reinforces the idea that Dowding's dismissal from the head of Fighter Command was--in large part--due to the failure of Britain's night fighter defenses rather than the contraversy over "Big Wings" or other factors. Korda is perhaps on less solid ground when he suggests that Winston Churchill harbored a grudge against Dowding for standing up to him when the Prime Minister was seeking to send additional squadrons during the Battle of France. It is the view of this reviewer that Churchill supported Dowding to the hilt during the Battle of Britain itself and that Dowding's downfall was only a question of time given his strained relationship with the RAF hierarchy.

However, for those BoB enthusiasts who have perhaps read Wood and Dempster's "The Narrow Margin", Korda's book will not be as satisfying. It barely skims the surface of what the battle was like for "the few", although Korda does pay homage to Geoffrey Wellum's masterpiece "First Light" which, along with Pierre Clostermann's "The Big Show", is certainly one of the best--and most recent--first-hand accounts of what it meant to be strapped into the cockpit of a Spitfire and hurling oneself into aerial battles against attackers who outnumbered the defenders in many instances almost 10:1.

For those who want to read the most definitive work on The Battle of Britain, I would recommend highly Stephen Bungay's "The Most Dangerous Enemy"The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain. Bungay's work treats both the political and personal elements of the battle in a way that is deeply satisfying to the serious student of this phase of WWII.

This is an easy-to-read short history of the Battle of Britain that focuses in on tactics and strategies of the RAF vs the Luftwaffe and in particular on the role of the feisty, controversial Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Downing, who seems not to have gotten the credit he was due in other histories, official and otherwise. But while Downing's constant strife with everyone from his subordinates and superiors to Winston Churchill would make a good bio of the Air Chief Marshall, whose policies turned out to be mostly correct, far too many pages are spent on these backroom brawls and not enough on the actual fighting of the men involved. There is very, very little action in the sky here and, after a long build-up to the first forays into the skies and a detailed day-by-day narrative of the ongoing battle, the book hardly touches on the raids on London itself, and the humanity of the story does not register as it should. Nevertheless, Korda has revealed the machinations behind the machines but not very much about the men on both sides who had to fight those battles.

I will not add to the many good reviews of this account of the great air battle; all the positive reviews are well deserved. But I made the mistake of buying the ebook version, which sells for only a little less than the printed book. DO NOT BUY THE eBOOK! There is not one single photo included. Not one. The print book has dozens of photos. Instead, at the end there is an odd collection of disjointed text, like captions, one per page. I suspect that these may be the photo captions. This is a disgrace, an outrage to perpetrate on a fine book. eBooks and the Kindle, may be the rage, according to Amazon at least, but non-fiction ebooks are far too high priced, often just a few dollars less than the real printed book. So, if you want to read this book, BUY THE PRINT BOOK. I will be doing that, from now on, for all non-fiction.

As a young boy growing up in England and watching the Battle Of Britain standing in the street and later in life in the Royal Air Force as an engine mechanic on the Mosquito that had two Rolls Royce Merlin engines this book brought back a lot of memories. It is so close to the fact as I can remember and some that I was not aware of. A great read.

If you're interested in WWII history then you should definitely read this excellent book. I don't usually write book reviews so I'll make this short. Just when you think everything has been written about a particular topic in history, someone will come up with new insights. Michael Korda is a historian and long-time book editor who writes like a professional and knows very well about the details of the Royal Air Force's Fighter Command and its role in protecting Britain from the onslaught of Nazi Germany, in the very early days of what would become World War II. It begins and ends with the story of Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowling who was eventually given his rightful place as the builder and protector of Fighter Command and a proponent of the tactics that would eventually save the nation. Dowling, who overcame great odds going against bureaucrats, eventually succumbed to the intense political infighting and was dumped by Winston Churchill in 1942.

"With Wings Like Eagles" is also the story of how nascent technology changed everything. The information gathered through the early radio directional system (which is basically a radar) and the methods used to disseminate it gave the RAF a distinct edge against Hermann Goering's Luftwaffe. Korda also describes the new airplanes that were developed to fight the battles. The Germans also had some of the most advanced airplanes ever seen at the time which is very fascinating. Korda was in the RAF in the 1950s and was involved in some of the stories of these heroes on both sides and from around the world. The bulk of the book is about the few from Winston Churchill's famous epitaphic "Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few". I'm not really a tech head or a military expert so some of the more technical stuff was abit confusing, but the way the book was written made it more easier to understand and there were alot of fascinating stuff.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding led Fighter Command to victory, but it wasn't easy. He not only had to put Spitfires and Hurricanes into the air to attack fleets of Luftwaffe planes, he had to stave off old enemies in the Air Ministry and critics within his command. Before the war, Dowding put together an early-warning system with radar buried phone lines, spotters and central command to get the word quickly and accurately to the fighter squadrons. He also husbanded his resources, preventing Prime Minister Winston Churchill from sending more fighters to a losing cause in France, and keeping reserves during the battle itself. "With Wings Like Eagles" is a worthy addition to your library especially if you like WWII history like myself, the book also reminds me of that Iron Maiden song ;-).

Instead of repeating other reviewers, I focus mostly on seldom-mentioned information. Strengths of this book include its descriptions of the secret re-arming of Germany and the founding of the Luftwaffe, the question of whether or not the barges prepared for the invasion of England were part of a genuine invasion plan (or merely a bluff), and related political issues. A history of radar is provided. The Luftwaffe is described as better than the RAF in terms of the recovery of pilots who had parachuted into the water. The tale about eating carrots improving vision was invented as a cover for the existence and use of a small radar in the British planes. (p. 238).

The reader may be surprised to learn that a shortage of British planes was never an issue for most of the battle: A shortage of trained pilots was the key concern. (p. 210, 251). Mention is made of foreign pilots, notably the 141 Poles. (p. 144). Unfortunately, however, Korda fails to "connect the dots". It was the Polish pilots who scored a very disproportionate number of kills, at very disproportionately low losses, and Sir Hugh Dowding acknowledged the fact that, without the acts of the Polish pilots, he was unsure if the outcome of the Battle of Britain would have been the same. Please click on 303 Squadron: The Legendary Battle of Britain Fighter Squadron, and read the Peczkis review.

The author makes some false and dubious statements. He repeats the myth of the Polish Air Force getting destroyed on the ground on the first day of the 1939 war. (p. 75). He states that the fact that Germany and Japan could not be bombed into submission proves that there was no chance that the blitz could have forced England to quit the war. This is a non-sequitur. The German and Japanese mindsets instilled social conformity, and blind obedience to authority, much more than the English mindset. For various other reasons, the English people were much freer to complain than their German and Japanese counterparts, and the English government was much more receptive to popular criticism than the German and Japanese governments. Besides, it would've been easier for Britain to quit the war in 1940 than for Germany and Japan to do the same in the later 1940's because of Britain's relatively low-level investment in the war up to that time. In fact, 1940 was the time of the sitzkrieg, or sitting war, during which a German-British truce was a serious possibility.

Finally, Korda asserts that Japan could not be bombed into submission, as proved by the need for the atomic bombings to bring her to her knees. (p. 269). Other commentators have argued just the opposite: That the atomic bombings were unnecessary because Japan was already on the verge of surrender--in large part due to the nonstop B-29 carpet bombings of Japanese cities.

With Wings like Eagles by Michael Korda is a thoughtful look at what is arguable one of the greatest air battles in history - the Battle of Britain. Every time I think that there simply cannot be anything else written about this particular battle, I am taken back by the fact that every few years someone comes out with a new look, with a little different slant on things. Some of these books are great, some not so great and some are absolutely horrid. This work by Korda falls into the first category.

This account of The Battle of Britain is not one of those "shoot-em-up bang, bang books" filled with the personal narratives and recollections of the pilots who took part in this battle; rather it is an overall view of the battle and the sequence of events, really starting before the fall of France and the evacuation at Dunkirk. This work concentrates more on the planning, preparation and mechanics of the battle than some past offerings by others, and it certainly does a wonderful job of examining and assessing the tremendous egos of the leaders of all countries involved (England, Germany and France, along with the supporting cast). I found the account of infighting on the British General Staff and German High Command as fascinating as the actually physical battle and it certainly was just a viscious at times.

There are always reasons for everything, and the result of this battle certainly had many factors at play, some planned, some purely opportunistic and then there was the sheer luck involved. The author has given fare nods to all. This work takes a close look at the battle from both the British and the German perspective and has done quite a nice job of it. Now I cannot make the claim as some that "this is a well researched book," as I simply do not know if it was or was not. I will say that what I read pretty well agrees with the many other accounts of the battle, and as far as I could tell the time line was quite accurate. When the author speculates, he goes to great pains in pointing this fact out. What I am trying to say is that I am far from an expert on this particular battle, but from what I do know of it (which is actually quite a lot for a pure armature reader of history) all seemed to be in order. I am quite sure that someone who has a more extensive background in this area could probably nit-pick the book to death...but to what ends?

The author does give us some food for thought in this work. The primary aspect of this battle is one that I had never considered. It is the author's opinion that the appeasers, Chamberlain being the top dog in this pack, actually helped England in some rather unexpected ways. The author speculates had not these men gone through their appeasement process, England never would have had the time to ready themselves for a battle which was absolutely inevitable in one form or another. Now whether this was done on purpose (a fact I doubt), or whether it was foresight on the part of Chamberlain (another fact I doubt) or if it was completely blind luck (which is my opinion), is indeed pure speculation.

This book of course strongly features Churchill, and rightfully so, but also includes the thoughts and actions of Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, the real architect of the English victory, and that of his opposite Goring. We also get an insightful look at the developers of the weapon platforms used; Williy Messerschmitt, R.J. Mitchell, Sidney Cam and the rest of the engineers involved. The author discusses the old argument that "the bomber will always get through' verses the tactical and strategically use of the fighter type aircraft. This was of course the central augment of the time and the author has addressed this at length.

It is also gratifying to read an author who points out the fact that times were changing and that the ineptitude shown by both the British and German high commands during the First World War were starting to change somewhat even though many were still caught up in the entire Old World social class thing. Many of the fighters, junior officers and NCOs where from solid middle class stock, practical and well grounded, as well as educated, rather than the rather effete, and frankly completely drained upper class who, by this time, thanks to the First World War, were almost completly drained of most of their vitality and certainly intellegence.

This is a good solid piece of popular history and is a very welcome addition to my library. It is well written and quite easy to follow. I do recommend it highly for those that have an interest in this area and do recommend it for those who want a nice, not too technical account of one of the more important battles in our time.

Don Blankenship
The Ozarks

This is less a "history of the Battle of Britain" than a briefing on the major figures and developments of a time when Winston Churchill suggested in the House of Commons on August 20, 1940, that, "Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few." It was also Churchill who had said the previous June, also in the House of Commons, "The Battle of France is over. I expect the Battle of Britain is about to begin...." And just to complete proper attribution, the title of Michael Korda's book was suggested by this passage from the Book of Isaiah (40:31): "They shall mount up with wings like eagles; they shall run, and not be weary; and they shall walk, and not faint."

As for the key figures, Prime Minister Churchill of course but Korda's primary focus is on Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding, the leader of RAF Fighter Command and his own "team or rivals," Commanders Trafford Leigh-Mallory, Keith Park, C. J. Quintin Brand, and Richard Saul. Juxtaposed to Churchill was Adolph Hitler but Korda's primary focus is on Hermann Göring and several General Field Marshals who included Albert Kesselring, Hugo Sperrle, and Hans-Jürgen Stumpff. Over a relatively brief period of time (from July 10 until October 31 in 1940), the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) attempted to gain air superiority over the Royal Air Force (RAF), especially its Fighter Command, and hopefully force a surrender without having to invade Great Britain. Without air superiority, such an invasion (codenamed "Operation Sea Lion") would not have succeeded and Hitler knew it.

In this book, Korda explains what the RAF's "Dowding System" was, how it operated, and why effective execution of it eventually defeated the Luftwaffe. Of special interest to me is its architect, Dowding, whose total confidence in and commitment to the strategies he devised were vindicated by heroism of those who flew the Spitfires and Hurricanes against what at first seemed vastly superior forces. Although no doubt well-aware of the doubts about his competence and efforts to oppose (if not replace him) him, he persevered. In the final chapter, Korda says this about Dowding's relationship with the Air Ministry: "In the circumstances, it took no great effort to float the suggestion in high quarters that Dowding was too old for the job and out of touch with the latest technology, not to speak of being tired, stubborn, difficult, and hostile to new ideas... He had been put on notice in August, at the height of the battle, [prior to the day, September 15, when - for all intents and purposes - the invasion was denied] that his retirement date had been postponed to November, and this time was not extended." After leading the Fighter Command to "the greatest and most crucial air battle of history to date," Dowding retired, "having been informed rather abruptly that there was no further post available for an officer of his seniority. Korda correctly suggests that special praise must also be given to others, inspired by Churchill's leadership and the courage of the fighter pilots, and while under almost constant attack, who maintained the early-warning communication systems, kept the fighter planes in the air, and provided critically important support in countless other ways. Moreover, they did so with severely limited resources but with sufficient faith, hope, and courage.

As suggested earlier, this is not a history of the Battle of (and for) Britain but what it does offer is a rigorous and remarkably comprehensive briefing (or "overview," if you will) of an intense 82-day period well before the United States became involved in what became World War Two. Virtually alone and certain that a massive and decisive invasion was imminent, Britain needed more than a prime minister's determination to "never, never, never, never give up." The imperiled nation also needed a prophet. Almost alone, Dowding had prophesied, correctly, the form of air warfare would take; and almost without help, he had invented the means with which to defend Britain against attack from the air, right down to the smallest item. Not only did he prophesy the nature of the attack; he prophesied the kind of tools that would be needed to defeat it - radar, the single-engine monoplane fighter, the centralized operations room - and by a miracle of vision and obstinacy manager to put it all in place by 1940, just when it was needed. Few prophets have ever had a clearer picture of what was to come - or what to do about it."

Those who share my high regard for this book are urged to check out a film, Battle of Britain, that was released in 1969 and directed by Guy Hamilton. It is based on Derek Wood's book, Narrow Margin: The Battle of Britain and the Rise of Air Power 1930-1949. The role of Air Chief Marshall Dowding is brilliantly portrayed plated by Sir Laurence Olivier.