Customer Reviews

Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo

5 star:		(2)
4 star:		(1)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(2)
1 star:		(1)

 

 

There are 724 footnotes in this book, of which 720 seem to be for English-language sources, mostly American. And the trust in American sources is complete. For example: there's a section on the Racak massacre, with no mention that some French and German papers have cast doubts on the evidence, only a 200-word quote from American observer William Walker. For example: the famous appendix to the Rambouillet accord (granting NATO troops the right to bivouac and billet and make use of any facility anywhere in Yugoslavia) was just boilerplate that would have been deleted on request -- and the backup for this revelation is interviews with an American general and an American envoy. Why didn't they ask Yugoslavs too?

Serb criminals and crimes get full coverage along with epithets like "murderous" or "cowardly" or "atavistic". But nothing on killings of Serbs before the war, and nothing in the text about the Belgrade TV station slaughter, or the cluster bombs that hit the Nis marketplace (though that's in one of the appendixes). As for the Chinese embassy attack, it was obviously inadvertent because there was no sensible reason for it. Thus irrationality connected to Serbs proves they're murderers, while irrationality connected to Americans proves they're innocent.

I found no errors in fact, and I don't expect some balanced presentation of non-American views. But a book that doesn't even note the other views, and excises facts which don't fit with the presentation of the American view, has no value except to those who want to believe that NATO was right. Others will prefer Judah's "Kosovo: War and Revenge" (which at least checked multiple sources), and Parenti's "To Kill a Nation". Or at the extreme there's Noam Chomsky's "The New Military Humanism" which is filled with anti-NATO bias ... about enough to balance the pro-NATO bias in "Winning Ugly".

Newt Gingrich is right when he praises this book, and the international reviewers that give it 1-3 stars are also right when they point out that it is seriously incomplete and arguing from a very American point of view.

In my view, this book is essential reading together with the following four books, all of which I have favorably reviewed here at Amazon: first, Kristan Wheaton, The Warning Solution: Intelligent Analysis in the Age of Information Overload, Cees Wiebes, Intelligence and the War in Bosnia: 1992-1995 (Perspectives on Intelligence History), Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat, and Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime These four books cover what this book does not: 1) a full explanation of why "inconvenient warning" fails time and again; 2) a full explanation of the complete inadequacy of Western intelligence in relation to historical, cultural, and current indigenous intelligence as well as small arms interdiction in lower-tier unstable regions; 3) a useful itemization of the weaknesses of both NATO and the US military in responding to unconventional challenges in tough terrain distant from the center of Europe; and 4) how "supreme command" is most often exercised without regard to intelligence.

Having said that, let me enumerate what I regard as the very positive features of this book, one that makes it central to the discussion of NATO, Air Power, and US politics as they affect "engagement."

First, the authors are to be commended for graciously but no less effectively nailing the Clinton Administration, and especially Sandy Berger, Madeline Albright, and William Cohen, for inattention and indecisiveness and a complete lack of any coherent sustainable strategy.

Second, although the author's do not stress this point beyond highlighting it in the opening sentence of the book, it comes across as a continuing theme: the entire conflict could have been resolved early on had the NATO allies had a capability to deal with *one man*, that is, Milosevic.

Third, the authors note clearly (on page 10) how there were many non-violent precursors to the violence and ensued, and that the Albanians finally concluded that only violence would get them international attention. This is a major theme within Jonathan Schell's utterly brilliant and comprehensive book, "The Unconquerable World" and one that any future Director of Central Intelligence must be held accountable for: warning in the *non-violent* stage.

Fourth, the author's, who between them have considerable expertise in defense analysis, indict the Clinton Administration for over-selling the peace negotiation efforts of Ambassador Holbrook, and the very bad campaign planning of General Clark.

Fifth, the author's document the pattern of Madame Secretary Albright, whose own book I recently reviewed along these lines, of rhetoric rather than reality--or words rather than actions with consequences. NATO bluffed while Madeline talked. Milosevic, no fool, understood all this. Albright is, however, credited with understanding that ultimately force would be needed to achieve the policy objectives.

Sixth, and this is something I learned the hard way in El Salvador, the author's very correctly make the point that such conflicts cannot be controlled with pressure on only one of the belligerents. *Both* parties to the conflict must be challenged and contained.

Seventh, the author's are helpful in pointing out that the Administration erred in failing to consider partition and independence as an option for the conflicted parties, and they emphasize that one must never under-estimate the will of any one party to achieve independence.

Eighth, and on the head of the Republicans we place this one, the authors point out that the impeachment proceedings against Bill Clinton because of his personal relations with Monica Lewinsky severely distracted and handicapped the Administration. Indeed, I recall that in all our Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) reports at the time, we had to modify all of our search strategies to include "and not Monica", so over-whelming was the trash that would come up on Bosnia and other places we were looking at, all "hits" corrupted unless we excluded the Monica factor from US foreign policy. The lesson we take from this is that impeachment, especially frivolous impeachment, has major national security consequences, and is not merely a matter for domestic consumption or impact assessment.

The book is flawed, but not grievously, for failing to have any serious treatment of intelligence. There are just four over-lapping references to CIA, and to intelligence reports, in the entire book. In as much as this book is up to the norm for beltway policy books, we conclude that until such books have the deeper coverage and understanding of intelligence shortfalls as a matter of routine, intelligence and policy in Washington DC will continue to co-exist without reform and with a deliberate choice being made by policy experts to ignore intelligence and what intelligence, properly done, can bring to the process of peacemaking.

The author's final policy recommendation merit listing, and their elaboration is a highlight of the book:
1) Interventions should occur as early as possible
2) Coercive diplomacy requires a credible threat of force
3) When force is used, military means must relate to political ends
4) Airpower alone usually cannot stop the killing in civil wars
5) The Powell Doctrine for the use of force remains valid
6) Humanitarian interventions need realistic goals
7) Exit strategies are desirable but not always essential
8) Other countries need better, more deployable militaries
9) UN authorization for intervention is highly desirable, even if it is not required
10) Russia's support is valuable in these types of operations
11) NATO works well in peace and in war but only if US leads
12) An effective foreign policy requires that the president lead with confidence.
13) The US is not a hyperpower, but rather a superpower prone to *underachievement* instead of imperial ambition (this was pre-Bush and pre-neocon)

This book stands as the core reference on NATO and Kosovo, and as one of the more helpful references on principles of intervention and foreign policy that all future presidents and their staff can learn from.

Other more recent books I recommend, with reviews:
The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People
The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (The American Empire Project)
Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy
Breaking the Real Axis of Evil: How to Oust the World's Last Dictators by 2025
Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik
War Is a Racket: The Anti-War Classic by America's Most Decorated General, Two Other Anti=Interventionist Tracts, and Photographs from the Horror of It

Daalder and O'Hanlon make the claim that the 1999 NATO air campaign against Milosevic's Serbia was a good thing, since it stopped the ethnic cleansing and left everyone in Kosovo better off than they would have been without NATO's military intervention.

Viewed through the lens of subsequent headlines, this argument becomes hard to support. The ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians by Serbs has ceased, to be replaced by similar outrages against Serbs by Kosovars. Net improvement? Nil.

Was the Kosovo air campaign justifiable as a fire-break against further bloodshed in the Balkans? The citizens of Macedonia would demur, I'm afraid.

It is hard to escape the impression that the Kosovo campaign was not only the last of the Wars for Greater Serbia, a point Daalder and O'Hanlon dance around in their conclusions, but also the first of the Wars for Greater Albania -- a point the authors utterly fail to address.

One is ultimately left with the conclusion that the authors have done a very good job of researching and arguing the wrong thesis.

The book is exhaustive in the diplomatic minutia involving the events leading up to and during the bombing campaign. It gives the reader a glimpse at the agonizing quibbling that takes part in diplomatic efforts of a difficult matter, almost Sysiphusian. The authors are also caustic in the blunders committed by the allies prior to the bombing campaign.

Where the book is faulty is in three areas. (1) It focuses its main analysis on the American side of diplomacy and politics; in a way, it is defensible since the United States was the main player in ending the genocide in Kosovo. And, although they do report diplomatic/political actions by the Europeans powers, it is not enough (although, quite frankly, I don't think that I could have handled even more quibbling). (2) The book was written shortly after the grisly holocaust in Bosnia, of which the Serbs were primarily responsible, and memories would have been fresh for the reader. Not so now. That event should have been reviewed in the beginning of the book because Milosevic's murderous reputation influenced the subsequent events vis a vis Kosovo. (I personally have a theory that Milosevic, seeing the downfall of the Communist rulers in Eastern Europe decided that the only way to retain power was to exploit the ethnic hatreds that are always present in the Balkans and so that he engineered well publicized, though fake, attacks on Serbs followed by retaliation by Serbs on others, thereby creating a chain reaction.) (3) Granted the fact of Serbian atrocities on Albanians, the book fails to adequately shine a light on the atrocities committed by the Albanian KLA atrocities on Serbian civilians. Like in Northern Ireland where the extremists on both sides refuse to engage each other and instead commit crimes on innocent civilians, in Kosovo (and Bosnia earlier)you had the Serb and Albanian civilians being victimized by the vicious elements within each ethnic group.

This is a serious and worthwhile study which analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of American leadership and the NATO system in its first offensive war. It is particularly useful to read this book after Kaplan's The Coming Anarchy (also reviewed). Kaplan makes clear there will be a lot more destruction of humanity that will require American leadership and the use of force. Daalder and O'Hanlon make clear that we have a lot to learn if we are going to engage in campaigns like Kosovo.

Anyone who plans to advise the next Administration would be well served by reading these two books together and pondering their implications for improving American decision making and coalition leadership skills in the context of interventions in dangerous places. The clearest points in this book are Daalder and O'Hanlon's judgments that this was the right war, it was ultimately a success, airpower had a powerful but limited influence and without the threat of a land campaign and the Russian abandonment of Milosevic. In their view, airpower by itself would have failed, and that the United States has to lead for these interventions to work and the Clinton Administration consistently failed to lead the public, the Congress or our allies and because of the Clinton's Administrations prior vacillation on Saddam Hussein (loud threats, tiny attacks that ended quickly without coercing Saddam). The confused posturing of the Clinton Administration actually increased the likelihood that force would have to be used because Milosevic had no reason to believe they would actually fight to the end. Once NATO had consolidated its position and the Administration had launched the gamble of forceful coercion Daalder and O'Hanlon give Clinton and the allies high marks for realizing that NATO had to win or cease to be relevant and they stepped up to the challenge. Their critique of the Clinton Administration is decisive and thorough: "Having failed to make a public case for the use of force, the Clinton administration opted for a minimalist strategy. Its hope was that a bit of bombing would work. This was the military equivalent of the 'Hail Mary' play in football. Not only was this an irresponsible way to go to war, it also was unnecessary. A case for decisive military action-at a minimum, a robust air campaign from the war's outset--could have been made. The American public would probably have supported such a strategy given its disdain for Milosevic and memories of the Bosnian war. The tragedy of this case is that, in fearing the absence of public and congressional support, the administration embarked on the use of force lacking both. That is no basis for taking the tremendous risks that the use of force necessarily implies." (pages 224-225). This is a book worth studying and thinking about.

This book's ultimate value for future historians, I predict, will be as a guide to source documents. Its analyses are already dated and rendered anachronistic by "facts" on the ground.

Illustrative of most everything that is wrong with fact-thick, morally vacant analysis, the forest of footnotes and obsession with the minutiae of diplomacy remind one of those thick studies of the Congress of Vienna (which settled Europe for a half-century after Napoleon's defeat & exile) from the 19th century. The pro-Clinton bias is also evident despite a superficial attempt as "balance." Much analytic acrobatics is performed to portray the Clinton administation and the ineffectiveness of NATO (and the cowardice of French and German leaders is almost entirely overlooked).

The authors also miss one of the central points proved so recently: war by committee, in Beltway speak, "multilaterialism", will always fail, especially when it is coupled with an Administration which plans its actions on the basis of polls and an obsession with a tainted legacy.

Nor is William Jefferson Clinton properly criticized for enganging in an adulterous affair and then committing perjury and half dozen other felonies in an attempt to hide his illicit affair. Instead some reviewers bring to task those who held Clinton accountable for his multiple crimes involving the Lewinsky affair (a Federal judge did hold him in contempt and publically label him a perjurer).

Other reviewers laughably attempt to blame Clinton and his Administration's base incompetence upon what they partisanlly call a "frivolous impeachment" (Richard Nixon faced impeachment over the VERY SAME CRIMES! Perjury, subornation of perjury, conspiracy...yet apparently when a Liberal-left Democrat commits these crimes, in the minds of some, they aren't crimes at all; after all, the Watergate burglary was, according to one of its primary perpetrators, carried out to find proof of John Dean's wife's past as a call girl; oh well, since it involved sex, it can't be a big deal).

To blame the Republican House for doing its Constitutional duty (while congratulating the Senate on failing to do its duty) and impeaching a President who brazenly committed crimes involving the abuse of his official position is breathtaking in its supercillious desperation.

This book also demonstrates why history should not be written until a significant amount of time has passed (at least ten, more profitably at least twenty or twenty-five years): lack of perspective. In the haze and smoke of recently concluded battle, any analysis is bound to be deeply flawed--as this one is.

Time must be allowed to past, scholar must be given time to digest the facts and the primary sources. Above all, time must intervene so that the actions of the immediate past (just a few years ago) can be judged in light of the lasting consequences (and results or failure) on the ground.

Even today, while it is obviously that earlier, forceful intevention, instead of the usual futzing around with the UN and NATO, bodies designed to delay action not facilitate it, no one can seriously say what the ultimate outcome of NATO's intervention or the horrors of the Milosevic/Mladic push for a Greater Serbia empire in the Balkans will be. The claims about a push for a Greater Albania are little more than Serbophilic nonsense given the economically prostrate state of Albania (as close to a "failed" state as one can get without actually being one) and the non-existence of an Albanian military. The Macedonian Army, for example, was well on its way to crushing the Albanian terrorists when the Clinton-Albright intervention halted the police action against what were an ill-equipped, poorly led band of rag-tag terrorists. (And the idea that FYROM should have to given into Albanian demands of autonomy and lingusitic equality are quite ridiculous when juxtaposed with France's long-time refusal to grant similar rights to the Bretons, Basques and other minorities; likewise with the Spanish gov'ts similar policy toward the Catalans and their own Basques; sauce for the goose is NOT apparently sauce for the gander, a point the book completely ignores).

Just as the notorious Bomb Damage Assessment of the strategic bombing of Germany during World War 2, conducted in the immediate aftermath by the US military, led to seriously flawed conclusions that distorted military policy makers appreciation for the very significant role such bombing played in destroying Nazi Germany's ability to fight, this book too will most likely be shown to contain short-comings not yet recognized.

The "instant-book" phenomenon is not, like so much else, a product of the 24-hour, internet-wired world, but one that goes back to at least World War 2 when a slew of books came out in 1940 and 1941 by, especially, journalists purporting to provide an "inside view" of Hitler's Germany. Few of these books have much value at today because their immediacy to the events they examine and the author's consequent lack of access to critical information (especially information concealed by totalitarian and or criminal regimes)render them useless.

This book should be read, if for no other reason, as a clarion call to scholars and historians to avoid the "instant" analysis bug. Time matures and improves human beings. The same is true of historiography.

The impulse to influence future historians--as well as reap quick profits from the topical immediacy of the subject matter seems as irresistable now as it was seven decades ago.

The phenomenon still continues today during the Liberation of Iraq and the democracy aborning. The vast majority of books like this will be consigned to the "dustbin of history". If they have any staying power is usually negative: cementing one political factions version of events that helps only to muddy the waters for later, more detached and impartial analyses in the decades to come. I.e. converting one political factions biases into received wisdom which only hampers serious history.

A book of straight reportage would have been far more helpful than a thick tome cluttered with stiff, wonky prose and politically influenced goals (however superficially impartial the authors attempt to be).

Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon are to be commended for their brilliant analysis of the issues and personalities that resulted in the are war in Kosovo. They have thoroughly researched the materials and provide a relatively objective assessment of the political dynamics surrounding NATO's first major combat operations. Unfortunately, brilliant minds often overlook simple facts. ALLIED FORCE, the air war over the Balkans, was not NATO's first combat operation, DELIBERATE FORCE, several years earlier, was. That point aside, The authors are to be commended for the wealth of first hand accounts they obtained to produce such a solid work. Of particular note are their policy implications ... a must read section of the book for anyone who thinks that we have wrestled with all the pol-mil nuances of the post-cold war world. Bravo gentlemen!