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Wittgenstein (Great Philosophers)

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Hacker's introduction to the later philosophy of Wittgenstein is a very brief but suprisingly in-depth discussion of the central issues. Most of the little book is dedicated to Wittgenstein's remarks concerning the philosophy of psychology but the opening section on Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy is enjoyeable to read. The book is a great introduction for readers new to Wittgenstein - both in content and style - but is equally valuable for the reader who is familiar with, and has a lasting interest in, Wittgenstein. The book acts as a series of reminders of some central themes. For those with a deep interest in Wittgenstein you may want to carry this little book around in your back pocket so as not to forget the path to clear thinking.

Wittgenstein approached philosophy with a unique perspective - one that changed the field forever. He pushed the focus away from intractable questions and onto the language and syntax of these same questions. Wittgenstein claims that by analyzing the words and grammar of philosophical questions, we can discover where our conceptions of these philosophical questions have gone awry. This represented a radical shift in the way one does philosophy. Though many still fervently question Wittgenstein's claims and methodology, his influence remains steadfast. This tiny book introduces Wittgenstein's take on philosophy, and then applies that take to views of mind. Namely, how Wittgenstein's work challenges the Cartesian and Behaviorist traditions. It is clearly written, well organized, and accessible to a beginner. Nonetheless, the book may still challenge a complete newcomer, but it's not insurmoutable. No previous knowledge is assumed, but, as always, some would facilitate comprehension.

Some of the numerous issues that arise include: philosophy as a non-cognitive pursuit distinct from science; language games; the dissolution of philosophical problems as opposed to their solution; the contemporary replacement of Cartesian mind/body with brain/body, thus maintaining the dualism; whether or not a person can "own" a pain; are experiences "privately owned"?; the confounding of "thinking" with "inner sight"; the expression of a pain does not imply an epistemic condition; the needlessness of positing an "inner realm" for experiencing one's sensations; how we can directly gain access to the inner goings-on of others (thus there is no absolute epistemic privacy); Wittgenstein's conception that brains don't have sensations, human beings do; behavior is the gateway to the "inner" of another human being; bodies and minds don't suffer, human beings do. In the end, Wittgenstein puts the totality of a human being in the place of the Cartesian mind/body dualism and the black box of the strict behaviorist. In the final section this idea gets applied to the question "Can machines think?"

Don't expect much biography. The book only scratches the extreme topmost surface of Wittgenstein's life. There is no mention of his upbringing in one of the wealthiest families of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Nor any talk about some of his erratic behavior, including his incredible desire for seclusion. His philosophy, not his life, receives emphasis here.

Though the book focuses on issues of mind, its real focus is on Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy. Mind was just the chosen topic to delineate his work and make the text easier to follow. Thus, each clear example builds logically on the previous clear example. This book represents a great place to start, but a bad place to stop. Only the rudiments of a foundation get established here. Much more reading is required to fully appreciate the scope and radical nature of Wittgenstein's thought.

WITTGENSTEIN by Peter Hacker is a 59 page essay on Wittgenstein's view of a particular class of mental processes that comprises pain, intention, belief, understanding, and expectations. The book sets out to establish that this class is an illusion and does not really exist, and if this class does exist, it is not relevant to our usual, ordinary use of the English language.

At only 59 pages, the book cannot cover all of W.'s philosophy, for example, there is no commentary on families of resemblances, how words get their meaning, or rule-following. To benefit from Peter Hacker's book, this reviewer recommends first reading the Blue and Brown Books, On Certainty, and the Philosophical Investigations.

THE EARLIER VIEW. Pages 3-15 and 40 disclose what W.'s philosophy is reacting against, namely, the views of Descartes, Hume, and others. Earlier views have held that "to exist" is similar to other verbs, such as "to drink." Earlier views held that the property of existence is similar to other properties, such as "to be red." Earlier views held that "the mind" is the name of a thing, and thus had some similarity to other names for things, such as "the brain" or "the penny." (pages 7-11 of Hacker).

We learn that Descartes divided human existence into the MIND and BODY. Over the course of a hundred years or so, this was rejected and replaced with the concept that human existence is divided into the brain and body, where the mind resides in the brain, and where the mind contains "inner processes" such as pain, beliefs, desires, where these inner processes reside on a sort of theater stage known as the mind (page 23, Hacker). Or where speaking about what we believe, intend, expect, feel in terms of pain, rests on observing some state or event in one's mind (page 25, Hacker).

We learn that the earlier view was that our own pain, beliefs, intentions, desires, are all AUTOBIOGPHICAL statements (page 23, Hacker), and that they are descriptions of our state of mind, just as one might describe one's room (page 34, Hacker).

REASONS TO DOUBT THE EARLIER VIEW. W. argues that the notion of an inner theater stage is a fallacy, for the following reasons. If I am in pain, it is impossible to doubt that I am in pain. Nothing counts as doubting whether one is in pain (page 30, Hacker). It is never the case that we say, "I thought I was in pain (or I thought I believed so and so, or I thought I intended such and such), but I was mistaken." (pages 30, 31). W. tells us that statements about pain, beliefs, intentions, expectations, being pleased, promising, are NOT like descriptions of one's self (NOT autobiographical statements, NOT like a description of one's own room) because of the fact that they can never be incorrect (page 34), and secondly, because of the fact that NO skills are needed to apprehend one's pains, fears, intentions, expectations, or the fact that one might believe something (page 35), and thirdly, because they have no particular duration (in contrast, moods and emotional states have particular durations) (page 36). Please note that durations and temporal issues are also discussed in the Philosophical Investigations (pages 163, 149, 169, 175, 179, 184, 185).

ON CERTAINTY. Wittgenstein's book, ON CERTAINTY, discloses arguments in additional to those in Peter Hacker's book. "To say, I know that I am in pain means nothing because in the practice of using "to know" you must have some sort of evidence (paragraphs 501 to 504, 555, 564, of ON CERTAINTY). Please also note that Robert Fogelin (page 157, 158 of Fogelin's book on Wittgenstein) tells us that in making a promise, we are NOT reporting that a promise exists in our mind. Here, Robert Fogelin is agreeing with W. that "mental processes" are not relevant to things like promising, expecting, having a pain.

PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (PI). Wittgenstein, in the PI, provides further arguments against inner processes as being relevant to pain, intention, believing, "No process could have the consequence of meaning" (page 186 of PI). Even if there existed something in the mind corresponding to a pain, intention, or belief, this "thing . . . has no place in the language game at all . . . it drops out of consideration as irrelevant." (paragraph 293 of PI). W. discounts that idea that things like pain, intention, beliefs, or expectations, are mental processes. W. writes, "To say of an expectant person that he perceives his expectation . . . would be an idiotic distortion." (paragraph 453 of PI). Also, W. argues, "I see someone pointing to a gun and I expect a bang. The shot is fired . . . so did that bang somehow exist in your expectation? . . . the bang was not so loud as I expected . . . then was there a louder bang in your expectation? (paragraphs 442, 449, 452 of PI).

CRITICISM. I think it might be useful if Peter Hacker had made a nice, orderly table showing all the arguments, examples, or thought-experiments, that W. uses to dissuade us that "inner processes" in the mind are relevant to pain, intention, expectation, promising, and the like. Also, Peter Hacker's book does not tell us how Wittgenstein's ideas have been modified by other philosophers, for example, in the years 1960 to the present.

This book is part of The Great Philosophers series put out by Routledge. Those who have plenty of background in philosophy consider these books crib-notes for things they forget. Those who have little background in philosophy consider these introductory texts. The books in this series are so short -- this one is only 57 pages -- that they are more rightly called extended exegesis articles on a particular philosopher. There's lots of Wittgenstein to cover, and Hacker mostly emphasizes W's views on mind. I used to be quite taken with Wittgenstein, but after much more exposure to philosophy, cognitive science, and mathematics, I now tend to find his views on these subjects mostly irritating, even if I find W. the man more interesting. There's been a lot of Philosophy of Mind move under the bridge since W., and I think many of his little "Ludwig-isms" are now open to respectful rejoinders. One of the recurring malfunctions the reader can note is how Wittgenstein didn't have a handle on the type-token distinction when dealing with instances of mental events. This leads him to ask all sorts of questions about mental experience, introspection, etc. which he thinks can't be answered. I would guess that in 150 years of computational improvement, intellectual history will look at W.'s philosophy of mind the way it looks at Aristotle's biology. Both are grand products tied to a particular worldview, rather than to theories constructed from controlled, quantitative measurements of events in the world. After all, 'the world is all that there is' as somebody, somewhere has written.