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24 of 24 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Well-Researched, Full of New Insights, and Too Short,
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This review is from: World War II Desert Tactics (Elite) (Paperback)
World War II Desert Tactics (Elite)This title gives a wealth of insights into tactics and weapons systems in World War II desert fighting. The book constantly goes beyond the obvious to give new perspectives. For example, it is well known that British armored tactics early in the war put too much emphasis on independent tank actions to the detriment of effective all-arms coordination. Griffith goes beyond this to point out how the Desert Rats' early victories against the Italians, using the looping all-tank flanking movements of Hobart's "pure" armor theories, reinforced the wrong lesson. The disastrous armored losses later in Operation Battleaxe and other engagements could be traced in part to over-confidence from the early victory at Beda Fomm. Griffith pays superb attention to weapon systems, giving details that were new to me. For example, the slow arrival of the superior 6-pounder antitank gun owed much to Dunkirk. The British decided to replace their huge equipment losses by emphasizing quantity over quality, which meant a larger number of the less effective 2-pounder instead of smaller numbers of the far superior 6-pounder. In general, the British did not lack good anti-tank hardware. Instead, as the author points out, they failed to fully appreciate the role of anti-tank guns, putting too much reliance on their tanks instead. There are plenty of other fascinating tidbits. Did you know that, statistically, just one tank crewman was killed, wounded or captured for every tank knocked out? Or that German AP shells were much more likely to cause fires after a hit, while British shells sometimes just left a hole? The book includes summaries of the major campaigns, with an eye toward tactics and weapon systems. Griffith shows how the slow-moving British communication system prevented rapid responses on the battlefield. Rommel's habit of leading from the front gave his staff officers fits, but his quick, on-the-spot decisions and superior German radio communications turned a near-hopeless situation in "the Cauldron" into his famous greatest victory at Gazala. I could find no major errors. There is a typo on p. 31, where a caption describes an "A-13 Mk II" cruiser tank; the photo suggests the author meant an A-13 Mk IV. If the definition of good writing is to leave your reader wanting more, Mr. Griffith succeeds well. There are plenty of photographs, with thought-provoking captions, some useful tables, maps, and interesting diagrams. The book covers British, Italian, and German tactics, and also gives some thoughtful insights into the US Army's early experience in Tunisia. The book is too short to be comprehensive in every way, but it is informative enough that even knowledgeable researchers should give it a look. It is also very readable, and thus accessible to anyone with an interest in the arcane subject of World War II desert warfare.
7 of 9 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
WW II Desert Tactics,
By
This review is from: World War II Desert Tactics (Elite) (Paperback)
Very good coverage of why it took the British & Commonwealth forces so long to defeat the Desert Fox. Despite their advantage in supplies and numbers the Allies learned the hard way what not to do. The Americans had to learn these same lessons at Kaserine Pass. Exceeded expectations. A must have in understanding the desert war.
4.0 out of 5 stars
Craft of war in the desert,
By
This review is from: World War II Desert Tactics (Elite) (Paperback)
The book is not an operational history. Author examines tactical principles which guided the employment of tanks in North African desert war.British envisaged an independent role for tanks in combat.Here author has made some interesting observations.German victory in 1940 deluded the British.Media claimed principal credit for German success should go to panzers.Later on British triumph against Italians at Bedda Fomm served to perpetuate the myth.Germans realised earlier on that panzers cannot fight of their own. To fight effectively it required the support of other elements: AT guns, artillery infantry airpower. In other words, a typical panzer division was a flexible all arms unit. According to General F.W Von Mellenthin ,panzers follow the path of least resistance and penetrate into enemy rear areas.This is called Schwerpunkt,the point of main effort, in German military terminology. It is futile to throw armour against well-prepared defensive positions manned by an enemy who anticipates an attack and is determined to resist at all costs . AT guns are used to kill enemy tanks; artillery employed to neutralise enemy AT guns; air power to provide close fire support and prevent the movement of enemy reserves to the front. German supremacy in combined arm tactics helped Rommel inflict series of defeats on British 8th army before his advance came to a halt along the El Alamein line. Author has taken a dig on popular notion which claims Germans borrowed ideas on tank warfare from British military theoreticians: Liddell Hart/Fuller. German panzer tactics were evolved by General Guderian. British belived mobility, armour, firepower helped tanks to fight of their own. Consequently, supporting arms were relegated to an auxiliary role. This,author argues, sprang from the flawed theories of Fuller/Hobart. Biggest mistake British made was to think tank was the best weapon to kill another tank. Germans , as recalled earlier, took a diametrically opposite approach.Further the former towed AT guns which trailed behind panzers. Thick plumes of dust raised by squealing treads of tanks served to veil its presence. This made British think they were fired upon by tanks which made them to overestimate the quality of German armour. Another striking fact most German panzers carried good optical sights making them capable of engaging targets up to a distance of 2000 yards.However British tactical methods improved once Auchinleck took command of 8th army .He forbid the practice of using tanks in piecemeal fashion what author calls as penny packeting.Armour was now massed and started operating as a part of all arms groupings. Finally, author puts in a nutshell American combat experience in North Africa. Green,raw American troops took a terrible beating before they stood up to veterans of Afrika Korps. Book features B/W photos,battle maps, colour plates. There are diagrams depicting different tactical formations used by British combat units. Colour plates carried commentaries which proved useful in deepening my understanding of the subject. Finally, there is an useful bibliography for those who wish draw more information on the subject. |
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World War II Desert Tactics (Elite) by Paddy Griffith (Paperback - April 22, 2008)
$18.95
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