57 of 64 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Seems to Miss the Essence of This Subject, September 26, 2004
This review is from: World War II Infantry Tactics (1): Squad and Platoon (Elite) (Paperback)
Dr. Stephen Bull, a British museum curator and author of two volumes on WW1 trench warfare in Osprey's Elite series, attempts to outline the essence of Second World War infantry tactics in two new volumes in the Elite series. In the first volume, Dr. Bull addresses squad and platoon tactics of the US, Britain and Germany. Although this volume is graphically attractive and appears comprehensive, it essentially drives by the subject at a high rate of speed, accepting questionable popular theories and failing to draw appropriate conclusions. Indeed, while Dr. Bull's grasp of weaponry appears sound, his grasp of small unit tactics seems superficial and fixated on "sexy" topics like snipers and hand-to-hand combat.
Dr. Bull draws his material from three sources: official training manuals from the period, veterans accounts and secondary works. In the first section, Dr. Bull addresses the soldier's experience (casualty rates, combat fatigue, physical demands); this section really isn't necessary for discussing tactics but appears influenced by John Keegan's Face of Battle methodology. At any rate, Dr Bull uses a variety of anecdotal evidence from different British and American infantry units to suggest that infantry losses in 1944-1945 were as heavy or worse than that experienced in 1916-1918. Dr. Bull misses the point - it is not the quantity of loss as much as the quality of losses that really matters. As three D-Day veterans told me, "our leadership bled away rapidly in combat." Replacing ten privates who took three months to train is fairly easy, but replacing one combat-experienced NCO or junior officer is much tougher. At any rate, while it is clear that "the poor bloody infantry" always suffers the most, it is not clear how this section adds to a discussion of tactics. It would have been more appropriate to discuss the training of squad and platoon leaders - and how this differed between the three armies - than to discuss individual soldier issues better left to the Warrior series.
The next section on Training has some useful material on camouflage, physical training, individual movement techniques (IMT), and battle drills, but also includes garbage on hand-to-hand combat "techniques," including kicking, eye-gouging and "anti-hair pulling tactics." Basics are ignored: how much marksmanship training did the average WW2 infantryman get before battle? What was medical care like? I bet the average British or US platoon was better fed than the average German platoon in 1944-1945. The author also ignores other important (but mundane) issues such as noise/light/litter discipline, mission preparation, rehearsals and tactical adaptability. The section on "The Squad Ethos" parrots the near-axiomatic notion that soldiers only fight for their buddies and ignores the fact that officers and NCOs have other motives. If officers sought to protect their men, they could not order attacks that risked heavy losses. Officers are, in fact, usually motivated by some kind of higher purpose (ideology, careerism, etc). The section on squad organization and weapons details the US, German and British squads, although there is little effort to distinguish between "leg," mechanized and airborne squads. Nor does Dr. Bull ever mention that squads are mere tactical building blocks - they normally do not conduct independent operations. The whole idea of "squad tactics" is a bit artificial, since even squad-size patrols or ambushes are usually part of a larger unit operation.
The heart is this volume is the seven pages on squad offensive and defensive tactics, and it focuses almost exclusively on the hasty variants. I was amazed that Dr. Bull hardly mentions patrolling or ambush tactics - the bread and butter of small unit infantry operations. Deliberate assaults, with external fire support or engineers, are ignored and there is virtually no mention of tank-infantry cooperation. Somehow, in his ellipitical way in approaching this subject, Dr. Bull obscures the fundamental essence of offensive tactics, which is find 'em, fix 'em, flank 'em, f--- 'em. Bull is also a little flippant with terminology, comparing an assault to "temporary insanity" - a proper assault requires a very rationale thought processes, not a bunch of out-of-control impulses. Bull quotes one apparently trigger-happy veteran who talked about the "excitement of constantly stuffing fresh ammunition into the magazines and blazing away" - not a good example. I think Dr. Bull has confused infantry tactics with Telly Savalas' character in "The Dirty Dozen." As for defensive tactics, Dr. Bull suggests that advance posts could be "within about 2,000 yards of a main position" which is nonsense - well beyond range of organic weapons and how could they communicate? LP/OPs should be within range of one's own weapons - about 300-500 meters at the squad level.
The section on the Platoon almost appears to be an afterthought and it is only 23% of the volume, and half of that focuses on snipers. Key questions, like how support weapons should be used or squads employed (the two up one back standard) get remarkably little attention. Several of the color plates are also a bit suspect. The plate depicting a US rifle platoon in the defense shows a position with no forward security (LP/OP) and located on the crest of a small hill (not the "military crest"), which means the men would be skylined and highly vulnerable. Both the platoon leader and platoon sergeant are depicted at a considerable distance from the machinegun team, but experience showed that the platoon leader would locate himself close to this vital weapon. The plate on the German defensive position in Normandy is also a bit deceptive, since it suggests that the Germans typically burrowed holes through hedgerows for all their riflemen. I visited the remnants of a German company-size position near St. Lo in Normandy in June 1989 and was surprised at the relative crudity of the position. Even after 45 years, it was obvious that the Germans had cut simple holes through the TOP of the hedgerows.
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39 of 45 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Author's Reply, October 5, 2004
This review is from: World War II Infantry Tactics (1): Squad and Platoon (Elite) (Paperback)
It is admittedly highly unusual for an author to submit a review of his own work - but having seen the one currently attached to 'Squad and Platoon Tactics' I feel that the book buying public would be ill served if I did not attempt offer an alternative.
What Mr Forczyk does not appreciate are two key points -
First this is one of two volumes, so pretty well everything that he believes to be 'missing' is actually in volume two, for example armored infantry, tank cooperation, support weapons, mines etc. This is currently with the publisher, to appear in early 2005. Secondly when there are daft pieces of advice given these are direct quotes from actual manuals, or period instructions from actual battles, or eyewitness accounts. It matters not a jot whether I, or Mr Forczyk, believe these instructions would produce poor tactics - these are direct descriptions of the real thing, by people who were there, or by officers who produced the training literature. Likewise the illustrations are produced from manual drawings, or sketches by veterans. This book is about things as they were - not as we now might like them to have been.
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11 of 11 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Not on tactics . . . . . ., March 23, 2006
This review is from: World War II Infantry Tactics (1): Squad and Platoon (Elite) (Paperback)
This book is falsely advertised. Little of it is actually on tactics. A better title would be "World War II Infantry: Squad and Platoon". It is the TACTICS part of the title that makes this book misleading. I bought this book to better understand TACTICS, but it fell short. Most of it was on small arms, but I already knew about small arms. Very little of it had tactics, which draws me to the conclusion that this author knows very little on the subject.
If you are looking for infantry TACTICS, I suggest: Light Infantry Tactics for Small Teams by Christopher Larsen. There's a book that is actually on tactics.
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