Customer Reviews

World War II Infantry Tactics (1): Squad and Platoon (Elite)

5 star:		(2)
4 star:		(3)
3 star:		(4)
2 star:		(1)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

Dr. Stephen Bull, a British museum curator and author of two volumes on WW1 trench warfare in Osprey's Elite series, attempts to outline the essence of Second World War infantry tactics in two new volumes in the Elite series. In the first volume, Dr. Bull addresses squad and platoon tactics of the US, Britain and Germany. Although this volume is graphically attractive and appears comprehensive, it essentially drives by the subject at a high rate of speed, accepting questionable popular theories and failing to draw appropriate conclusions. Indeed, while Dr. Bull's grasp of weaponry appears sound, his grasp of small unit tactics seems superficial and fixated on "sexy" topics like snipers and hand-to-hand combat.

Dr. Bull draws his material from three sources: official training manuals from the period, veterans accounts and secondary works. In the first section, Dr. Bull addresses the soldier's experience (casualty rates, combat fatigue, physical demands); this section really isn't necessary for discussing tactics but appears influenced by John Keegan's Face of Battle methodology. At any rate, Dr Bull uses a variety of anecdotal evidence from different British and American infantry units to suggest that infantry losses in 1944-1945 were as heavy or worse than that experienced in 1916-1918. Dr. Bull misses the point - it is not the quantity of loss as much as the quality of losses that really matters. As three D-Day veterans told me, "our leadership bled away rapidly in combat." Replacing ten privates who took three months to train is fairly easy, but replacing one combat-experienced NCO or junior officer is much tougher. At any rate, while it is clear that "the poor bloody infantry" always suffers the most, it is not clear how this section adds to a discussion of tactics. It would have been more appropriate to discuss the training of squad and platoon leaders - and how this differed between the three armies - than to discuss individual soldier issues better left to the Warrior series.

The next section on Training has some useful material on camouflage, physical training, individual movement techniques (IMT), and battle drills, but also includes garbage on hand-to-hand combat "techniques," including kicking, eye-gouging and "anti-hair pulling tactics." Basics are ignored: how much marksmanship training did the average WW2 infantryman get before battle? What was medical care like? I bet the average British or US platoon was better fed than the average German platoon in 1944-1945. The author also ignores other important (but mundane) issues such as noise/light/litter discipline, mission preparation, rehearsals and tactical adaptability. The section on "The Squad Ethos" parrots the near-axiomatic notion that soldiers only fight for their buddies and ignores the fact that officers and NCOs have other motives. If officers sought to protect their men, they could not order attacks that risked heavy losses. Officers are, in fact, usually motivated by some kind of higher purpose (ideology, careerism, etc). The section on squad organization and weapons details the US, German and British squads, although there is little effort to distinguish between "leg," mechanized and airborne squads. Nor does Dr. Bull ever mention that squads are mere tactical building blocks - they normally do not conduct independent operations. The whole idea of "squad tactics" is a bit artificial, since even squad-size patrols or ambushes are usually part of a larger unit operation.

The heart is this volume is the seven pages on squad offensive and defensive tactics, and it focuses almost exclusively on the hasty variants. I was amazed that Dr. Bull hardly mentions patrolling or ambush tactics - the bread and butter of small unit infantry operations. Deliberate assaults, with external fire support or engineers, are ignored and there is virtually no mention of tank-infantry cooperation. Somehow, in his ellipitical way in approaching this subject, Dr. Bull obscures the fundamental essence of offensive tactics, which is find 'em, fix 'em, flank 'em, f--- 'em. Bull is also a little flippant with terminology, comparing an assault to "temporary insanity" - a proper assault requires a very rationale thought processes, not a bunch of out-of-control impulses. Bull quotes one apparently trigger-happy veteran who talked about the "excitement of constantly stuffing fresh ammunition into the magazines and blazing away" - not a good example. I think Dr. Bull has confused infantry tactics with Telly Savalas' character in "The Dirty Dozen." As for defensive tactics, Dr. Bull suggests that advance posts could be "within about 2,000 yards of a main position" which is nonsense - well beyond range of organic weapons and how could they communicate? LP/OPs should be within range of one's own weapons - about 300-500 meters at the squad level.

The section on the Platoon almost appears to be an afterthought and it is only 23% of the volume, and half of that focuses on snipers. Key questions, like how support weapons should be used or squads employed (the two up one back standard) get remarkably little attention. Several of the color plates are also a bit suspect. The plate depicting a US rifle platoon in the defense shows a position with no forward security (LP/OP) and located on the crest of a small hill (not the "military crest"), which means the men would be skylined and highly vulnerable. Both the platoon leader and platoon sergeant are depicted at a considerable distance from the machinegun team, but experience showed that the platoon leader would locate himself close to this vital weapon. The plate on the German defensive position in Normandy is also a bit deceptive, since it suggests that the Germans typically burrowed holes through hedgerows for all their riflemen. I visited the remnants of a German company-size position near St. Lo in Normandy in June 1989 and was surprised at the relative crudity of the position. Even after 45 years, it was obvious that the Germans had cut simple holes through the TOP of the hedgerows.

It is admittedly highly unusual for an author to submit a review of his own work - but having seen the one currently attached to 'Squad and Platoon Tactics' I feel that the book buying public would be ill served if I did not attempt offer an alternative.

What Mr Forczyk does not appreciate are two key points -

First this is one of two volumes, so pretty well everything that he believes to be 'missing' is actually in volume two, for example armored infantry, tank cooperation, support weapons, mines etc. This is currently with the publisher, to appear in early 2005. Secondly when there are daft pieces of advice given these are direct quotes from actual manuals, or period instructions from actual battles, or eyewitness accounts. It matters not a jot whether I, or Mr Forczyk, believe these instructions would produce poor tactics - these are direct descriptions of the real thing, by people who were there, or by officers who produced the training literature. Likewise the illustrations are produced from manual drawings, or sketches by veterans. This book is about things as they were - not as we now might like them to have been.

This book is falsely advertised. Little of it is actually on tactics. A better title would be "World War II Infantry: Squad and Platoon". It is the TACTICS part of the title that makes this book misleading. I bought this book to better understand TACTICS, but it fell short. Most of it was on small arms, but I already knew about small arms. Very little of it had tactics, which draws me to the conclusion that this author knows very little on the subject.

If you are looking for infantry TACTICS, I suggest: Light Infantry Tactics for Small Teams by Christopher Larsen. There's a book that is actually on tactics.

For a 64-page book, this is an outstanding value. I have several hundred books and manuals on military subjects, including a number of War Department, Department of the Navy, and Department of Defense manuals. I purchased "World War II Infantry Tactics--Squad and Platoon" as a guide for building minature World War Two small units. I already knew quite a bit about US Army and USMC squads and platoons from World War Two--and I am very familiar with the current stuff because of my 23 years of military service--but I don't know everything. British infantry squads have different assumptions and "character" than American squads. They don't fight the same way, they don't look the same in the field, and even if they had the same equipment they'd use it differently. I'm not as familiar with German infantry squads, but what Dr. Bull wrote is comprehensive and accurate. If you need more detailed information, you'll have to collect a bigger library. This book is on the squad and platoon--for order of battle information, go to books dealing with divisions and regiments. A note about rifle squads and platoons in the US Army and Marines--they usually go into combat with less than their full TO&E allotment of personnel. During World War Two, the general attitude was that anybody could be cannon-fodder foot soldiers. Because of this attitude, special soldier units such as Ranger battalions had to be formed to make up for lack of skilled infantry rifle companies. General McNair trained the average infantry Joe as well as he could, but the emphasis for quality personnel and other investments went to the Army Air Force and then to Engineer, Armor, Artillery, and Airborne units--with the infantry getting low priority. Audy Murphy, the most-decorated American soldier of the war, was rejected by the Marines and the Paratroopers for being to small, skinny, and lacking education, proving that the metrics used for predicting success weren't perfect. Dr. Bull didn't cover Marines in this volume, which is okay--the USMC rifle squad differed radically after 1944 from the US Army infantry squad even though the US Army had more soldiers in the Pacific war than there were Marines. The training, tactics and mind set of Marines and Soldiers from the same nation differed sufficiently that plugging a few into the other service's rifle squad resulted in disaster--they don't interchange well even today. Organization, equipment, and tactics exist to serve doctrine. "World War II Infantry Tactics" details the differences between infantry rifle squads and platoons from three nations. I'd like to see Dr. Bull write on the squads and platoons from the USSR and Imperial Japan, as well as France, China, and the smaller nations.

This is a companion to another work by Bull: "World War II Infantry Tactics--Company and Battalion." The squad and platoon are the lowest units within an infantry organization. Here, British, American, and German units are compared. Basic principles of each country's use of these formations is provided.

The squad is considered the basic constituent unit--10-12 soldiers. As this book notes, "it was the cornerstone of morale" (page 20). Squad organization and weapons are described across the three countries considered here. Offensive and defensive tactics are also discussed. Finally, the platoon. I think that there might have been a bit more on this structure, but the section is informative.

As always, the pictures and diagrams add. Much of the material is from manuals from all three powers, giving the work added effectiveness.

All in all, a nice addition to this Osprey series, "Elite."

This book is a very good source of information for the small units tactics: the only remark is that there's no mention of the soviet army and this is really a pity, since the Red Army was a major player of WWII and you can't simply "forgot" about is.
Recommended.

This book should've been named, WWII Infantry: Squad and Platoon. Because unfortunately, I, like other readers was left somewhat disappointed in the quantity of actual tactics contained in the book - seemingly only 13 of the 60 pages dedicated to the subject.

I was surprised that there was no mention of Russian infantry squad and platoon make-up, or their tactics whatsoever, which I imagine would've been vastly different to the other nations described.

The graphical tactical plates were interesting, although four of the nine plates contained little tactical information; and some information was repeated though the book i.e. Plate C is described on page 60, and then effectively retold in the Field Works section on page 46.

I would've liked to see more diagrams of tactical situations with more in-depth descriptions; rather than small side diagram with a 15-word explanation. The six pages (effectively 10% of the book) dedicated to the Sniper let the book down, which seemed to be there as padding to bulk the book, although there is an unnerving account of sniper action on page 59.

One the plus side I enjoyed the small sections on the Squad Leaders, Squad Organization and Tactics, but again, material was still too light.

A well written book on basic organization, leadership, weapons and employment of American, British, and German Infantry, but very limited 3- 4 pages on squad/platoon tactics.

This book provides an introduction, in a very succinct fashion, to the squad and platoon experience, training, doctrine, tactics (defensive and offensive), organization and fieldworks for the German, English and American armies in 64 pages. Does it succeed? Remarkably, for its length (64 pages) and its breadth of topics, yes. With one hour's of reading one gets an idea of the main differences (and similarities) between the German, British and American armies at this level of organization. The book also is well illustrated with pictures and sketching to show attack, defense strategies, field fortifications, etc. (basically what it discusses). The only illustration it is missing is one showing how the "typical" German, English and American infantryman was kitted out (a page with all three would have been nice). Plus the author's writting is not dry.

In short, if you are looking for a brief introduction to this topic this is the book to read.

This book provides the detailed tactics that I find interesting. I am an avid wargamer. With Final Combat as my rules set, I am able to replicate authentic WWII infantry tactics as described in this book. It also details methods of fortifying buidings which will eventually be incorporated into my games. I recommend this book to any WWII enthusiast or wargamer.