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Wrong War

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The title of Jeffrey Record's book comes from a quote by General Omar Bradley in reference to General MacArthur's view that the Korean War should have been escalated. A general war to remove Mao from power was judged by Bradley as: "The wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy." [1] Whether the Chinese would have directly intervened in Vietnam if the United States had fought the war in a more aggressive manner is a very debatable matter. Record notes this himself by reminding his readers that China had pressured the Viet Minh to accept the Geneva settlement of 1954. Record also observes that in 1965 Lin Piao warned Hanoi not to expect direct intervention by Red China in the war. [2] Despite this difference between Korea and Vietnam, Record still considers the latter to be "The Wrong War" for America's Cold War strategy of containment.

Record's thesis is strongest at the geopolitical level. He argues that the security of the Republic of Vietnam was not of vital importance to either American security or the strategy of containment. Record convincingly argues that American leaders did not understand the political dynamic between the Soviet Union, Red China and Hanoi. Instead of viewing the Communists powers as a monolith, American leaders should have sought to "detach" the Communist powers from one another. [3] Indeed, this strategy became the rational for President Nixon's famous trip to Red China. Although it should be added, that Nixon did not have to sell-out a long time ally of the United States in pursuit of this strategy. It is a fair criticism made by Record, and many others, that the United States over-invested in a peripheral area during the Cold War causing itself a great deal of harm. However, it should also be noted that every president from Eisenhower to Ford of either party judged the Republic of Vietnam's (RVN) security as a vital matter for the United States. Of course, these leaders had various views on the level of commitment to Vietnam that was merited.

Where Record's book falls short is on the issue of whether victory was possible for America and her allies in Indo-China once the decision to commit military forces had been made. The worst blunder by American political leaders was not using ground forces to close the Ho Chi Minh Trail. This network of infiltration routes from North Vietnam, through Laos and Cambodia, and into the RVN was established in 1960. "Trail" is a misnomer. In fact, the Trail was an extensive road network capable of moving and supplying modern armor divisions complete with heavy artillery along with oil and gas pipelines. By 1973 the Trail had moved and was supporting sixteen NVA regular and six NVA reserve divisions along the border of Laos and Cambodia. "General Dung [Senior General Van Tien Dung, NVA] described the newly completed roads, trails, and pipelines as `endless lengths of sturdy hemp ropes being daily and hourly slipped around the neck and limps of the monster who would be strangled with one sharp yank when the order was given.'" [4] Record claims that it would have not been possible to close the Trail with ground forces. [5] However, since it was never attempted there is no real way of knowing that for a fact. On the other hand, Record does allude that the bombing of the Trail did have an effect of slowing down infiltration. [6] Again, the problem here was the politically inspired "rules-of-engagement" that made victory virtually impossible. It was Washington's decision to fight an entirely defensive war in the RVN that set the stage for the final debacle.

Record admits that pacification in the South was ultimately successful. However, Record states that the victory against the Viet Cong was largely irrelevant: "The supreme irony is that control of South Vietnam's rural population made no difference in the war's outcome. Even a complete elimination of the communist political base in the country would not have deprived Hanoi of a capacity to launch - or afforded the GVN a capacity to resist - the decisive communist conventional invasion of 1975." [7] Indeed, only the closing of the Trail would have made the RVN defensible. At least Record has the grace to admit that the final defeat of the RVN was not the result of Maoist third-stage guerrilla operations. The final Communist victory was a completely conventional attack predicated on breaking numerous agreements and international law.

Record judges the war unwinnable due to the nature and determination of the Communist enemy in Hanoi. As an example of Communist stamina Record quotes a Viet Minh officer who at Dien Bien Phu stated that to get into position to attack the French his men should: "walk across the bodies of our men." [8] This quote could just as easily demonstrate Communist contempt for human life. Given the great loss of life sustained during Hanoi's twenty years of unprovoked aggression (1955-1975 and beyond) the Vietnamese Communist leadership could be more accurately judged as pathological in its power lust than merely "tenacious." The enormity of Communist crimes against the people of Vietnam has been documented. [9] Record characterized RVN president Ngo Dinh Diem as: "Frenchified, dictatorial, mandarin-era-nostalgic, Catholic celibate...." [10] Record's attacks upon the RVN leadership while ignoring the far greater crimes of the Hanoi Stalinists is disturbing. Record seems almost to admire the leadership of Hanoi whose only demonstrable talents were militarizing an entire society and murdering millions of people.

Record's chapter "Hollow Client" is an attack upon a strawman. Record quotes Stuart Herrington on the rampant corruption found in the GVN and its armed forces in 1974. [11] However, Herrington notes that the growth of corruption was the result of the severe worldwide economic downturn in 1973 coupled with the drastic decrease in American aid. The result was ARNV soldiers and officers unable to support their families on their pay. In the summer of 1974 a Defense Attache Office (DAO) report found that: "More than 90 percent of the men polled indicated that their pay and allowances were insufficient to meet their family needs for food, clothing, and shelter." [12] There were cultural differences between the north and the south of Vietnam, but they should not be overemphasized. However, Record develops the theme based on the old slander of: "If a Vietnamese isn't Red, then he's yellow." [13]

The numbers do not bear out the view that the ARVN would not or could not fight. As Herrington noted the ARVN enjoyed many successes in 1973. During the year following the Paris "peace" agreement ARVN suffered 12,000 KIA while inflicting 45,000 KIA on the Communists. During one period in 1974 the RVN was reporting more than 400 combat deaths per week. [14] General Lewis Walt documented the casualties sustained by the armed forces of the RVN as: prior to 1965, 30,000 KIA; 1966, 11,000 KIA; 1967, 12,000 KIA; 1968, 17,000 KIA; 1969, 22,000 KIA. [14]

Shame on Jeffrey Record for calling into question the valor of these men in order to make a political point. As I judge it, ultimately Record's book is an attempt to justify Congress's pulling American support from the GVN. Record states his thesis and purpose: "Congressional actions, however, simply registered the collapse of public willingness to have anything to do with the Vietnamese tar baby." [16] Record is selling the American people short on this. National honor is important to most of the electorate. In 1972 the RVN was able to stop the Communist attack with the help of American air power. Lacking both this air power and even the ability to resupply and rebuild their depleted units made the military situation of the RVN by 1975 hopeless, and the Vietnamese were well aware of this fact.

Stuart Herrington, who was in the RVN during the last two years of its existence repeatedly notes the importance of American support for both material and psychological reasons: "In Saigon, I sensed that this insecurity had escalated since my departure [in 1972]. It was as if the Saigonese needed to hear someone say, `You aren't alone in this thing. We are with you...' a disturbing edginess permeated South Vietnamese in all walks of life - an attitude that reflected an acute case of insecurity in the wake of our withdrawal." [17] RVN leaders understood that their country was on the receiving end of one of the most ignominious betrayals in history. Upon signing the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, President Ford stated:


"In South Vietnam, we have consistently sought to assure the right of the Vietnamese people to determine their own futures free from enemy interference. It would be tragic indeed if we endangered, or even lost, the progress we have achieved by failing to provide the relatively modest but crucial aid which is so badly needed there." [18]


As Ambassador Bui Diem stated at the time:


"The manner in which the United States took its leave was more than a mistake. It was an act unworthy of a great power...The United States fought long and hard in Vietnam, and if in the end circumstances required that it withdrawal, it may be considered a tragedy but hardly an act of shame. The same can not be said, however, for the manipulation and callous manner with which the American administration and the American Congress dealt with South Vietnam during the last years of the war." [19]


The title of Lewis Sorley's book "A Better War" is from a quote by New Yorker columnist Robert Shaplen: "You know, it's too bad. Abrams is very good. He deserves a better war." Many years after the war someone reminded Abrams' son who was an active duty officer and instructor at the Command and General Staff College of Shaplen's quote. Creighton Abrams immediately responded: "He didn't see it that way. He thought the Vietnamese were worth it." [20]

While the war may not have been in America's strategic interests, the casting of aspersions upon the South Vietnamese can not justify the American betrayal of an ally and its reneging on agreed upon obligations.


1. Jeffrey Record. The Wrong War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998) 184

2. Record, 13-14

3. Record, 15-16

4. Stuart A. Herrington. Peace with Honor? (Novato: Presidio Press, 1983) 109

5. Record, 176-7

6. Record, 110-111

7. Record, 95

8. Record, 29

9. Jean-Louis Margolin "Vietnam and Laos: The Impasse of War Communism" in The Black Book of Communism, ed. Stephane Courtois (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001) 565-576

10. Record, 124

11. Record, 132-133

12. Herrington, 42; 103-105

13. Record, 133

14. Herrington, 100;114

15. Lewis Walt. Strange War, Strange Strategy (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1970) 91

16. Record, 56

17. Herrington, 13; 24-25

18. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=4660

19. Lewis Sorley. A Better War (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1999) 368

20. Sorley, 388

Twenty-five years after the fall of Saigon, antagonists on the right and left are still debating whether we could have "won" in Vietnam. "The Wrong War" exposes the rationale behind U.S. decision making and examines alternatives that could and perhaps should have been examined, and evaluates their prospects for success.

Dr. Record shows how U.S. decision makers translated lessons learned from World War II to Vietnam. Surely, a military that destroyed Germany and Japan could easily defeat a pre-industrial state like Vietnam. The reasons why we could not and did not are exposed in this work. These include underestimating the stamina of the Viet-Cong and our insistence on using conventional tactics while fighting an unconventinal war. The physical and psychological impacts of the militaries' rotation policy and preoccupation with creature comfort is also examined critically.

He also analyzes our South Vietnamese allies militarily and politically and takes a critical look at the civilian-military conflict that raged in Washington. One of the key issues was mobilization of the reserves. Would it have made a difference? In all areas, he looks at alternative strategies and evaluates their chances for success. There is no guarantee these solutions would have worked any better than the ones employed.

Dr. Record applies Omar Bradleys' famous quote about Korea to Vietnam. It was, "the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, with the wrong enemy." His arguments are presented clearly and succinctly in a book that takes aim at antagonists on both sides of the Vietnam debate. While LBJ, McNamara, etc. were often wrong, there is no evidence that other strategies would have fundamentally changed the situtation.

This is an excellent work that explodes the myths that we could have "won" in Vietnam using different approaches at a cost acceptable to the American people morally and politically. In less than 200 pages, the author examines virtually every aspect of the war. No one involved comes out as having the moral or political courage of their convictions sufficient to do what was in the best interest of the nation. There is certainly a lesson to be learned here: Under no circumstance should we go to war without clearly defining our objectives and carefully examining our chances of success. Today, as we have troops employed all over the world, this is too important a lesson to overlook.

Jeffrey Record is an internationally respected defense analyst who has served as a legislative assistant to Sen. Nunn and Sen. Bentsen, also working as a scholar at the Brookings Institution and the Hudson Institute. This is no left-wing peacenik!

His very astute book, based on hefty research and years of teaching courses on the Vietnam War, is a bit repetitive in some places but well-worth reading--the repetition is probably needed because he is out to counter some very entrenched myths about the "international communist conspiracy," North Vietnam's relationship to China, the civilian and military roles in Vietnam, etc.

It is curious that Michael Lind has gotten much more press and attention from readers for his much-criticized book, Vietnam, The Necessary War, whereas Record's well-researched, balanced work has received far more consistently positive critical reviews, yet much less widespread attention.

Record makes many crucial points...Get the book and read it. And then let's see if we can get Record and Michael Lind to have a long public debate--a debate that Record would easily win before any impartial jury. We need to demolish the myths and begin to heal the great divide in our country over this disastrous, unwinnable war.

"In less than 200 pages, the author examines virtually every aspect of the war."

What a crock of @#$%!

McNamara's out of control ego thought that he could apply his quantitative analysis skills to any predicament or field. Johnson was an insecure fool who put his faith in him because he had no faith in himslef. McNamara (Rasputan) created a rift beteen the JCS and Johnson and usurped their power (through various methods and manipulations). The fact is that the military was out of the loop in the strategic decision making process, and Westmoreland like a true military man (recognizing himself subordinate to the civilian government) kept his mouth shut carried out their insane policies and took the wrap for them (the body count etc..was McNamara's concept). The only crime the military command committed was not resigning in mass to protest the McNamara/Johnson rape of the constitution and the military (they almost did, they should have followed through).
Do you think anybody who had anything to do with that administration is going to admit that they were responsible for what happened in Vietnam? Do you think their going to admit that they should have let the military handle the military strategy after they had intentionally alienated them? We did find and destroy the enemy consistently but we could never finish the job because of the strategic and tactical restraints. We had to fight an affirmative action war. Even with this we woud have still eventually won (Tet 68 Viet Cong wiped out; give Westmoreland his troops; invade Laos cut off Ho Chi Min trail; force the NVA into constant conventional warfare; They take even more unimaginable losses; they capitulate; Nobody in the military took winning a land war in Vietnam lightly. In the 1950's we knew what was needed to defeat the communists. It was no suprise. McNamara however thought he knew better and ultimately Johnson turned his back on the JCS and went with McNamara. That is really the bottom line.

Read McNamara's book "In Retrospect" where he attempts portray himself as taking his share of responsibility but only in the context of the terrible situation he had been placed in as opposed to the situation he created. He says in his book:

" We met and shook hands. When the president-elect asked if I would be his secretatry of defense, I told him...I am not qualified."...He rejected my claim that I was not qualified, pointing out dryly that there were no schools for defense secretaries, as far as he knew..." "When it came to Vietnam we found ourselves setting policy for a region that was terra incognita. Worse, our government lacked experts for us to consult to compensate for our ignorance."

This ignorance didn't seem to apply when it came to usurping the power of the military as though this particular profession was somehow overrated and anyone (he in particular) could do it better (I could quote more McNamara or you all could really read on the subject and find out for yourselves).

Guerilla operations were not foreign to us. Who were the guerillas in the jungles of the Phillipines successfully fighting the Japanese in WWII?. The guerilla war in the South of Vietnam was not self sufficient and relied on the north to sustain it, just as the government in the south relied on us to sustain it. The war was with North Vietnam (and the Soviet Union)and as Tet68 proved the VC were under the control of the north who sent them to be slaughtered. There was no popular uprising as planned in the south because nobody wanted the communists there. In early 1968 the war was clearly being lossed by the north and their puppet NLF. Giap was a history teacher and a fool of a military man. He was spoon fed a victory by the French at Dien Bien Phu, and he miscalculated and failed at every major
undertaking against the americans. He was handed one of the worst military defeats ever during Tet68 and Khe San failing on both objectives. He was however handed a victory due to the McNamara/Johnson coverup of the true circumstances concerning the estimated time table to success in Vietnam within the context of the limitations they had set on the military. Westmoreland wanted the 200,000 troops long before Tet68 to go on the strategic offensive, but that doesn't make a good enough story for the press. It had to be misrepresented as a desperate need to combat the intentionally under estimated strentgh of the enemy which was now apparent through their brilliant coordinated attacks throughout the south as being a coverup by the military. Where will it all end? If we had had that kind of deceit from the press and executive branch during WWII, we would have settled with the Japanese after Guadalcanal in 1942 and pissed our pants and settled with the Germans during the Battle of the Bulge. A dangerous precedent has been set since Korea with politics interfering in military strategy. This penny wise pound foolish approach to war (getting more men killed in the long run and failing the objective to save the various political discomforts in the short run) is not the doing of the military professionals, it is the doing of the politicians. They are the liars and the murderers trying to displace the blame on the tenacity of the enemy or the mad military men driving us headlong into a nuclear war with China. I guess the Japanese or Germans or Chinese or North Koreans were not so fanatic. Who thought the Chinese would come pouring across the border if we cut off the Ho Chi Min Trail? Nobody but the politicians who want to rationalize in hindsight as to why they wouldn't allow it at the time. Who really though the Chinese would come pouring across the border if we invaded North Vietnam along the DMZ? The same group for the same reason. Who wants to admit they were the idiots and fools that murdered approx 58,000 Americans while they played the jack of all trades master of none, and kept from them the one thing (victory) that they should have been able to show for such a sacrifice?

If there was a war criminal to come out of Vietnam, it was McNamara. If there was a fool, it was Johnson.