Yalta: The Price of Peace [Hardcover]

S. M. Plokhy (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: February 4, 2010

A major new history of the eight days in February 1945 when FDR, Churchill, and Stalin decided the fate of the world

Imagine you could eavesdrop on a dinner party with three of the most fascinating historical figures of all time. In this landmark book, a gifted Harvard historian puts you in the room with Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt as they meet at a climactic turning point in the war to hash out the terms of the peace.

The ink wasn't dry when the recriminations began. The conservatives who hated Roosevelt's New Deal accused him of selling out. Was he too sick? Did he give too much in exchange for Stalin's promise to join the war against Japan? Could he have done better in Eastern Europe? Both Left and Right would blame Yalta for beginning the Cold War.

Plokhy's conclusions, based on unprecedented archival research, are surprising. He goes against conventional wisdom-cemented during the Cold War- and argues that an ailing Roosevelt did better than we think. Much has been made of FDR's handling of the Depression; here we see him as wartime chief. Yalta is authoritative, original, vividly- written narrative history, and is sure to appeal to fans of Margaret MacMillan's bestseller Paris 1919.

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly

Starred Review. Harvard historian Plokhy (Unmaking Imperial Russia) enhances his stature as a scholar of modern Russia in this convincing revisionist analysis of the February 1945 Yalta conference. Plokhy makes sophisticated use of Soviet sources to make a case that Yalta was anything but the diplomatic defeat for the West so often depicted in cold war literature. He describes Yalta in the context of a clash between different approaches to international relations. FDR was a liberal internationalist. Churchill and Stalin saw the world in terms of power and interests. And with the Red Army only 50 miles from Berlin, Stalin held the trump cards. Plokhy's detailed and highly engrossing narrative of the negotiations shows that the West did reasonably well. Roosevelt's agenda was global. He secured Stalin's commitment to join the war against Japan and participate in the U.N. Churchill, focused on Europe, preserved British interests in the Mediterranean. Stalin achieved recognition of the U.S.S.R.'s great-power status and a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. The Yalta agreement was not the first conflict of the cold war but just a step toward a cold war that emerged only after three more years of failed negotiations. Maps. (Feb.)
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From Booklist

Revisiting the much-studied Yalta conference of February 1945, historian Plokhy capitalizes on his advantage over prior authors. He had better access to Russian archives, which permits him to vibrantly re-create the summit’s physical surroundings, interpersonal relations, and diplomatic fencing. Because dueling interpretations of Yalta’s protocols contributed significantly to the onset of the cold war, Plokhy’s fundamental thesis questions whether Yalta’s agreements were the best Churchill and Roosevelt could have wrung from Stalin. As Plokhy stresses, the conference participants had, beyond defeating Germany, divergent objectives: FDR wanted the UN and help against Japan; Churchill wanted a free hand in Greece and a restoration of France; Stalin wanted territory from Japan, reparations from Germany, and Communist governments in Eastern Europe. Within the framework of the tense negotiations that ensued, Plokhy brings forth the daily dynamics of Yalta and embroiders them with items behind subsequent recrimination about the conference results, such as FDR’s ill health and the presence of probable Soviet spy Alger Hiss. Releasing the subject from cold war historiography, Plokhy establishes a new standard on Yalta and its controversies. --Gilbert Taylor

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Product Details

• Reading level: Ages 18 and up
  
• Hardcover: 480 pages
• Publisher: Viking Adult; 1St Edition edition (February 4, 2010)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0670021415
• ISBN-13: 978-0670021413
• Product Dimensions: 9.3 x 6.1 x 1.7 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.6 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 4.3 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (22 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #523,915 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

More About the Author

S. M. Plokhy (Plokhii) is the Mykhailo Hrushevsky Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University. A leading authority on Eastern Europe, he has lived and taught in Ukraine, Canada and the United States. He has published extensively in English, Ukrainian and Russian. For three successive years (2002-2005) his books won first prize of the American Association for Ukrainian Studies. In the fall of 2009, he was honored with the Early Slavic Studies Association Distinguished Scholarship Award. He lives with his family in Arlington, Massachusetts.

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

67 of 71 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Challenging what we know about Yalta and its aftermath, February 4, 2010

By 

Todd Bartholomew (Atlanta, GA USA) - See all my reviews
(VINE VOICE)    (TOP 500 REVIEWER)   

This review is from: Yalta: The Price of Peace (Hardcover)

The February 1945 Yalta Conference between Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill has long sparked considerable debate, and not just within the historical community. You could fill a small library with books on the topics, ranging from polemical screeds to thoughtful scholarly analysis. Harvard historian Serhii Plokhy (Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History) enters into the historiographical debate with a somewhat revisionist take on the Yalta Conference that is reflective not only of his vast experience writing on Russia, but considerable research of wartime and postwar Soviet, American, and British archives. Much like Fraser J. Harbutt's equally recent Yalta 1945: Europe and America at the Crossroads the argument advanced by Plokhy runs counter to the traditional argument that Stalin turned the tables on the battered and crumbling British Empire and a dying President Roosevelt. Plokhy instead posits that Roosevelt, and especially Churchill proved to be very hard bargainers, and gained considerable concessions considering the Soviet dictator held almost all the cards. Plokhy counters the naïvely feeble American consensus construct that the West was duped by Stalin at Yalta and got nothing except the occupation of territories already occupied by their forces. The reality was that the big three (Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin) and their nations all had wildly differing approaches to international relations, which spurred the conflicts and resulted in the misinterpretations and misunderstandings following Yalta. As Plokhy points out, Roosevelt was a liberal internationalist, much in the mold of his idol Woodrow Wilson. Roosevelt wanted to keep America engaged internationally and rejected the isolationism of the 1920s and 1930s, as witnessed by his desire to create a United Nations at the end of the war. Churchill and Stalin were more traditionalist in their thinking, holding to the desire to strike equilibrium between the great powers, viewing the world in that construct where neither one could become more powerful than the other. To that end Plokhy points out how Roosevelt was focused on the global nature of the war, securing Stalin's commitment to invade Japan, whereas Churchill was focused almost single-mindedly on Europe.

The term "revisionist historian" strikes fear into many within and outside of the historical community, but Plokhy is not the archetypal wild-eyed revisionist. Too much of the historiography of Yalta has come from a Western perspective, even when writing of the Soviet's intentions and actions. As a specialist in that field Plokhy brings the balance, nuance, and understanding of the culture to the fore, resulting in an eminently readable book that may change some minds. Considering Stalin had virtually all the cards it's astonishing that Churchill got what he did. Britain was in no position militarily or economically to intervene in the Balkans at the war's end to preserve their sphere of influence. And Stalin could have just has easily said no to the division of Berlin into occupation zones, as well as balking at a number of other issues including Austria, Trieste, and others. Considering Soviet losses during the war there is little wonder about their desire to create a buffer between themselves and a Europe that had created two catastrophic wars. Nor is it surprising that the Soviets wanted that buffer to be enfeebled and anemic so as not to create any problems for them. Plokhy's "Yalta" is an impressive read, and bound to challenge long-held beliefs about the Conference and its aftermath.

33 of 35 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars A BALANCED AND SOBER LOOK AT YALTA, February 11, 2010

By 

Paul Gelman "PAUL Y. GELMAN" (HAIFA , ISRAEL) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Yalta: The Price of Peace (Hardcover)

Seventy years ago, during February 1945,three leaders were making their way to Yalta.They were:Stalin,Roosevelt and Churchill.As the Second World War was still going on, the three decided to meet in the south of the Crimea-a place which had known wars before.Perhaps the most famous was the Crimean War of the nineteeth century.The three leaders were to decide the fate of the world in a limited number of days.Among the many issues discussed were the fate of Germany,the question of Russia's entrance in the war against Japan,the redrawing of Eastern European borders,particularly those of Poland and.Yalta was always a controversial subject which divided the historians.On the one hand there were those who claimed that Western interests were sacrificed because Churchill and Roosevelt wanted to pacify Stalin.On the other hand there were those who claimed the opposite,namely, that everything was done to achieve a balance of power.

This new study dispels the first myth.Drawing on newly-discovered documents,the thesis of the book is very simple:the Western leaders have done all they could and achieved the best possible results within that period of time.Published and unpublished documents and diaries also confirm this thesis.S.M Plokhy quotes extensively from the diaries of both Churchill's doctor and Roosevelt's daughter and in addition the new documents prove that Stalin did not want to take advantage of Roosvelt's poor health.The new findings confirm that the Russians were extremely resolute to establish control over their Western neighbours,with Poland as the key player.To be precise,after Yalta,each side remained suspicious about the other's intentions.Yalta did not cause the Cold War,on the contrary: the Cold War came afterwards.

The problem pointed out by the author at the very beginning of the book concerns the absence of an official conference record which could have settled the controversy.Instead, we get a lot of quotations from memoirs or notes taken during those eight fateful days.The author is very good at conveying to the reader the atmosphere which prevailed at the various meetings and does not spare even the tiniest details, thus giving us a feeling of actually being there ,seeing, hearing and attenting the meetings.His analysis of the various phases and issues is extremely good and helpful in understanding what went on, because he includes the broader panoramic picture of everything.To give just an example,when he discusses the Far Eastern question,which was to settle the terms of Russia's entrance in battle against the Japanese,Mr.Plokhy provides an extensive background to the relations between Russia and Japan ,starting from the nineteeth century onwards,including details about the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905.The motivations,thoughts and actions of the Big Three and their aides are well illustrated.Military and political manoeuvers are discussed in detail and he provides a balanced and realistic look at the debates which went on during the final days of the conference(Even some menu contents are described for the curious reader).

The last two parts of the book examine the high expectations following the Yalta conference and the crises in the East-Wesr relations that followed after FDR'S death.This sorrowful event was the end of cooperation with the USSR.The epilogue is an exceptional analysis of the Yalta agreements,absolving both Roosevelt and Churchill of any mistakes or inconsiderations.The Soviet Union had its own reasons to be satisfied with the results, because its power status has been recognized.

Professor Plokhy then asks:could the Western Allies have done better at Yalta? The first answer that comes to mind is:"Of course they could have."The problem was that both Churchill and FDR viewed the postwar world through different lenses.Roosevelt was interested in global supremacy; Churchill ,by contrast,was interested more in Europe and in the control of the Mediterranean, which was very essential to the continued existence of the British empire..Thus,from Churchill's point of view, Stalin was a potential enemy and not an ally.Both Churchill and FDR were committed to prevent the communization of Eastern Europe.

To sum up, this book is richly detailed,enlightening and the research invested in it is impressive indeed.The Big Three and all the other minor characters who played their roles in Yalta come to life in the best possible way.

10 of 10 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Operation Argonaut, April 16, 2010

By 

R. M. Peterson (Santa Fe, NM) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Yalta: The Price of Peace (Hardcover)

"Operation Argonaut" was the code name Winston Churchill gave to the conference of the Big Three held in early February 1945 near Yalta in the Crimea. I don't know whether Churchill (or Roosevelt) fancied himself Jason, but the dragon certainly was Joseph Stalin and the Golden Fleece was world peace. In the myth, Jason and the Argonauts were successful in their mission to recover the Golden Fleece, thanks to the potion provided by Medea that put the dragon to sleep. History did not replicate myth, however. Stalin was far from somnolent at Yalta and the Argonauts proved unable to secure world peace.

Yet at the formal dinner that marked the end of the eight-day conference, as Churchill, FDR, and Stalin exchanged toasts and compliments, all of the participants were flush with feelings of accomplishment, cooperation, and optimism. "The evening exemplified what later became known as the spirit of Yalta--the feeling that there were no problems that they could not solve in the future." Nazi Germany was on its deathbed, Soviet Russia had been persuaded to join the Allies in the Pacific war against Japan, and agreement had been reached among the Big Three on the fundamentals of the world organization that would become the United Nations. It was only natural, only human, that after 5+ years of horrific war in Europe people would begin to entertain notions of a lasting peace. But those notions were soon dashed and a few years later many political pundits looked back at Yalta not as a promising step toward world peace but rather as the beginning of a new war, the Cold War. As time passed, Yalta became more and more a suspect or disreputable, even dirty, word in American politics. In 2005, President George W. Bush went so far as to include it "in the unjust tradition of Munich and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact."

S.M. Plokhy sees the Yalta conference differently. As he argues in YALTA: THE PRICE OF PEACE, "if diplomacy is the art of the possible, and if one were to judge the results of Yalta according to the geopolitical and military situation at the time, one would conclude that the Western leaders achieved considerably more than they were subsequently credited with." To me, Plokhy is altogether convincing on this point.

The chief criticism of the Yalta agreement has been that it constituted a betrayal of Eastern Europe, particularly Poland. Of course, it really was not until July, at Potsdam, that the U.S. and Great Britain accepted Stalin's "iron curtain". But they had little real choice either then or back in February, at Yalta, when Russian troops were on the west bank of the Oder, 70 kilometers from Berlin, whereas the Allies, having only recently recovered the offensive after the Battle of the Bulge, were still 600 kilometers from Berlin. If Stalin wanted to impose his naked will on Poland and Eastern Europe, he had Soviet troops on the ground and there was very little the U.S. and Britain could do about it short of risking war with the Soviet Union, which was unthinkable. To make matters even more difficult for FDR and Churchill, Stalin was no sleeping dragon. The book shows again and again that he was an ever-alert, cagey, formidable, even brilliant foe. (Anthony Eden, Churchill's Foreign Secretary at Yalta, "considered Stalin the toughest negotiator he had ever encountered in his long diplomatic career and claimed that if he had to pick a negotiating team, Stalin would be his first choice.")

So FDR and Churchill opted for a set of actions that would keep open dialogue and diplomacy over Poland and Eastern Europe. According to Plokhy, even "decades after the conference, with the benefit of hindsight, new archival findings, and tons of research, it is still very difficult to suggest any practical alternative to the course they took." And soon after Yalta, external events rendered impossible continuation of the sort of dialogue and diplomacy practiced by FDR and Churchill at Yalta - among them, the sudden death of FDR (perhaps so soon after Yalta because of the physical demands of the nearly three-week trip), the ouster from power of Churchill and the Conservatives in the U.K., and the detonation of atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, introducing a whole new dimension to the realm of geopolitics.

YALTA: THE PRICE OF PEACE is first-rate history. To me, it is mind-boggling to consider the multitude of complex issues that the Big Three had to address in a few short days at Yalta - for example, the role of France in post-War Europe, treatment of a defeated Germany and the issue of reparations, Poland (both its borders and the constitution of its government), repatriation of POWs and other displaced nationals, the Balkans, the United Nations, and conditions for Russian entry into the war against Japan. Plokhy discusses the ins and outs and back and forths relating to these issues competently, thoroughly, and (but for a few instances) clearly. The narrative contains enough background and stage-setting and sufficient anecdotes and human-interest stories to make it quite readable. I have not read any competing histories, but it is difficult for me to believe that any might be better for the general reader.