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Yalta: The Price of Peace

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The February 1945 Yalta Conference between Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill has long sparked considerable debate, and not just within the historical community. You could fill a small library with books on the topics, ranging from polemical screeds to thoughtful scholarly analysis. Harvard historian Serhii Plokhy (Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History) enters into the historiographical debate with a somewhat revisionist take on the Yalta Conference that is reflective not only of his vast experience writing on Russia, but considerable research of wartime and postwar Soviet, American, and British archives. Much like Fraser J. Harbutt's equally recent Yalta 1945: Europe and America at the Crossroads the argument advanced by Plokhy runs counter to the traditional argument that Stalin turned the tables on the battered and crumbling British Empire and a dying President Roosevelt. Plokhy instead posits that Roosevelt, and especially Churchill proved to be very hard bargainers, and gained considerable concessions considering the Soviet dictator held almost all the cards. Plokhy counters the naïvely feeble American consensus construct that the West was duped by Stalin at Yalta and got nothing except the occupation of territories already occupied by their forces. The reality was that the big three (Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin) and their nations all had wildly differing approaches to international relations, which spurred the conflicts and resulted in the misinterpretations and misunderstandings following Yalta. As Plokhy points out, Roosevelt was a liberal internationalist, much in the mold of his idol Woodrow Wilson. Roosevelt wanted to keep America engaged internationally and rejected the isolationism of the 1920s and 1930s, as witnessed by his desire to create a United Nations at the end of the war. Churchill and Stalin were more traditionalist in their thinking, holding to the desire to strike equilibrium between the great powers, viewing the world in that construct where neither one could become more powerful than the other. To that end Plokhy points out how Roosevelt was focused on the global nature of the war, securing Stalin's commitment to invade Japan, whereas Churchill was focused almost single-mindedly on Europe.

The term "revisionist historian" strikes fear into many within and outside of the historical community, but Plokhy is not the archetypal wild-eyed revisionist. Too much of the historiography of Yalta has come from a Western perspective, even when writing of the Soviet's intentions and actions. As a specialist in that field Plokhy brings the balance, nuance, and understanding of the culture to the fore, resulting in an eminently readable book that may change some minds. Considering Stalin had virtually all the cards it's astonishing that Churchill got what he did. Britain was in no position militarily or economically to intervene in the Balkans at the war's end to preserve their sphere of influence. And Stalin could have just has easily said no to the division of Berlin into occupation zones, as well as balking at a number of other issues including Austria, Trieste, and others. Considering Soviet losses during the war there is little wonder about their desire to create a buffer between themselves and a Europe that had created two catastrophic wars. Nor is it surprising that the Soviets wanted that buffer to be enfeebled and anemic so as not to create any problems for them. Plokhy's "Yalta" is an impressive read, and bound to challenge long-held beliefs about the Conference and its aftermath.

Seventy years ago, during February 1945,three leaders were making their way to Yalta.They were:Stalin,Roosevelt and Churchill.As the Second World War was still going on, the three decided to meet in the south of the Crimea-a place which had known wars before.Perhaps the most famous was the Crimean War of the nineteeth century.The three leaders were to decide the fate of the world in a limited number of days.Among the many issues discussed were the fate of Germany,the question of Russia's entrance in the war against Japan,the redrawing of Eastern European borders,particularly those of Poland and.Yalta was always a controversial subject which divided the historians.On the one hand there were those who claimed that Western interests were sacrificed because Churchill and Roosevelt wanted to pacify Stalin.On the other hand there were those who claimed the opposite,namely, that everything was done to achieve a balance of power.
This new study dispels the first myth.Drawing on newly-discovered documents,the thesis of the book is very simple:the Western leaders have done all they could and achieved the best possible results within that period of time.Published and unpublished documents and diaries also confirm this thesis.S.M Plokhy quotes extensively from the diaries of both Churchill's doctor and Roosevelt's daughter and in addition the new documents prove that Stalin did not want to take advantage of Roosvelt's poor health.The new findings confirm that the Russians were extremely resolute to establish control over their Western neighbours,with Poland as the key player.To be precise,after Yalta,each side remained suspicious about the other's intentions.Yalta did not cause the Cold War,on the contrary: the Cold War came afterwards.
The problem pointed out by the author at the very beginning of the book concerns the absence of an official conference record which could have settled the controversy.Instead, we get a lot of quotations from memoirs or notes taken during those eight fateful days.The author is very good at conveying to the reader the atmosphere which prevailed at the various meetings and does not spare even the tiniest details, thus giving us a feeling of actually being there ,seeing, hearing and attenting the meetings.His analysis of the various phases and issues is extremely good and helpful in understanding what went on, because he includes the broader panoramic picture of everything.To give just an example,when he discusses the Far Eastern question,which was to settle the terms of Russia's entrance in battle against the Japanese,Mr.Plokhy provides an extensive background to the relations between Russia and Japan ,starting from the nineteeth century onwards,including details about the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905.The motivations,thoughts and actions of the Big Three and their aides are well illustrated.Military and political manoeuvers are discussed in detail and he provides a balanced and realistic look at the debates which went on during the final days of the conference(Even some menu contents are described for the curious reader).
The last two parts of the book examine the high expectations following the Yalta conference and the crises in the East-Wesr relations that followed after FDR'S death.This sorrowful event was the end of cooperation with the USSR.The epilogue is an exceptional analysis of the Yalta agreements,absolving both Roosevelt and Churchill of any mistakes or inconsiderations.The Soviet Union had its own reasons to be satisfied with the results, because its power status has been recognized.
Professor Plokhy then asks:could the Western Allies have done better at Yalta? The first answer that comes to mind is:"Of course they could have."The problem was that both Churchill and FDR viewed the postwar world through different lenses.Roosevelt was interested in global supremacy; Churchill ,by contrast,was interested more in Europe and in the control of the Mediterranean, which was very essential to the continued existence of the British empire..Thus,from Churchill's point of view, Stalin was a potential enemy and not an ally.Both Churchill and FDR were committed to prevent the communization of Eastern Europe.
To sum up, this book is richly detailed,enlightening and the research invested in it is impressive indeed.The Big Three and all the other minor characters who played their roles in Yalta come to life in the best possible way.

"Operation Argonaut" was the code name Winston Churchill gave to the conference of the Big Three held in early February 1945 near Yalta in the Crimea. I don't know whether Churchill (or Roosevelt) fancied himself Jason, but the dragon certainly was Joseph Stalin and the Golden Fleece was world peace. In the myth, Jason and the Argonauts were successful in their mission to recover the Golden Fleece, thanks to the potion provided by Medea that put the dragon to sleep. History did not replicate myth, however. Stalin was far from somnolent at Yalta and the Argonauts proved unable to secure world peace.

Yet at the formal dinner that marked the end of the eight-day conference, as Churchill, FDR, and Stalin exchanged toasts and compliments, all of the participants were flush with feelings of accomplishment, cooperation, and optimism. "The evening exemplified what later became known as the spirit of Yalta--the feeling that there were no problems that they could not solve in the future." Nazi Germany was on its deathbed, Soviet Russia had been persuaded to join the Allies in the Pacific war against Japan, and agreement had been reached among the Big Three on the fundamentals of the world organization that would become the United Nations. It was only natural, only human, that after 5+ years of horrific war in Europe people would begin to entertain notions of a lasting peace. But those notions were soon dashed and a few years later many political pundits looked back at Yalta not as a promising step toward world peace but rather as the beginning of a new war, the Cold War. As time passed, Yalta became more and more a suspect or disreputable, even dirty, word in American politics. In 2005, President George W. Bush went so far as to include it "in the unjust tradition of Munich and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact."

S.M. Plokhy sees the Yalta conference differently. As he argues in YALTA: THE PRICE OF PEACE, "if diplomacy is the art of the possible, and if one were to judge the results of Yalta according to the geopolitical and military situation at the time, one would conclude that the Western leaders achieved considerably more than they were subsequently credited with." To me, Plokhy is altogether convincing on this point.

The chief criticism of the Yalta agreement has been that it constituted a betrayal of Eastern Europe, particularly Poland. Of course, it really was not until July, at Potsdam, that the U.S. and Great Britain accepted Stalin's "iron curtain". But they had little real choice either then or back in February, at Yalta, when Russian troops were on the west bank of the Oder, 70 kilometers from Berlin, whereas the Allies, having only recently recovered the offensive after the Battle of the Bulge, were still 600 kilometers from Berlin. If Stalin wanted to impose his naked will on Poland and Eastern Europe, he had Soviet troops on the ground and there was very little the U.S. and Britain could do about it short of risking war with the Soviet Union, which was unthinkable. To make matters even more difficult for FDR and Churchill, Stalin was no sleeping dragon. The book shows again and again that he was an ever-alert, cagey, formidable, even brilliant foe. (Anthony Eden, Churchill's Foreign Secretary at Yalta, "considered Stalin the toughest negotiator he had ever encountered in his long diplomatic career and claimed that if he had to pick a negotiating team, Stalin would be his first choice.")

So FDR and Churchill opted for a set of actions that would keep open dialogue and diplomacy over Poland and Eastern Europe. According to Plokhy, even "decades after the conference, with the benefit of hindsight, new archival findings, and tons of research, it is still very difficult to suggest any practical alternative to the course they took." And soon after Yalta, external events rendered impossible continuation of the sort of dialogue and diplomacy practiced by FDR and Churchill at Yalta - among them, the sudden death of FDR (perhaps so soon after Yalta because of the physical demands of the nearly three-week trip), the ouster from power of Churchill and the Conservatives in the U.K., and the detonation of atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, introducing a whole new dimension to the realm of geopolitics.

YALTA: THE PRICE OF PEACE is first-rate history. To me, it is mind-boggling to consider the multitude of complex issues that the Big Three had to address in a few short days at Yalta - for example, the role of France in post-War Europe, treatment of a defeated Germany and the issue of reparations, Poland (both its borders and the constitution of its government), repatriation of POWs and other displaced nationals, the Balkans, the United Nations, and conditions for Russian entry into the war against Japan. Plokhy discusses the ins and outs and back and forths relating to these issues competently, thoroughly, and (but for a few instances) clearly. The narrative contains enough background and stage-setting and sufficient anecdotes and human-interest stories to make it quite readable. I have not read any competing histories, but it is difficult for me to believe that any might be better for the general reader.

I will give S.M. Plokhy, he does try to tell the story of Yalta from the basis of what happened and what the actual dynamics were behind it. Gone are the ideas of certain groups being sold out by some evil conspiracy, this work focuses on the fact that a lot of what went on at Yalta was a combination of realpolitik, and the first fractures in the World War II grand alliance. The book does a great job of demonstrating what was accomplished during the conference and what took place.

This is a very interesting book for those who would like a largely unbiased view of the Yalta conference. Plokhy does a very good job of portraying each party has not totally pure but also with a strong argument to back their own desire. This book is full of the shades of gray that show how any war is settled.

Mao says that to Nixon in Oliver Stone's "Nixon." The idea is that the foibles of individual statesmen bring on the calamities and upheavals that become the raw material of history books. It's a great line and it kept running through my mind while I read "Yalta: The Price of Peace."

The book is a superb reconstruction of the 1945 summit between Roosevelt (dying), Stalin (paranoid), and Churchill (politically insecure). Over the course of several days and many heavy meals, the Big Three played checkers with world politics: they agreed to dismember Germany, to create the UN, to move Poland westward (necessitating the expulsion of millions of Germans), and to give the Soviet Union a protectorate in Manchuria (in exchange for Moscow's agreement to enter the war with Japan). Mao and Nixon would have been impressed -- and jealous.

I don't have much to add to the laudatory Amazon reviews. The writing is clear and occasionally eloquent. The author moves seamlessly between grand strategy and droll biographical comments. His political judgments are balanced. And he taps recently-opened Soviet archives. Highly recommended.

Three months before the end of World War II, the three most powerful leaders of the world met in the small Russian seaport of Yalta. The week long conference focused on current war issues; but more importantly, it would shape future nations, shift the balance of world domination and be the the beginning of the Cold War. Yalta, The Price of Peace by S. M Plokhy, is an indepth and well researched look at this historical event. Using documents that were not available until after the collapse of the Soviet Union and other new archival sources, S. M Plokhy covers every aspect of the meeting where East met West.
On the surface,The Yalta Conference was a success and shaped many world policies. The book covers this well but also goes deep into the minds of Churchill, Stalin and Churchill; a political chess match with powerful egos at play, each with its own agendas. On the table were many important concerns: who would govern Poland, German post war reparations, Russian involvement in the war with Japan, treatment of prisoners of war, creating the United Nations and others. The three leaders, along with their adviser's, played a game of give and take that resulted in definite winners and losers.
What makes this book great is that it not only covers events on the surface, but it goes much further by showing what went on behind the scenes. Stalin would secretly meet with Roosevelt on an issue behind Churchill's back. Churchill would do the same to Roosevelt. Stalin bugged Churchill and Roosevelts' quarters and would know things before they were discussed in conference. We are informed of the truths, lies, agendas, and hidden agendas of all parties and how they played a role at the bargaining table.
Through out the book one questions the success and failures of each leader. Was Roosevelt too soft with Stalin on the fate of Eastern Europe? Did Roosevelt's poor health affect his judgement? Did Churchill's re-election concerns play a role in his decisions? Were Stalin's objectives set in stone? These and many others questions may never be answered as historians still debate them.
The only negative comment about the book is that is was a bit dry in parts. There was too much elaboration on UN voting issues, and other administrative procedures. But, unlike most books on World War II that involve time frames of months and years, this book only covers a week. This may explain why it was slow at times.
As the Russian Army was closing in on Berlin and the Allies were approaching the Elbe, much more was at stake then winning the war; the lives of millions and the future of world politics would move into a new realm. Yalta, The Price of Peace, is a classic account of this historical event and how it affects us even today.

Robert Glasker

I thought this book was terrific. Mr Plokhy, professor at Harvard and author of several award winning works, really knows his history and does an impressive, engaging job of describing the events at the eight day conference which began Feb 4th, 1945 on the southern shore of the Crimea just outside of Yalta. The coverage also inculudes the private dealings that went on at the individual villas housing the leaders. To make it even more interesting, the author creates personal profiles of the "Big Three" and some of their key delegates that really lets you understand the motivations and desires of these key people and of what they were trying to achieve.
In addition, the history of the combatants, including a current status report of the war is discussed in order to make the conference agenda more pertinent and understandable.

Though there wasn't an official log of the conference the author uses the personal diaries of the participants and delegates to recreate the auspicious event. The author even suggests that using the individual diaries is better than a single monograph for with careful study of the various diaries you can pick up nuances and misunderstandings that crept into the negotiations that will lead to trouble in future dealings.

The key conditions discussed are: How will the dismemberment and occupation of Germany be handled. Will the western Allies recognize the retention of lost territories by Stalin. Will Poland stay independent. How will the United Nations be implemented. Will France be treated as an equal among the victors. Will Stalin assist in the defeat of Japan by attacking Manchuria. Roosevelt was also concerned about the big picture: how the new world order would play out, envisioning the US and the USSR at the top of the food chain while Great Britain and France would slide to a distanced second tier. Of course, Churchill did everything he could to prevent that from happening. Part of the problem at the conference was that each leader had different agendas and placed different priorities on these conditions. As the meetings progressed, Churchill and Stalin would frequently argue and it would take FDR, despite his ill health, to moderate between them. Churchill and FDR tried hard to achieve their agendas and Stalin was magnanimous to give in on some of the issues even though he will renege on some of them soon afterwards.
Since the war was almost over and the Red Army, by far the largest of the Allies, was already inside German borders as well as in varying control of Poland, Rumania, Hungary and striving for the Czech Republic and Austria, Stalin held all the aces in this card game. The other two leaders couldn't do much about it now unless WWIII was started. The author was correct to say the Yalta Conference didn't start the Cold War but it was surely a barbinger of it.

I particularly enjoyed the extended coverage of President Roosevelt. Part of the coverage dealt in how he separated himself from Churchill but embraced Stalin. FDR disliked British colonialisn / imperialism and wanted to see it disappear but he accepted the aggressive nature of Stalin and the Soviet Union as being necessary for their own protection. I find this attitude very naive and inexplicable. The author includes many quotes of the participants which help make his case on these hot topics.
There is a chapter "After Roosevelt" that discusses Truman and the beginnings of the Cold War which was good. In "Epilogue", the author sums up the people, their relationships to each other and an appraisal of the conference. The last paragraph, which is to long to quote but it concerns the costs a democratic president has to pay to partner with a totalitarian dictator, was perfect and worth the price of the book by itself.
The author includes six maps and a few but interesting photos of the participants. As expected as an academic, a scholarly Notes section and Index are provided.

The author presents a comprehensive account of this event and a balanced account of the three leaders, showing good and bad points of each.
This book was very enlightening and easy to follow and would be suitable for novice or old pro and its highly recommended.

No meeting provided as much promise and ultimate disappointment to so many as the Yalta Conference between Big Three (Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston S. Churchill and Joseph Stalin) and their lieutenants met to determine the future of Europe in the peace that was to follow the impending defeat of Nazi Germany. Yalta: The Price of Peace is one of the most lucid and balanced works on this critical moment in Second World War history. Plokhy has utilized American, British and Russian official `protocols' of the conference, individual participant diaries and writings, and the expanse of time to reconstruct for the reader the contexts of negotiations, the negotiations themselves and a basis for understanding in the 21st Century.

Plokhy argues with much support, that the 'failure' of Yalta was not what it seems today in the shadow of the Cold War, nor that the Western Allies were inept in their handling of Stalin. Rather the Western Allies got essentially what they wanted from Yalta - FDR got Stalin's assurance to enter the war against the Japanese and final commitments on the future UN organization; while Churchill got to preserve Britain's Imperial hold on the Med and extend it into Central Europe the Balkins (or he trusted that Stalin agreed to these things). That the Poles and so many other peoples of Central and Eastern Europe were apparently abandoned by the West to the beast from the east is something we see largely in hindsight. This is not to say that Churchill and Roosevelt (FDR to a lesser extent to be sure) did not recognize the moral dilemma that had generated for the future generations of democratic nations - they did, but they were essentially powerless to prevent it. Stalin 'possessed' much of the land that would eventually end up being part of the post war Soviet Union and the Western Allies had gotten their 'wants' - thus the Poles and others were sad but unavoidable sacrifices to be made for a greater peace. That Churchill and Roosevelt were wrong in their trust of Stalin is hindsight.

In the final analysis Yalta: The Price of Peace is likely to stand for some time as one of the benchmarks of studies on this period in world history. Thorough research and thoughtful evaluation have been utilized by Plokhy to provide students of history with a piece of work worthy their time and attention.

Plokhy's book is a richly detailed and balanced account of the February 1945 Crimean conference between Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill. He joins authors Margaret McMillian ("1919"), Adam Zamoyski ("Rites of Peace") as authors who have recently penned fine histories of the three major conferences ending Western warfare and geared to general readership. His direct and tight writing style, his detailed research (especially of the daily agenda and topics) and his sharp eye for interesting detail make for a compelling read. Stalin, monstrous as ever, fascinates as a historical heavyweight through his brilliant and deft negotiating skill, honed in the highly perilous world of post Lenin Russian politics. He knew at all times what he wanted and what was needed as the latest Russian autocrat; at times adamantine, checkmating the frustrated Churchill, always the gracious host, flexible on small points, deferential to Roosevelt; bolstered by the strategic reality that Russian troops were seventy kilometers from Berlin. He is the impresario of this historic meeting. Churchill is the Western realist, frustrated at Roosevelt, cautiously contentious with Stalin, striving to sustain Britain's imperial role in the world but pessimistic nonetheless. Roosevelt, aging and to die within two months, is the free wheeling moderator waging a risky personal presidential diplomacy and intent on convincing Stalin to enter the Pacific theater against the Japanese and joining the nascent United Nations. The interplay of the three titans of history as they grapple with the issues of the post war is what fascinates the reader.

S. M. Plokhy's Yalta is an updated monograph on the conference created with the help of newly accessed archival sources in both Ukraine and Russia. Unlike the recently released monograph on Yalta by Fraser J. Harbutt, he does not offered a new interpretation of Yalta but an updated narrative on the negotiations, which he believes are outdated due to the lack of publications on this event since the end of the Cold War and the opening of former Soviet archives. Plokhy also presents a conclusion that attempts to dispel "myths", but the majority have already been addressed in previous publications on the conference. And although the author does offer a better contextual understanding of the Soviet delegation's position, including "the mindset of the Soviet leaders", his prose is too often marred by attacks on those same leaders.

Whereas the previously mentioned Harbutt views the real split at the beginning of Yalta to be between Churchill and Stalin, Plokhy readily sets up the Western bloc to oppose that of the Eastern in the beginning chapters of his monograph, stating "Stalin...saw both Churchill and Roosevelt as representatives of the same imperialist camp." Plokhy credits Stalin with "exploiting" both Roosevelt and Churchill, claiming "Stalin, who liked to play off his unsuspecting subordinates against one another at the Kremlin, appears to have succeeded in doing the same to the two Western leaders." But he omits the major gaps that already existed in Roosevelt's policies when compared to Churchill, even though he mentions them at various points in the text. For instance, in describing Churchill's reaction to the commitments Roosevelt made in regards to German reparations and Poland, Plokhy states: "Churchill fought to the very end...and felt more betrayed by Roosevelt than by Stalin."

For Plokhy, the Soviets were just as pleased with the outcome of Yalta as the Western Allies. Unfortunately, this satisfaction was based on their own interpretations of what occurred at the conference. "...each side misjudged the other's intentions" and "what followed was a period of mutual distrust and suspicion that helped bring about the Cold War." Thus, Plokhy considers Yalta a stepping stone to the Cold War, which can readily be overshadowed by some of the other conferences he views as being far more detrimental to the Big Three than Yalta. The Crimean conference, for Plokhy, might have left many unanswered questions and a lack of alternatives for the Big Three, "but the main decisions leading to the Cold War were made after" Yalta. Therefore, in his final analysis, Plokhy echoes previous historians in insisting that Yalta's "true significance can be appreciated only by considering it in the context of its own time and peeling off the accretion of multiple layers of Cold War myth."