Customer Reviews

Years of Renewal

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I found HAK's memoirs to reflect the mood of the period they describe. Years of Upheaval was about one of the boldest periods of American foreign policy. The book was equally fascinating and self-confident. The Ford presidency was a period of unprecedented involvement of Congress in the making of foreign affairs, with the unavoidable mishaps that resulted of the difference of policy between the branches of government. I found Years of Renewal too preoccupied on demonstrating who was to blame for the lack of direction in many areas, the usual culprit being the "McGovernite Congress".

Kissinger's political legacy is still with us and the book is a must read to get a historical perspective on the various foreign policy platforms unveiled by the Republican presidential candidates.

A unique aspect of the book is the focus on African diplomacy. Some of the best chapters are about the shuttle diplomacy that lead to majority rule in Rodhesia.

Not enough Secretaries of State contribute to the public record in such a prolific way. HAK's memoirs, however controversial, are necessary to understand that historical period.

Brilliant and intense. Like Churchill, Kissinger not only made history, but was able to write about it. Also like Churchill, one must filter some of what one reads through an understanding of its author. Fair enough.

What the reader gets in all three volumes (and, by the way, his book, "Diplomacy") is an insight into how the post-WWII, post-Soviet world was shaped. To his credit, HAK enunciates his principles, exemplifies them in his actions, and champions them passionately both in victory and in defeat. You may not agree with him, but if you disagree, you are forced to review your assumptions about how the world should and does work. I found the sections on the fall of Vietnam particularly harrowing, as it forced me to review the beliefs I espoused during this troubled time.

A lesser, but still fascinating, facet of the work is the character sketches HAK draws of various leaders. From Julius Nyrere to Gerald Ford (whose virtues are seen far to outweigh his faults), they illuminate the often-Byzantine negotiations depicted.

So read it. Make up your own mind. You may be outraged, you may be frustrated. But you will not be bored.

Henry Kissinger's book, "Years of Renewal," is a complete review of U.S. foreign policy initiatives while he was Secretary of State under President Gerald R. Ford. In it, he details how they built upon the foreign policy successes of the Nixon Administration and laid the foundation for the resurgence of the American spirit seen during the Reagan Administration. From a diplomatic standpoint, this may have been America's finest hour.

With the possible exception of Lincoln, no U.S. president has inherited a nation as severely divided as Gerald R. Ford. Immediately after assuming office, he faced one international crisis after another with a hostile, "McGovernite Congress," and an emasculated intelligence gathering system that made effective response to even the most extreme provocations virtually impossible. Kissinger says throughout, Ford made decisions solely on what was best for the nation, not on what was politically expedient. His reward for such selfless service: defeat in the next election.

Like Kissinger's other works, this book can be read either in individual chapters or be taken as a whole. In each segment he details, what they did, what their options were, the assumptions their actions were based upon, and if unsuccessful, what their fall back plan was to be. In spite of seemingly insurmountable odds, they were able to hold the Atlantic Alliance together, strengthen our ties to the Peoples Republic of China, and keep the Soviets out of both the Middle East and Africa.

The Chinese war philosopher, Sun Tsu said, "In the moment of victory, button your chin strap." History has proven the Soviets should have listened. Given our national paralysis following Vietnam/Watergate, it seemed they could not be stopped. In the international chess game--that is diplomacy at the highest levels--they were stopped through the efforts of a few, dedicated statesmen who blocked them at every turn. The fall of the Soviet Union and Communism was the ultimate result.

This book is a textbook on how to conduct foreign policy. Enlightening and informative, it has inspired me to read Kissinger's other works, "White House Years," and "Years of Upheaval." I highly recommend it to any serious student of the era.

Henry Kissinger's final volume of his memoirs offers a suprisingly fresh and revealing insight into both the Nixon and Ford presidencies. While Kissinger tends to over-explain minute points, the writing is engaging and even funny at times. However, make sure you bring along an expansive vocabulary, for his diction can be quite complex. Kissinger's ego aside, I found it to be an excellent, revealing, and interesting analysis of one of the most fragile eras of American History.

Dr. Kissinger is without question the most regarded and respected Secretary of State in this century - if not in U.S. history. Any work by him I consider to be essential reading, and as such, this was a must-read for me. I have read the three installments of his memoirs, culminating in this one. I will concede to those who don't read a lot of history/current affairs books, this one seems a bit daunting. However, out of the three, this one is certainly quite "readable". It is the best-written of the three; Dr. Kissinger seems to exhibit a great deal more clarity and reflection in this work. Critics of Dr. Kissinger have complained that he is only writing because of some need to make excuses for his foreign policy "blunders" - namely, in regards to Vietnam and the USSR. I would argue emphatically that this book is not such a work. Dr. Kissinger presided over some of the most troubling and chaotic events of the century. While there occasionally is a hint of defense on his part for his actions, it is certainly not a "puff piece" designed to give him a favorable legacy. One must remember that Dr. Kissinger was by and large commended for his actions in the foreign policy arena. History already looks upon him favorably. He is not a monumental screw-up like Robert MacNamara, who is futilely trying to rewrite his legacy with book after book. These are Dr. Kissinger's memoirs, the purpose of which is to shed light and reflect on the events he witnessed and dealt with. Thus, he does not need to make apologies or absolve himself. He is merely writing a historical record of his service, a career that needs no bolstering or "revisionism". I recommend it strongly, not only to those readers of history and foreign policy, but to those of you tired of the incompetents now directing foreign policy for this country. Dr. Kissinger's work must be studied and factored into current world events, because he was the grandmaster of that domain.

It is hard to imagine that any future secretary of state will ever enjoy, if that is the right word, the power and responsibility invested in Henry Kissinger in the critical years 1974-76. For in this time frame he served an unelected president, Gerald R. Ford, on the heels of a constitutional crisis, the forced resignation of another president, Richard M. Nixon. His tenure included the agony of the final days of America's first lost war, the Viet Nam conflict, and the international perception that America was in a state of political disarray. Russia, Cuba, the Arab League, emerging African independence leaders, and scores of others would take advantage of this perception, which was not entirely wrong. The 1974 Congressional elections had brought to power what the author disparagingly referred to as McGovern Democrats seeking to reign in executive excesses of the Nixon years.

This work was published in 1999, a quarter century after the events it narrates, and thus Kissinger must set the table with a lengthy prolegomena of the "Nixon Problem," so to speak. Kissinger, of course, had been there from the beginning in 1969 and does give his own tenure a cohesive organic flow. Though a Harvard professor and Rockefeller Republican, Kissinger proved to be a genuine cold warrior to Nixon's liking. To his credit, Kissinger's fascination with Nixon was tempered by his equally strong admiration for Metternich; thus he was able to channel Nixon's raw knuckle world view into such dramatic accomplishments as the opening to China.

Gerald Ford was no Nixon, for better or worse. Kissinger, who generally subdues his paternalistic tendencies in this work, expresses genuine respect for Ford's decency but does not hide his opinion that Ford's Grand Rapids advisors were not quite ready for prime time, and probably would never be. Thus the table is set for a memoir of a beleaguered yet noble statesman moving incessantly around the globe, hamstrung by a president of modest skills and a slew of elected and bureaucratic enemies back home while maintaining a strong American visage toward the two nuclear superpowers and a staggering range of agendas of every sort.

Self-aggrandizement came so natural to the author in his professional life that those of us who remember his career will scarcely take notice of it in this volume, the third of his executive trilogy. Kissinger believed that Nixon's foreign policy was on an essentially sound trajectory, particularly in relation to Russia and China. Thus his time under Ford was, in the secretary's mind, a crusade to continue this Nixon trajectory without Nixon. Détente, linkage, and triangulation--Kissinger's stock in trade--would be put to the test.

In this 1100+ page work Kissinger spills a lot of ink on his dealings with China. He could hardly have foreseen the economic world order of 2010 and China's role today; in 1974 nuclear holocaust dominated diplomatic concerns, and diplomacy with China was still in its exploratory stages, with Chairman Mao still at the helm. Mao had the good political sense and the long historical view not to unduly burden Kissinger's day about Viet Nam. In other working relationships this would not always be the case.

Kissinger had a better feel for the problems of his Russian counterparts, notably Premier Leonid Brezhnev, who was not as bold as Nixon in disengaging from the past and thus was held hostage to it. Not surprisingly the matter of arms control occupied much of the diplomatic calendar, often in a Russian exercise of face saving. Brezhnev's health and competence were further matters of concern.

Certainly the most maddening and time consuming of Kissinger's international duties involved what has come to be known as his "shuttle diplomacy" between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Again, it is wise to reflect upon the times: Israel had fought back Egypt twice within the past decade, and little progress on such issues as Palestinian refugees could be made before more basic questions of boundaries and security were settled. To his credit Kissinger backed the right horse among Arab leaders, Egypt's Anwar Sadat, who shared something of Kissinger's long view of the region, and it is fair to say that the American secretary of state had certainly improved the prospects of the Carter Administration in the region several years later.

Like his predecessors Kissinger worked with an eye toward the containment of communism. The ever-present threat of communist subversion in the 1970's was always on his mind, even as the American public was re-evaluating this cost, and communism certainly put Africa in Kissinger's sights. The major African flashpoint on his watch was Angola, where Cuba sent a liberation army of sorts in a clear gesture of both invitation to and intimidation of emerging African nations into the communist sphere.

Kissinger's detailed accounts of his African work are intriguing to read. For the most part he was dealing with nations in a state of political adolescence, where aging heroes of the decolonization period wrestled with younger upstarts seeking advantageous international alignments. Kissinger knew many of the senior leaders and describes the charism of each along with the future shock of tribal peoples entering the family of nations.

In Africa, as much as anywhere, we see Kissinger's existential play-calling severely hindered by an anti-war American backlast. In the case of Angola, for example, he was thwarted by the controversial "Tunney Amendment" which prohibited funding of covert American counter insurgence. But throughout his work Kissinger scorns the "McGovernites" in a way that suggests he never quite "got" Viet Nam. Having had no role in starting the war, he apparently believed his work should not be impeded by it, either.

I do commend Dr. Kissinger's decision to take his time in publishing this third volume. The extra time has resulted in a particularly thoughtful analysis of a most peculiar time for American statecraft. The hubris, what there is of it, has been acquired honestly.

Another good book by Henry Kissinger whose brilliance is only exceeded by the man who appointed him the Honorable Richard M. Nixon. Although Kissinger Balance of Powers doctrine proved to be subordinate to Professor's Strauz`s-Hupe Geopolitics outright confrontation of communism under Reagan that caused the collapse of such an immoral depressive political system, this book is still quite remarkable! The insights, review of policies, personalities and off beat stories only add to this superb book. In any event, Kissinger or Strauz`s-Hupe are far more correct in forming, guiding and creating a foreign policy far better than what is now in existence under Madeline Albright and President Clinton. The book points out several problems that will left to others to clean up after Clinton leaves office. At least under Kissinger we had character, respect and consistent leadership that is required for any successful foreign policy. This book reflects on the very things I have mentioned and does well to being a peering critic of today's failures and miscues by a Secretary of State that flunked Geography. Kissinger will be back to give more informative opinions lets hope the days of Half-Bright will not!

I have not completed the book, but I judge it to be less interesting than Vol 1 and 2. He is more caught up in the details, than in the message. I will struggle through it, but would not really recommend it to a good friend.

It is hard to know what to believe in Henry Kissinger's book "Years of Renewal" regarding either the Vietnam War or the detente policy with the Soviets.

A major problem is that the book contains only unclassified material, and Mr. Kissinger has not sought to de-classify hundreds of secret decision memoranda and rules of engagement that he generated. Without these factual records, there is no way to evaluate much of what he has written.

For instance on the Vietnam War, why was the U.S. government, which had beaten two major powers in Europe and Asia in World War II in four years, unable to defeat the third rate power of North Vietnam in eleven years? Why did he keep the stalemate going so long? And how did North Vietnam come up with $20 billion per year in cash to buy the food, equipment, and ammunition to prosecute the war? No clear answers have ever been forthcoming.

Two concessionary detente projects by Mr. Kissinger continue to occupy the current State Department. In 1972 he compromised the Soviet Lend-Lease debt from World War II from its original $11.3 billion in 1945 ($90 billion in today's dollars) down to $722 million, and it would become payable in installments at 3% interest only when the Soviets received most-favored-nation trade status. Twenty years later in 1992 President George Bush granted MFN to the Russians. However, the State Department refuses to collect any principal or interest on this debt, and conducts an annual renegotiation with the Russians to put off collecting for the American taxpayer.

As a parting shot as Secretary of State in January 1977, Mr. Kissinger conducted a pre-emptory giveaway to the Soviets of eight Alaskan islands in the Arctic Ocean and Bering Sea including the 200 nautical mile ocean zone around them with billion of dollars of fishing, petroleum, and other resources. He created a maritime boundary line that put all these on the Soviet side. No negotiations, no quid pro quo, no notification to Congress, no participation by State of Alaska, no public debate, no news release. A maritime boundary line should have been a matter of enormous historic and economic discussion. The Soviet official who received the diplomatic note was grateful, but nonplused, as reported by a telegram from the U. S. Embassy in Moscow: "He did ask, as a personal aside, whether it was not customary to negotiate or at least discuss such matters before giving notice about enforcement provisions."

This detente giveaway remains today as an executive agreement with the Russians and is subject to revision at the will of the State Department. The State Legislature of Alaska has wanted to scrap the whole thing for years. Its most recent expression is HJR27 which passed the House nearly unanimously and is pending in the Senate. For the State Department's current stance, Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering is working toward conceding even more sea territory to the Russians in face of their demand for 300 million pounds per year of fishing rights to be taken from American fishermen. His most recent negotiations took place in Seattle in January, but the public, Congress, State of Alaska, and the news media were not invited.

Mr. Kissinger's book has a puzzling silence or vagueness about these detente concessions. The American public deserves more openness.

Sincerely,

Carl Olson Chairman State Department Watch

YEARS OF RENEWAL by Henry Kissinger

The book covers Kissinger's years as Ford's Secretary of State, but contains no mention of East Timor. Indonesia invaded East Timor less than a day after President Ford and Kissinger left Indonesia after a state visit.

This blatant act of aggression, which has been regularly condemned by the United Nations (UN) Security Council, the UN General Assembly, and the International Court of Justice, resulted in the deaths of over 200,000 people, more than one third of the population. Proportionately, this ranks as one of the worst cases of genocide since World War II.

As Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, along with President Ford, was in Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia, literally hours before the invasion. It is now known that as early as August of 1975, Dr. Kissinger informed the rulers of Indonesia that the United States government would not object to an invasion of East Timor. In fact, the Indonesian government delayed the assault, at the request of the US government, until Ford and Kissinger had left the country.

Over the next twelve months, as many as 100,000 East Timorese were killed by the Indonesian Army, according to human rights groups like Amnesty International. estimony given before Congress revealed that 90% of the weapons used by Indonesia had been supplied by the United States. This was in direct violation of a treaty that stipulated their use for defensive purposes only.

So much for Dr. Kissinger's humanity. So much for his commitment to history.