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With Zeal and with Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America, 1775-1783 (Campaigns and Commanders)

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_With Zeal and with Bayonets Only_ is the most important book on the military side of the American Revolution to see print in this century. It completely revolutionizes our view of battle in the War of Independence. Everything that came before it dealing with combat in this conflict is obsolete and must be reconceptualized and rewritten.

Based on metciulous research, _With Zeal and with Bayonets Only_ is both well written and authoritatively argued. Matthew H. Spring succeeds in vindicating the reputation of the British troops who attempted to crush American independence. They were not hidebound, unthinking machines good only for parade-ground evolutions and set-piece European battles.

The British Army that fought in North America from 1775 to 1783 was what modern American officers call "a thinking army." British officers, such as William Howe, were well aware that they had to adapt to American conditions from the outset, and they trained all their foot soldiers to function like light infantry. After Bunker Hill, they invariably led their Redcoats into battle in open order. Lacking large amounts of cavalry, they trained their foot soldiers to move quickly to overtake and strike a speedy foe. In battle, the Redcoats usually sought a quick decision. They preferred to close to within 75 yards of the enemy, fire a volley, and then charge with the bayonet. These tactics brought them victory more often than not.

Spring realizes, of course, that the British lost the war, and he explains how these frequently successful tactics contributed to that defeat. The fact that British officers tried to clinch victory on the battlefield reflected an improper appreciation for the political dimensions of the Revolution. In addition, pressing the enemy with troops deployed in loose order worked only so long as the attackers were superior to their foes. As the Revolution progressed and the Continental Army upgraded its own fighting skills, the Redcoats' tactical practices backfired on them -- as seen at Cowpens and Guilford Court House.

Nevertheless, Spring demonstrates that the British Army of the Revolution was a much more formidable force than most Americans realize. His book makes General George Washington's victory seem all the more incredible and admirable.

_With Zeal and with Bayonets Only_ is must reading for anyone who wants to think they possess any real understanding of the American War of Independence.


Gregory J. W. Urwin

Professor of History, Temple University
Associate Director, Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy at Temple University
General Editor, Campaigns and Commanders, University of Oklahoma Press
Member, Board of Trustees, Society for Military History
Academic Fellow, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies
Fellow, Company of Military Historians

For anyone who is deeply involved in the AWI this is a must. It will clear any patriotic fervor and misconceptions about the British army in the Revolution in your mind. Also the author makes the case rather inadvertently that the militia and an armed general populace is what prevented the revolution from collapsing to the encroachment of the British Army victory after victory in the field. It even quotes Cornwallis disdain for the militia but also his recognition of how they bled the British army piecemeal in a small unit engagements.

This is an excellent volume on how the British actually fought the AWI. It debunks several myths about tactics and operations. It is not a history of the war battle-by-battle, which really is not needed anyway. Great chapters on British firepower, reliance on bayonet charges, etc. A few minor flaws, such as a rather confusing chapter on drill, movements from column into line, etc., in which the author's prose in explanations is hopelessly confusing. Nevertheless, the book as a whole is excellent and nicely produced by the publishers. I recommend it without any reservations.

This is an excellent book of scholarly research , as such the author has a penchant (strong tendency) to use little used french expressions ( ex. petite guerre , bete noir ) and English slang of the 18Th century . That said the book is a great resource for understanding the British Army's response to " The American style of War "( their term ) . It makes the case that the British Army was not a bunch of automatons marching in a row stupidly to their death . But were a quick to learn and adjust to the situations they encountered , after all they won most their battles and dominated the armies of the rest of the world for 200 years . They made extensive use of their own rangers , which they first organized for fighting the French in America , and created special response units to cope with a quick enemy. The author does a good job of explaining the strategy and tactics used and the enormous logistical problems the Brits faced as well as the Americans in feeding and clothing their soldiers . They too often went hungry . Also showed the striking difference in the German soldiers compared to British both in attitudes and habits . Five stars for content four for writing style . It is a slow read for the most part but worth it. This is a must have book for understanding the British Army in America . When you see how tough the English were you will be even more impressed by the final American victory .

WITH ZEAL AND WITH BAYONETS ONLY: THE BRITISH ARMY ON CAMPAIGN IN NORTH AMERICA, 1775-1783
MATTHEW H. SPRING
UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA PRESS, 2008
HARDCOVER, $34.95, 352 PAGES, ILLUSTRATIONS, MAPS, CHARTS, BIBLIOGRAPHY, INDEX


The 18th Century British soldier might easily have been excused for suspecting that he had very few friends. To most contemporary politicians, the British Army was no more than an unwelcome necessity in wartime and an unjustifiable extravagance in peacetime. Nevertheless, the overall impression which is to be gained from a close study of the British Army's own records, and from the surviving letters, diaries, and memoirs left behind by its officers (and occasionally by its men), is that by and large, the British Army of the 18th Century was very little different in character or in spirit from today's British Army. It was, above all, an army which was led, not driven, into battle. Curiously enough there was, in a very real sense, not one British Army but two: a British or English Establishment, and an Irish Establishment. The former was of course the senior of the two, but constitutionally rather precarious, and always liable to swinging cuts whenever a case could be made for declaring units surplus to requirements. However, by an Act of 1699, Ireland was allocated a separate military establsihment of 12,000 officers and men (raised to 15,325 in 1769), paid and administered from Dublin Castle. Obviously Ireland could occasionally be stripped of men in times of crisis and in response to a European war the establishment might temporarily be increased; but the important point was that in peacetime it wasn't to be reduced below 12,000 men. The Irish Army-made up of units raised in Scotland and England-was primarily intended for the defense and internal security of that country. Nevertheless, apart from the Viceroy's ceremonial Battleaxe Guards (dressed similarly to the English Yeomen of the Guard), no regular units were permanently assigned to the Irish Establishment-though the four regiments of 'Irish' Horse might have been forgiven for thinking otherwise; and on being ordered overseas or on service a battalion automatically reverted to the English Establishment. Soldiers received basic training in drilling and weaponry on joining the army, but battalion maneuvers and training in collaboration between different arms of the service was hampered by the fact that the British Army was scattered around Britain. There were some peacetime "camps of instruction," and in wartime, regiments often assembled in Britain to perfect their own advanced training and to work with other units. In the summer of 1774, seven light companies came together in camp near Salisbury to have William Howe teach them his excellant new system of skirmishing drills. Howe based his tactics on his own experience of the 1754-1763 French and Indian War, and many senior officers were also combat veterans. But the overwhelming mjority of officers and men had no combat experience before they reached North America. Author Matthew H. Spring has shown that regimental colors and grenadier caps were rarely seen in North America, as dress was radically modified to meet local demands. Moreover, many regiments had short histories, and the practical demands of campaigning meant that new men were constantly entering their ranks. Nevertheless, there is abundant evidence that unit identity mattered greatly to British soldiers serving in America. Who were these Redcoats who so often fought so effectively? The rank and file of the British Army during the American War of Independence were, in theory, volunteers, who had signed on after listening to a regimental recruiting party of an officer, a sergeant, and a couple of drummers. Not a few "volunteers" were tricked, having gone to bed in a tavern, drunk, and been rudely awakened with a hangover and the king's shilling in their pocket. More found hunger the most eloquent recruiting sergeant. In emergencies, the government authorized the compulsory enlistment of "all such able-bodied, idle, and disorderly persons who can't...prove themselves to exercise...some lawful trade or employment."

In April, 1775, just over half the rank and file came from England and Wales, the remainder from Scotland and Ireland. Most British soldiers in North America weree infantrymen: just over 60 regiments of foot served there for at least part of the war, though accurate accounting is complicated by the raising, in North America, of units then carried on the regular establishment. Only two regular cavalry regiments-the 16th and 17th Light Dragoons-were sent overseas, though the use of Loyalist horsemen somewhat made up for Britain's shortage of cavalry. The British Army, traditionally small by the standards of such major European powers as France or Prussia, expanded with war and contracted with peace. During the American Revolution, its establishment rose to seven battalions of foot guards and 111 battalions in the line, with 30 regiments of cavalry (use of the term "battalion" poses other questions, but at this time most regiments had a single battalion)). Each British battalion had 10 companies, eight battalion companies-their soldiers known as "hatmen" for the tricorn hats they wore-and two flank companies, one light and the other grenadier, whose members also wore distinctive caps. At its full establishment strength, an infantry battalion should have numbered around 600 officers and men, in North America most British battalions were smaller. There were sharp differences between the officers of British horse and foot regiments and the "gentlemen of the ordnance." Artillery and engineer officers were commissioned after passing through the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich and then promoted by seniority. Young men who sought commissions in the horse and foot had to produce a letter testifying to gentlemanly status and could then buy the rank of ensign (for the infantry) or cornet (for the cavalry). Then, subject to regulations that increasingly demanded time in rank, they could buy promotion as vacancies became available. But an officer could only buy his way to lieutenant colonel, after which all promotion was by seniority. What seemed a simple system was actually complex. Although most first commissions between 1660 and 1871 were purchased, in wartime the abundance of first commissions as new units were raised outstripped the supply of young gentlemen whose families were prepared to disgorge a substantial sum and thus give their son a chance at a early death. Free commissions might be obtained by the active interest of powerful men, by joing the regiment as a gentleman volunteer, or to be commissioned from the ranks. Vacancies created when an officer died or was killed were filled by seniority within the regiment. British tactics in America are only now being properly understood.

The pressure to make infantry more agile predated the war and tactics, dress, and equipment were modified to enable infantry to deal with irregular opponents in the wild or forested country, and officers ensured that "regiments are frequently practiced at firing with ball at marks." However, tension remained about the relationship between musketry and cold steel. Some officers admired the Prussian pattern, in which infantry slammed out volleys as rapidly as possible. But this was incompatible with combat in broken country, and volley fire was arguably more difficult in practice than it was in theory. Although the infantry certainly hammered away toe to toe at some battles, like Camden in August, 1780, such instances were less common than we might think. When attacking, the British generally fired a single volley at close-range-say, as little as 35 yards-cheered and then charged with the bayonet, a tactic that often broke their opponents. The British didn't lack cavalry in North America because they had none to send but because the terrain meant they could rarely go beyond tactical victory to destroy the beaten army. Nor were successful infantry charges necessarily useful in woodland, for the advantages of discipline and unit cohesion enjoyed by regulars were at a discount in a formless battle. American Major General Nathanael Greene (together with General George Washington) recognized that defeating the British might well involve losing every battle but ensuring that the beaten Continental Army retained enough cohesion to fight another day. That unconventional strategy was rightly observed and noted by some of the British officers like Colonel Banastre Tarleton at the Battle of Guilford Courthouse which he wrote was a pointless victory as "a defeat of the British would have been attended with a total destruction of Cornwallis' infantry, whilst a victory at this juncture could produce no very decisive consequence against the Americans." American successes, on the other hand, often had an impact far beyond America's shores, in strictly military terms, General Burgoyne's defeat at Saratoga wasn't a major event, but it encouraged the French to join the war, presenting the British with a conflict of strategic priorities in which ultimately safeguarding the British Isles would be more important than retaining control of North America. Cornwallis' surrender at Yorktown had an even greater effect, for it persuaded the British political establishment, always of two minds about the war, that the game was up. In truth, the king's men had no answer to what Spring has called "Rebel resillence." An experienced German officer maintained that after initial British failure to nip the rebellion in the bud, "the Rebels couldn't help but become soldiers." And so they did. British inability to destroy the Continental Army was central to their greater failure to convince the colonial population that rebellion would be extinguished. And populations can defy purely military predicitions.

WITH ZEAL AND WITH BAYONETS ONLY: THE BRITISH ARMY ON CAMPAIGN IN NORTH AMERICA, 1775-1783 isn't just a painstakingly researched book but one that provides a long and much needed honest appraisal that cuts through the enduring myths, half-truths, and legends of how and why the British Army fought the way it did in the American Revolution. Spring's book belongs on the shelf of any serious student of the American Revolution.



Lt. Colonel Robert A. Lynn, Florida Guard
Orlando, Florida

This is an eye-opening book that told me more about the British military in the Revolution than anything I have ever read on the topic, including first-hand accounts. It literally turns conventional (American) wisdom on its head in its well researched and meticulously presented analysis of evolving British tactics during the war. It explains the good but is not a partisan account in that it also unflinchingly addresses the bad, such as the pervasive British contempt for American militia, their all-too-frequent failure to give quarter and their own undisciplined excesses in bayonet charges. As the author of Braddock's March (Westholme Publishing 2009), I highly recommend this study to anyone with a serious or even amateur interest in the military aspects of the Revolution.

Most books about the American War for Independence tend to be either popular works focusing on key characters or grand narratives or scholarly works emphasizing social or strategic issues. Mathew H. Spring, in With Zeal and With Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in Northern America, 1775-1783, fills a gap in the historiography by developing an operational history of the British army during the American War for Independence. He challenges common stereotypes of the British as slavishly following eighteenth century linear warfare by persuasively arguing that British forces intelligently adapted their tactics to the conditions and constraints facing them in America, which allowed them to consistently win military victories.

Conventional history paints a picture of the British stoically exchanging fire from its rows of infantry, squared off to face the opponent. Yet, in the desultory warfare of colonial America, often fought in skirmishes in light woods, Spring contends that the British moved away from deeply packed columns and "fought two deep and with generous intervals between files (page 139)." Moreover, Spring notes the British forces' adoption of bayonet charges and shock tactics in response to rebel commanders' predilection for posting their troops behind walls and the like to protect them from British fire (page 216). Consequently, the British created new units of handpicked men who could be counted on to charge and meet their opponents at close range, often causing the American militias to flee in panic (page 219-220). Frequently these charges were part of a larger plan to encircle or flank the rebels by other forces.

Indeed, Spring notes that British strategy included not only various tactical means, but also employed ruses and tricks to entice the wary rebel commanders into seeking open battle (page 51). While this was partly due to the Americans' general avoidance of pitched battles in the open, it was also because of the British desire for tactical victory. This made the British increasingly conservative in taking any risk that might decrease their hard-to-replace forces or draw the ire of their superiors at court. Spring echoes John Shy by arguing that the British believed that tactical victories would convince a generally undecided American populace to back the stronger of the two sides (page 21).

One interesting note on Spring's research that might draw the attention of the critical reader is his use of research by practitioners of living history. Typically, these enthusiasts and amateurs would cause academic concern. However, Spring carefully analyzes their research, augmented with his careful research, to provide a deeper and richer scholarly work with a lively feeling. Another minor quibble is Spring's intense focus on British operations. This may leave some readers hoping for more coverage of American tactics, social events, and the like, but as Spring points out, ample coverage of these topics is available. Unlike many scholarly works, Spring manages to remain focused on his topic while creating scholarly and engaging book that will garner the attention of laymen and serious historians alike.

Last year, I became aware of an amazing series of military histories now being published by the University of Oklahoma Press. The series is called the CAMPAIGNS AND COMMANDERS SERIES. Under the general editorship of Dr. Gregory J. W. Urwin, the advisory board includes such distinguished historians as Lawrence E. Babits, David Glantz, Victor Davis Hanson, and Herman Hattaway.
The books in this series range from about 250 to 300 pages. While written as academic studies, rather than merely popular histories, they still contain a high degree of readability. The books are being published in really well done hardback editions, or the cheaper, but still attractive paperback versions.

When we Americans view the War for Independence through our classroom memories and Hollywood productions, we tend to think the British were regimented, tradition bound, ruled by protocol and hierarchy, and programmed like machines in battle. With bright red uniforms blazing in the sun, long straight lines marching in rank, and drums announcing their approach, the British were ripe targets for crusty old veterans of bear hunts and Indian skirmishes.
The American victory can by no means be devalued, but the skill and near success of the British army should be given its due. As Spring notes, "[T]he King's troops won the vast majority of their battlefield engagements in America because they tailored their conventional tactical methods intelligently to local conditions--very much as they had done in similar circumstances during the French and Indian War."
Several crucial facts emerge from that sentence. First, the British won most of the battles. Second, the British military was flexible in adapting to the contingencies of war. Such tactics might not suit Hollywood sets, but it reflects the true situation. Third, the British won the French and Indian War, which was, by all accounts, one of the great world wars of all history.
This book is a serious, detailed study of different aspects of the British army. The various chapters cover operational constraints, tactics, marching and deploying of troops, advancing in battle, use of firepower and bayonets, and the difficulties of fighting a war in wilderness areas of North America. The minute examination this book gives to soldiering in the British army is not the easiest of reading experiences. But it adds depth to our understanding of both sides in the war.
Even though this book drastically enhanced my appreciation for the British army, I would like to build from this book an explanation as to why the American side won.

The Americans won because they followed a Fabian strategy. The American army determined after Washington's retreat from Manhattan in 1776 and the fall of Philadelphia to engage the King's troops under controlled conditions, and thus they avoided confrontations when the terrain was not to their advantage. They were using time and space to win the war, not necessarily battles. Along with this, the American army did strike offensively, but only when near unique opportunities arose, such as at Trenton and Princeton. As Nathaniel Greene said, "I would always hazard an attack when the misfortune cannot be so great to us as it may bed to the enemy." Another aspect of their (our!) success was the destruction of isolated British forces. This left the American forces generally in control of the countryside. So the British won battles and occupied cities, but could never control the land. As one British general said, "How impossible must it prove to conquer a country, where repeated successes cannot ensure permanent advantages."
The Americans won because they possessed adequate firearms. To quote Spring, "Perhaps the war's most unorthodox dimension, and the most fundamental barrier to the restoration of British authority, was the fact that the great majority of the adult white male population had access to modern firearms...." The fact that most men had a flintlock and a bayonet handy enabled the colonies to field armies that at least were comparable to the forces they opposed.
The Americans won because of the constraints of the British army. Spring lists several constraints. First, commanders had to take care not to take actions that would galvanize the Patriot cause. A ruthless victory could, and sometimes did, result in greater opposition. Second, their limited manpower resources prevented their taking unnecessary risks, even though victory in battle often results from taking risks. Supplying their troops (logistics) created real difficulties, along with obtaining intelligence from the locals. And, the topography of the battle areas tended to favor defensive operations, thus favoring the American side. In effect, to win the war, all the Americans had to do was to keep from losing the war. They simply could wear down and outwait the enemy, and occasionally pop them with an unexpected set-back.

The Americans won because they were resilient. The British army won battle after battle. Yet tactical victories and control of the battlefields after the shooting stopped often did not translate into strategic victories. Each British victory resulted in the loss of their own troops. No British victories resulted in the total defeat of the American armies. And no defeat convinced the colonial population that ultimate victory could be obtained. As Spring points out, during Britain's previous wars, the British infantry, and their effective use of musketry, earned them a reputation for being among the best infantry in the world. Still, the long string of victories and the years of warfare over America's quest for independence resulted in a British defeat.

The common conception of the British army fighting the American Revolution in tightly-packed ranks, getting picked off and shot to pieces by crafty revolutionaries, has survived for generations now. A generation ago, American historians discovered, and demonstrated, that the Continental Army actually fought in more regular formation much of the time, and that it was this transformation from an ill-disciplined militia to a trained army that convinced many Europeans that America was worthy of nationhood. Within the last few years there's been a recasting of the picture of the British Army during the Revolution, with the Redcoats turning out to be not quite as dumb and tactically clumsy as everyone thought for many years. The result is a reappraisal of the way the American Revolution was fought, and why things came out the way they did.

This current book, by Matthew Spring, is a good example of this revision of the history of the American Revolution. Author Spring spent considerable time going over orders that British officers gave their regiments, how they intended those regiments to fight, what formations they wanted to use, etc. The interesting thing to note is that while the British army, when it was in Europe, formed its troops in three ranks with the files very close to one another, here in America they formed in two ranks, with the files much more spread out. The reason was that, in Europe, the troops were formed in such tight formations in part to protect them from enemy cavalry charges. In America, there wasn't much cavalry, largely because the lack of forage made having that many horses with your army impossible logistically, the regiments could more safely deploy in a looser formation. In addition, the Rebel forces almost always had more troops on the field, and they tended to operate in loose formation. This meant that if the British *didn't* spread out, they'd almost inevitably be flanke, and swamped. The resulting thin formations were less effective when making bayonet charges, but given the Rebels' lack of bayonets the British overlooked this. The formations also tended to be somewhat brittle when they suffered casualties, but the officers in charge never came up with another solution to this dilemma. It's an interesting discussion, especially given that the various German mercenaries the King hired never did adapt their tactics to the new World, with the result that their formations were much more vulnerable to Rebel fire than their British counterparts.

The book is very scholarly. It's not the best-written thing ever. It's full of technical detail, and the author doesn't even sort of make an attempt to sort things chronologically. If you're looking for any of those things, you should look elsewhere. If you want to understand how the British army actually fought, during the American Revolution, this book, and Mark Urban's "Fusiliers" are the two best books on the subject.

This book focuses on the details of how a British Battalion was used in combat during the AWI. Light Infantry and Grenadiers became the backbone of Howe's army. Provides a lot of reference and source material of Officers and Soldiers thoughts and views of engagements. Gave me a new perspective on the soldiers, battles and the tactics used. I am American and the author is British. So some reading the book might think the author is biased but I felt he provides source material to support his reasoning.