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67 of 67 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Healy vs Glantz, June 15, 2009
This review is from: Zitadelle: The German Offensive Against the Kursk Salient 4-17 July 1943 (Hardcover)
I've read David Glantz's book on Kursk and thought very highly of it. Then I discovered the rave reviews for Mark Healy's book and had to read and compare the two books.
Both books are well researched and are 5 star quality but the authors have different styles and formats. One book is a little better on one category but comes in second on another.
Mr Healy has spent a little more than half the book on the preparation and introduction to the campaign. It starts with the relationship of Hitler and Manstein at the time of the Kharkov Offensive and then expands on the discussion with Zeitzler, Manstein and other generals in deciding on which form of the Kursk Offensive: the "Fronthand" or the less aggressive "Backhand Approach". Once decided, Mr Healy enumerates every situation or condition that will have an effect on the offensive. Its an extensive analysis that is impressive. It includes Stalin's spy ring, Churchill's notification of the offensive to Stalin, Hitler's delays, planning the offensive, Luftwaffe support, panzer production troubles, partisan interaction, Lend Lease assistance to Stalin and much more. I particularly liked the discussion on Hitler's views on Manstein. It was also significant how many of the generals disavowed the "Backhand" approach.
Mr Glantz also discusses such items but not in as much length or detail. This area goes to Healy.
The next area to compare would be Wonder Weapons and tanks in general. Mr Glantz discusses Hitler's new panzers in chapter one and in chapter two a little about Russian armor. The Tigers, Panthers and Elephants are furthered discussed throughout the book. Mr Healy devotes an entire section of 7 chapters - Part Three- to the subject of wonder weapons and tank tactics. The presentation is impressive. Mr Healy wins here.
Mr Healy spends 170 pages on the offensive while David Glantz spends 176 pages. The volume is about the same but Glantz lists more engagements while Healy is more selective but gives greater depth to each selection. Mr Glantz covers the tank battles near Prokhorovka more fully. This is a close call but for me, I'll give it to Glantz.
I have an interest for July 9th for its a pivotal day in the campaign. The moves and counter moves made that day will lead to the tank battles near Prokhorovka just two days later. Both authors cover the day well but Mr Healy writes an auxiliary chapter, Chapter 37, that discusses the Soviet contention that it was their blocking of Oboyan that caused the Germans to shift to the east toward Prokhorovka which resulted in the massive tank battles. He presents evidence to the contrary, that it was in the German battle plan back in May to shift to the northeast. Very interesting chapter. In a related matter, Mr Healy refutes Soviet claims of destroying thousands of panzers in the first few days. This theory is confirmed on July 13th when Manstein argues with Hitler to continue the battle in the south. Both Mansttein and Kempf were confident that by continuing the assault, Soviet tank reserves could be shattered.
Near the end of Chapter 4, Mr Glantz states in his book that due to the stalled advance of Kempf and the stiff resistance facing 48th PzC driving north toward Oboyan that Hoth orders the 2nd SS PzC to shift its axis toward Prokhorovka. This would be more in tune with Soviet doctrine and a difference with Mr Healy.
Another point of related interest is the number of tanks destroyed in the campaign. Both authors have similar comments and quote similar numbers for this topic. An important point is that the Germans were able to recover many damaged tanks for use in future battle. About 325 panzers were destroyed while another 1600 damaged panzers were recovered for future use. Its estimated that the Russians lost 1614 tanks, five times the number of German losses. This topic is a draw.
In one area both authors were skimpy on and that is the battle for the skies. This is not unusual for Mr Glantz but he does mentions in Chapter 3 the condition of the Luftwaffe in the area before the start of the battle. Mr Healy does discuss a little fuller on the air war in Chapter 16. Both books may disappoint some people on this subject. If so, Christer Bergstrom's book has excellent coverage of the air war.
Each author ends his book with Conclusions. The main theme to both books is the future implications to the lessening of German offensive capabilities. Both are good but Glantz is more extensive and he takes this area.
Both books have pictures but "Zitadelle" has many move and better ones and in this area it clearly wins.
Both books have maps but "Battle of Kursk" has more and better ones, interspersed throughout the narrative and easy to study as your reading. Mr Healy only has a few maps at the beginning of the book. He does have a map of the July 12th tank battle which was helpful. Mr Glantz wins here.
Both books have Appendix. They're similar but "Battle of Kursk" is more extensive and Glantz wins here.
This is my simple, amateur ratings contest. People, of course, will weigh things differently. Owning either one will make you a winner, but the best choice is to have both books in your library; they really do complement each other.
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29 of 32 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Don't Miss this Book !, March 22, 2009
This review is from: Zitadelle: The German Offensive Against the Kursk Salient 4-17 July 1943 (Hardcover)
I have read many a book on the battle of Kursk in July 1943,but none as good or as balanced as this particular title.
The book expoldes many a myth and answers many questions which previous authours on this battle have left unanswered.
Much of the works of previous titles have taken as gospel, the writings of Russian Commanders such as Rotmistrov, and Russian figures for destroyed german armour and casulaties that make this battle a decisive and complete victory by the Russians.
The myth of hundreds of Tiger tanks being destroyed has never really been challenged in depth by western Historians, until now.
Mark Healy has put together a superb and extremely well balanced book that explores in great detail as to why this battle was fought, other plans proposed and discarded by the Germans, reasons for the delays in the commencement of the attack, Russian stratedgy, the strengths of opposing forces and the various roles of the opposing armies.
In fact the first 190 pages of the 400 page book explains the leadup to the battle in huge detail.
Some of the facts to emerge were that many of the German panzer and infantry units taking part were very understrength, supplies of Oil/Fuel for the luftwaffe were short, the Russians knew of the german plans and adopted a purely defensive battle plan to blunt the attack, and that Hitler always had one eye on when the allies would land in Italy.
All this is explained well and leaves the reader with no questions as to why, how, when and what was to happen.
The actual battle detail of which it draws from both Russian and German sources shows how it was a close run thing at times where the Russians had to pour in reserves in an effort to stop the German advance particulary in the South where Waffen SS Panzer Corps attacked.
The great tank battle of Prokhorovka is covered in depth and discloses that nearly 400 soviet tanks were destroyed against 17 german tanks and notes that only 3 tigers had been destroyed not 70, this was not a battle that broke the back of the german Panzer arm.
Although the battle at Prokkhorovka was a German local success it marked the high water mark of the attack, and it would be the Germans who would be on the defensive on the Eastern front for the rest of the war.
This is a very easy interesting read, with small print and a large number of photos from the battle depicting Soviet and German armour. There is a nice little 16 page colour profile of these weapons and aircraft involved in the conflict.
The only criticisim I have is that the maps are again black and white and are grouped into one section at the begining of the book where you have to flick back all the time to look
However I thouroghly enjoyed this book and is well worth the money spent on it
It makes a nice companion on your book shelf to explain the battle next to "Operation Citadel volumes 1 & 2 " by J Restayn & N Moller who have an excellent photo album on this battle
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22 of 24 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Clear, Consise & Challenging History, April 9, 2009
This review is from: Zitadelle: The German Offensive Against the Kursk Salient 4-17 July 1943 (Hardcover)
This is an excellent book written in a clear, consise fashion that examines the battle of Kursk in detail. The author looks into the military & political situation prior to Operation Zitadelle & argues that the operation came into being as a miltary solution to a political problem faced by Hitler in that he had to restore his allies confidence in the belief of the ultimate defeat of the Soviet Union.
The Russians became fully aware of the German intentions to attack the Kursk salient thru Enigma, the Lucy spy ring & by reading German radio communications. They then employed deceptive Maskirovka measures to disguise the level & degree of defences that they intended to grind the panzer formations down with. The Zitadelle offensive was continiously delayed by Hitler to the extent that strategic surprise had been totally compromised. Hitler was relying on the build up of the new Tiger, Panther & Ferdinand tanks by which to overwhelm the Russians with, but his real attention was focused on the Mediterranean & Italy causing the delay of Zitadelle & finally its termination thereof.
The author examines the German army & Red army in some detail. While the Red army was starting encourage independence & flexibility of command thru the relaxation of Soviet Party control, Hitler did the opposite & began depriving his commanders of this. The Russians were also far better equipped than they had been throughout 1941-42 & had become a mobilised army with massive amounts of 'Lend Lease' trucks. The German army on the other hand was severely lacking in infantry from the losses incurred in 1941-42. In fact the author argues that the German offensive failed in part due to lack of infantry in that they could not disguise their true intentions nor screen their main battle assets their panzers.
The battle itself is covered off in depth & the author draws on recent works & research that challenges previously Soviet accounts of the battle. In the South Mansteins forces with the 4th Panzer Army made surprising enrodes but Army Detachment Kempf could not keep up & protect their flank partly due to a devastating premptive artillery barrage that destroyed key bridges but also the tenacious Russian resistance.
In the North Model attempted to breach the Russian defences with infantry & then expolit it with armour. However mines took a heavy toll along with an active Soviet airforce & devastating artillery. In fact it is the Soviet artillery that could claim the majority of German infantry & tank losses. The Russian troops no longer suffered from tank shock & would allow German armour to initially pass & then emerge to attack the following infantry & tanks. A breach was acheived in the 1st line of defence but no mobile reserves were utilised by the Germans to exploit. The Russians quickly threw in their reserves to neutralise the threat.
The Clash at Prokhorovka is closely examined. The author provides evidence that Manstein & Hoth always saw this clash as necessary to defeat any planned Russian reserves intervention before closing the ring around Kursk. The Russian history of the destruction the panzer arm at Prokhorovaka is shown to be a huge myth. In fact it is the Russian 5th Tank Army that is almost annihilated but in the process were able to halt the German advance.
Ultimately the author suggests that German tactical briliance was cancelled out by superior & ruthless Russian strategy (in that the Russians would accept any losses as long as victory was attained) & the Russians had massive reserves that the Germans underestimated. By committing to Operation Zitadelle, Hitler was playing into the Russian strengths of defensive warfare & the German strengths of moblile warfare could not be exploited. Recommended reading.
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