Customer Reviews

Zitadelle: The German Offensive Against the Kursk Salient 4-17 July 1943

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I've read David Glantz's book on Kursk and thought very highly of it. Then I discovered the rave reviews for Mark Healy's book and had to read and compare the two books.
Both books are well researched and are 5 star quality but the authors have different styles and formats. One book is a little better on one category but comes in second on another.

Mr Healy has spent a little more than half the book on the preparation and introduction to the campaign. It starts with the relationship of Hitler and Manstein at the time of the Kharkov Offensive and then expands on the discussion with Zeitzler, Manstein and other generals in deciding on which form of the Kursk Offensive: the "Fronthand" or the less aggressive "Backhand Approach". Once decided, Mr Healy enumerates every situation or condition that will have an effect on the offensive. Its an extensive analysis that is impressive. It includes Stalin's spy ring, Churchill's notification of the offensive to Stalin, Hitler's delays, planning the offensive, Luftwaffe support, panzer production troubles, partisan interaction, Lend Lease assistance to Stalin and much more. I particularly liked the discussion on Hitler's views on Manstein. It was also significant how many of the generals disavowed the "Backhand" approach.
Mr Glantz also discusses such items but not in as much length or detail. This area goes to Healy.

The next area to compare would be Wonder Weapons and tanks in general. Mr Glantz discusses Hitler's new panzers in chapter one and in chapter two a little about Russian armor. The Tigers, Panthers and Elephants are furthered discussed throughout the book. Mr Healy devotes an entire section of 7 chapters - Part Three- to the subject of wonder weapons and tank tactics. The presentation is impressive. Mr Healy wins here.

Mr Healy spends 170 pages on the offensive while David Glantz spends 176 pages. The volume is about the same but Glantz lists more engagements while Healy is more selective but gives greater depth to each selection. Mr Glantz covers the tank battles near Prokhorovka more fully. This is a close call but for me, I'll give it to Glantz.
I have an interest for July 9th for its a pivotal day in the campaign. The moves and counter moves made that day will lead to the tank battles near Prokhorovka just two days later. Both authors cover the day well but Mr Healy writes an auxiliary chapter, Chapter 37, that discusses the Soviet contention that it was their blocking of Oboyan that caused the Germans to shift to the east toward Prokhorovka which resulted in the massive tank battles. He presents evidence to the contrary, that it was in the German battle plan back in May to shift to the northeast. Very interesting chapter. In a related matter, Mr Healy refutes Soviet claims of destroying thousands of panzers in the first few days. This theory is confirmed on July 13th when Manstein argues with Hitler to continue the battle in the south. Both Mansttein and Kempf were confident that by continuing the assault, Soviet tank reserves could be shattered.
Near the end of Chapter 4, Mr Glantz states in his book that due to the stalled advance of Kempf and the stiff resistance facing 48th PzC driving north toward Oboyan that Hoth orders the 2nd SS PzC to shift its axis toward Prokhorovka. This would be more in tune with Soviet doctrine and a difference with Mr Healy.

Another point of related interest is the number of tanks destroyed in the campaign. Both authors have similar comments and quote similar numbers for this topic. An important point is that the Germans were able to recover many damaged tanks for use in future battle. About 325 panzers were destroyed while another 1600 damaged panzers were recovered for future use. Its estimated that the Russians lost 1614 tanks, five times the number of German losses. This topic is a draw.

In one area both authors were skimpy on and that is the battle for the skies. This is not unusual for Mr Glantz but he does mentions in Chapter 3 the condition of the Luftwaffe in the area before the start of the battle. Mr Healy does discuss a little fuller on the air war in Chapter 16. Both books may disappoint some people on this subject. If so, Christer Bergstrom's book has excellent coverage of the air war.

Each author ends his book with Conclusions. The main theme to both books is the future implications to the lessening of German offensive capabilities. Both are good but Glantz is more extensive and he takes this area.
Both books have pictures but "Zitadelle" has many move and better ones and in this area it clearly wins.
Both books have maps but "Battle of Kursk" has more and better ones, interspersed throughout the narrative and easy to study as your reading. Mr Healy only has a few maps at the beginning of the book. He does have a map of the July 12th tank battle which was helpful. Mr Glantz wins here.
Both books have Appendix. They're similar but "Battle of Kursk" is more extensive and Glantz wins here.

This is my simple, amateur ratings contest. People, of course, will weigh things differently. Owning either one will make you a winner, but the best choice is to have both books in your library; they really do complement each other.

I have read many a book on the battle of Kursk in July 1943,but none as good or as balanced as this particular title.
The book expoldes many a myth and answers many questions which previous authours on this battle have left unanswered.
Much of the works of previous titles have taken as gospel, the writings of Russian Commanders such as Rotmistrov, and Russian figures for destroyed german armour and casulaties that make this battle a decisive and complete victory by the Russians.
The myth of hundreds of Tiger tanks being destroyed has never really been challenged in depth by western Historians, until now.
Mark Healy has put together a superb and extremely well balanced book that explores in great detail as to why this battle was fought, other plans proposed and discarded by the Germans, reasons for the delays in the commencement of the attack, Russian stratedgy, the strengths of opposing forces and the various roles of the opposing armies.
In fact the first 190 pages of the 400 page book explains the leadup to the battle in huge detail.
Some of the facts to emerge were that many of the German panzer and infantry units taking part were very understrength, supplies of Oil/Fuel for the luftwaffe were short, the Russians knew of the german plans and adopted a purely defensive battle plan to blunt the attack, and that Hitler always had one eye on when the allies would land in Italy.
All this is explained well and leaves the reader with no questions as to why, how, when and what was to happen.
The actual battle detail of which it draws from both Russian and German sources shows how it was a close run thing at times where the Russians had to pour in reserves in an effort to stop the German advance particulary in the South where Waffen SS Panzer Corps attacked.
The great tank battle of Prokhorovka is covered in depth and discloses that nearly 400 soviet tanks were destroyed against 17 german tanks and notes that only 3 tigers had been destroyed not 70, this was not a battle that broke the back of the german Panzer arm.
Although the battle at Prokkhorovka was a German local success it marked the high water mark of the attack, and it would be the Germans who would be on the defensive on the Eastern front for the rest of the war.
This is a very easy interesting read, with small print and a large number of photos from the battle depicting Soviet and German armour. There is a nice little 16 page colour profile of these weapons and aircraft involved in the conflict.
The only criticisim I have is that the maps are again black and white and are grouped into one section at the begining of the book where you have to flick back all the time to look
However I thouroghly enjoyed this book and is well worth the money spent on it
It makes a nice companion on your book shelf to explain the battle next to "Operation Citadel volumes 1 & 2 " by J Restayn & N Moller who have an excellent photo album on this battle

This is an excellent book written in a clear, consise fashion that examines the battle of Kursk in detail. The author looks into the military & political situation prior to Operation Zitadelle & argues that the operation came into being as a miltary solution to a political problem faced by Hitler in that he had to restore his allies confidence in the belief of the ultimate defeat of the Soviet Union.

The Russians became fully aware of the German intentions to attack the Kursk salient thru Enigma, the Lucy spy ring & by reading German radio communications. They then employed deceptive Maskirovka measures to disguise the level & degree of defences that they intended to grind the panzer formations down with. The Zitadelle offensive was continiously delayed by Hitler to the extent that strategic surprise had been totally compromised. Hitler was relying on the build up of the new Tiger, Panther & Ferdinand tanks by which to overwhelm the Russians with, but his real attention was focused on the Mediterranean & Italy causing the delay of Zitadelle & finally its termination thereof.

The author examines the German army & Red army in some detail. While the Red army was starting encourage independence & flexibility of command thru the relaxation of Soviet Party control, Hitler did the opposite & began depriving his commanders of this. The Russians were also far better equipped than they had been throughout 1941-42 & had become a mobilised army with massive amounts of 'Lend Lease' trucks. The German army on the other hand was severely lacking in infantry from the losses incurred in 1941-42. In fact the author argues that the German offensive failed in part due to lack of infantry in that they could not disguise their true intentions nor screen their main battle assets their panzers.

The battle itself is covered off in depth & the author draws on recent works & research that challenges previously Soviet accounts of the battle. In the South Mansteins forces with the 4th Panzer Army made surprising enrodes but Army Detachment Kempf could not keep up & protect their flank partly due to a devastating premptive artillery barrage that destroyed key bridges but also the tenacious Russian resistance.

In the North Model attempted to breach the Russian defences with infantry & then expolit it with armour. However mines took a heavy toll along with an active Soviet airforce & devastating artillery. In fact it is the Soviet artillery that could claim the majority of German infantry & tank losses. The Russian troops no longer suffered from tank shock & would allow German armour to initially pass & then emerge to attack the following infantry & tanks. A breach was acheived in the 1st line of defence but no mobile reserves were utilised by the Germans to exploit. The Russians quickly threw in their reserves to neutralise the threat.

The Clash at Prokhorovka is closely examined. The author provides evidence that Manstein & Hoth always saw this clash as necessary to defeat any planned Russian reserves intervention before closing the ring around Kursk. The Russian history of the destruction the panzer arm at Prokhorovaka is shown to be a huge myth. In fact it is the Russian 5th Tank Army that is almost annihilated but in the process were able to halt the German advance.

Ultimately the author suggests that German tactical briliance was cancelled out by superior & ruthless Russian strategy (in that the Russians would accept any losses as long as victory was attained) & the Russians had massive reserves that the Germans underestimated. By committing to Operation Zitadelle, Hitler was playing into the Russian strengths of defensive warfare & the German strengths of moblile warfare could not be exploited. Recommended reading.

This book is well-written, scholarly and thorough although generally written from the German side. Based on much new evidence on the German offensive Zitadelle (Citadel) to eliminate the Kursk salient in July of 1943, it offers new insight and even new information for historians to ponder.

As such this work should be included on the shelf of every serious student of the Eastern Front alongside the works of Glantz and House, "Battle of Kursk", from the Soviet side, Zetterling and Frankson, "Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis", Newton, "Kursk - The German View", based on documents produced by the American Army from Wehrmacht participants after the war, and Restayn and Moller, "Operation Citadel Vol I: The South" and Operation Citadel Vol II: The North". These six works should satisfy all but the more devoted readers.

The author argues that Citadel was a political necessity for Hitler to regain the possibility of Germany's winning the war. All of the operational commanders were against it, and other options such as Manstein's "Backhand" plan to fight a mobile defensive war were available. By a careful analysis of events, the author takes the Army Chief of Staff Zeitzler off the hook for delaying the operation until it no longer had a chance for victory.

In the southern attack it can be argued that the Germans were successful to a point, inflicting grievious casualties on the Soviets, especially on the tank formations. Nonetheless, the Germans were unable to achieve their objectives and the battle evolved into a significant strategic defeat. The battle eliminated the German reserves, greatly damaged their striking power, and destroyed their ability to win any further subsequent major battles in 1943. The Red Army had finally achieved dominance in summer conflicts and although it could be repulsed (like on the Narva or in the Western (South) Ukraine), it could not be defeated such as to lose the war. In many respects, this battle sealed Germany's doom -- the remainder was just killing.

There were several myths exploded in this very fine work -- such as the Soviets being able to destroy large numbers of German Tiger tanks. The Tigers fought extremely well, taking an enormous toll of Soviet tanks of all types, and just from a German tanker's perspective, their battle was a victory. After 24 hours of battle at Prokhorovka, Rotmistrov's tank army had been reduced from 850 tanks to only 150-200 servicable machines. Such losses truly indicate the ferocity of the fighting, and substance to the claim that Kursk was the greatest clash of armour ever.

The German Panthers and Ferdinands were hot off the production line and generally failed in their missions. The Panthers experienced significant "teething" problems and were generally disabled from mechanical problems rather than enemy action. In addition, the lack of German infantry to support the panzer formations increased casualties in those units and led a lack of coordinated attacks. Soviet soldiers no longer fled at the approach of tanks, and without infantry in support, German tank formations were vulnerable to destruction by individual Soviet soldiers. In short, Germany no longer possessed the manpower necessary to defeat the Soviet Union -- it could only delay the ultimate end.

These points are just a few of many in this excellent work. My only negative is that the maps were few and not greatly detailed (and in the front of the book.) The photos aid in giving a sense of the terrain, and the battle developed in context to an extreme degree. The writing is crisp and well-organized. Even the appendixes are useful although I would have like to see personnel strengths included.

I recommend this work without reservation to all readers interested in World War II and the Eastern Front.

"Zitadelle: The German Offensive Against the Kursk Salient 4-17 July 1943", by Mark Healy, is a deep book on Operation Citadel, the 1943 German offensive on the Eastern Front, also known to many as the Battle of Kursk. The first half of the book discusses the tactical situation in early 1943 in Southern Russia for the both the Germans and Soviets, their leaders, strategies, weapons, and tactics prior to the start of Operation Citadel, while the second half covers the actual battle itself. The book concludes with some analysis of the fighting and a few appendixes giving relative armored strength, units, and so on that, that are relevant to the text.

The book does a very good job of explaining the "backstory" of the battle, and explodes more than a few myths. For example, Mr Healy shows that while the German High Command was in favor of the offensive, this concurrence was based on it beginning as quickly as possible, preferably in early May. It was Hitler who chose to delay the offensive and ultimately decide to launch it, even though by the battle's start in early July, the German chances of success were slim. Mr Healy also shows that this battle was not the "Death Ride of the Panzers", as is often depicted, and that German tank casualties were much lighter than popularly believed, at least from tanks that were completely written-off, as opposed to damaged and repairable. And he points out that the Germans suffered more permanent tank losses post-Kursk, partly due to the later fighting and partly due to their tank repair depots being overrun by Soviet forces during their subsequent counteroffensive.

The author does an outstanding job in describing the ebb and flow of the battle itself, and provides a good analysis of the decisions made and their impact on the battle. One thing that I hadn't picked up in my other readings on the battle of Kursk was how much of an impact the weather (rain) had on the fighting. Another thing I liked was the large number of excellent photographs scattered throughout the book.

There are many reasons why Citadel failed, and Mr. Healy discusses them at length, from the Germans not having sufficient resources at hand for the offensive (particularly lacking in infantry), to superior Soviet strategy, to tactical mistakes made by the Germans, and to the Germans greatly underestimating the massive Soviet reserves, defenses, and the improvements of the Soviet infantryman himself.

While covering both sides, the book is written more from the German perspective than the Soviet side. That is not to say that it slights the Soviets or glorifies the Germans in any way, far from it. Mr Healy takes great pains to present as fair and balanced viewpoint as possible, it's just that more of his depictions and descriptions come from German sources.

While I feel this is an outstanding book, I do have a few nits. First, I would have liked a few more maps. The author provides some good maps in the beginning of the book, but little after that, and you often have to flip back to the front of the book to reference some of the locations being described in the text. Second, while I'm fairly tolerant of typos and such, there seemed to be a few more mistakes here than in most similar books. For example, one paragraph talks about the number of tanks available in early July and then states than only a few were lost during the fighting and that another number were available at the end of May, when he meant end of July. Another example is that in several places in the text and captions, the "Panzer 11" is referenced, when it should be "Panzer II". (If there is a Panzer 11, someone let me know; I've never heard of it.) Finally, the author states that the many of the German tank losses were only damaged, not destroyed and could be repaired. This is indeed an important point. My problem is that the author states it 20 or 30 times throughout the book, usually when discussing German tank losses on a given day of battle. I do not consider these nits to be serious, but they do detract slightly from the book.

But I greatly enjoyed the book and it added to my knowledge of the battle. Highly recommended.

Having read a number of accounts of Kursk this is by far the best. Well researched the book is a good balance of unit action and strategic analysis. It puts paid to many of the myths that surrond Kursk and provides the reader with full view of how the Germans lost this battle that they could never hope to win. Equal consideration is given to both the Russian and German accounts of the battle, which is something many accounts lack. I recommend you buy this, you won't regret it.Valhalla's Warriors: A History of the Waffen-SS on the Eastern Front 1941-1945

A very good book about this operation. Much more detailed than any writer who covered Kursk.
Very good photos, despite the font of the text is small, it is very comprehensive.
Enough coverage of every detail of the operation.
Road to Kursk is also detailed in depth. A book that deserves to be bought by WW2 scholars.

Carol (Bucharest, Romania)

this unlike most other books on kursk is not the same rehashed accounts of this pivotal battle re-formated.the research on this scale i have yet to see even on a topic that that has endless tomes dedicated to it.most kursk book are this army group that this corp that blah blah blah .....tha author keeps the book a VERY enjoyable read while offering vast amounts of new info while debunking many myths repeated ad nauseum in almost all other works related to this subject.worth every penny,i had trouble getting a copy so don't wait,this book is perfect for the dedicated east front researcher or a history buff picking up his 1st WWII book...except for him it will make his next book very disappointing as it will be hard to top this read

The Battle of Kursk has seen more than its fair share of myths but more than half a century later there is still room for a study that takes into account sources, both primary and secondary, from both sides. Sadly, this is not the case with this book. The bibliography is very limited and there are NO footnotes/endnotes. I cannot tell if this was decided on by the publisher or the author, but this is simply unacceptable and truthfully makes this book almost worthless as a source (not to mention that it takes the work done by others and omits the credit they are due). The two 'original' takes offered up in the book are not very original to begin with, both can be traced, and are, to the works by Steven Newton and Niklas Zetterling (Kursk: The German View and Kursk: A Statistical Analysis, respectively). Specifically, the author questions the Soviet interpretation of why Hoth moved his forces toward Prokhorovka rather than Oboyan and how many tanks were actually lost at Prokhorovka. The answers can be found in the aforementioned volumes (the author names and quotes Newton to give specifics for the former assertion). Also, the idea that Hoth, before the Kursk battle began, wanted to move toward Prokhorovka is also discussed in Russian literature today.

Overall the volume is interesting but lacking in numerous ways. The author's style is repetitive, as if each chapter (and there are close to 50 of them) was written on its own, thus overlapping with information from other chapters or when the author really wants to make a point. For instance, the move toward Prokhorovka rather than Oboyan is discussed in the beginning chapters and then has an entire chapter devoted to it later on in the book. I read and understood it the first time, I do not need it repeated ad nauseum. Aside from the repeating there is the ever present imagery the author is trying to draw. I do not care how the sun looked in the sky on the morning of July 5th, 6th, or 7th. I do not need to know how the clouds bunched together to produce precipitation or how rockets from both sides criss-crossed in the sky with their respective smoke trails. Get to the point.

There are countless grammatical errors throughout the book, sloppy editing to say the least. A single name is spelled two different ways within the same paragraph, we have "Rukosuyev" and then not 3 sentences later "Rokuseyev." And yes, he is talking about the same commander of the 3rd Anti-Tank Artillery brigade (p. 285). Bad spelling also rears its head when the reader is presented with an artistic rendering of a T-34 which supposedly has "Lenin" written on the side of the turret in Cyrillic. Sadly, the author of the rendering has spelled out "Lenim." A claim is made that two Red Army Mechanized Brigades were made up of 250 tanks (p. 234), that seems like overkill since some Red Army Tank/Mechanized corps in their whole (that is 3 brigades of tanks/mechanized forces) usually contained less than 250 tanks. At least one assertion I found untenable: "The surrender of the Axis forces in Tunisia in May had resulted in greater losses than at Stalingrad" (p. 368). Yes, more POWs were captured, but this of course overlooks how many Germans, and other axis forces, died getting to Stalingrad, trying to take Stalingrad, and trying to keep it. It also makes the case that the author considers Italian soldiers on par with German troops, as the majority of those surrendering in Tunisia were Italian, not German. Not a credible statement in the least. The author is also keen on repeating Cold War era propaganda as evidenced by the following: "Punishment battalions, the use of charging infantry to 'clear' minefields, the continuing policy of identifying retreat with treason, and the coercive presence of NKVD security units stationed in the rear to 'encourage' the front line troops to fight well..."(p. 104) Aside from these statements being wholly generalized and lacking context some of them are simply wrong. Thus, in general, the Red Army is underrepresented nor are the plethora of sources that have come out from Russia in the past few years (at least 5 volumes on Kursk) analyzed. Undoubtedly the author lacks Russian which is why this entire text is simply a repeat of what has already been written on the subject for an English speaking audience.

Lastly, while the Kursk 'eipic' is told well enough, the above (and what follows) is enough to reduce the work to 3 stars, perhaps 3 and a half at best. I found it quite helpful to have, every now and then, the numbers of tanks on hand and those in need of long/short term repair. It helps to explain why at times Soviet claims are so exaggerated. While some Soviet claims are simply propaganda meant for the population, at other times it becomes understandable why Tiger tanks are constantly being encountered, along with Panthers and Ferdinands. While at times Pz. IVs and StuGs could be confused for the former (Tiger and Ferdinand respectively), the regular appearance of repaired Tigers, Panthers and Ferdinands when they were knocked out just a day or two ago can easily lead to over-counting. At times there were only 3 Tigers, out of some two or so dozen, left within a unit. The next day the number would jump to 20. Sadly, no one took the time to explain this to Red Army soldiers who counted a knocked-out or disabled tank as such. Simultaneously, I found it quite annoying to be told that the Germans lost only 17 tanks at Prokhorovka but yet the Red Army, losing some 600, still retained their positions. Really? If the Germans continued with the supposed 200+ tanks at their disposal just on the Prokhorovka sector then what kept them from advancing? The problem here, it would seem, is that many of the German tank counts day in and day out are dependent on tanks coming out of long/short term repair, meaning that the real losses, be they total write offs or those lost for the moment, cannot be accurately gauged as tank stocks are regularly replenished each new day by those coming out of repair. Hence, the author asserts that on July 13, the day after the Prokhorovka battle, divisional returns totaled 251 tanks and assault guns for the SS Panzer Corps, a difference of 43 machines from the total of 294 which were available on July 12 (the numbers given for the 3 SS divisions are 70, 103, and 121 tanks and assault guns). First off, a tank out of action is one that's not going to be taking part in combat thus there is a real difference between 17 and 43. Secondly, from those 251 tanks and assault guns we are not told if any came from repair; if they did, then the number 43 would go up. Considering newly repaired tanks were regularly being delivered this is something I'd like to see taken into consideration. Somehow the Germans seem to be the only ones for whom we count 'write offs' as the only losses they endured. More so, we have the claim that Totenkopf could deploy 121 machines on July 12, but the next day the division was fielding 54 serviceable tanks and 20 or so Assault guns, what happened to 43 less tanks for all 3 SS divisions? The Leibstandarte on the next day was said to have "fallen" to a strength of "just 50 panzers and 20 Assault Guns" how can it fall to that strength if that's what it started out with on July 12?! Supposedly, it is on July 13 that Rotmistrov, commander of the remnants of 5th Tank Army, halts both the Leibstandarte and Totenkopf in their tracks with the remainder of what was his 800+ tank armada. Interesting, he couldn't do it with 850 tanks, but with some 150-200, it's not a problem. Right, thanks but no thanks. I'll be waiting for the next volume that demolishes some more 'Kursk Myths.'