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The counter-revolution of science;: Studies on the abuse of reason

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The Counter Revolution of Science is an important book for several reasons. First, The CRS explains the futility of schemes to plan progress, the impossibility of efforts for the "human mind to lift itself up by its own bootstraps". What this means is that "the attempt of conscious reason to control its own development limits the very growth to what the human mind can could foresee". Freedom "releases the knowledge and energies of countless individuals that could never be utilized in a society consciously directed from the top". Second, the CRS explains how the mindset of the physical sciences, which focuses on objective factors, fails when applied to economics. Understanding economics requires an appreciation of subjectivity in human relations. Engineers pursue technical excellence according to objective scientific principles, without considering economic factors (i.e. scarcity), and worse still the application of mathematical methods from the social sciences creates a false and dangerous impression that society can itself be engineered. Third, Hayek examines the history of the development of `scientistic' ideas, whereby various thinkers (especially St Simon and Comte) popularized positivism, socialism, and corporatism. Finally, reading the CRS instills an appreciation of the humility of individualism and disdain for the hubris of collectivism in the reader.

Generally speaking, Hayek makes the importance of recognizing and respecting the limits of human reason abundantly clear. Hayek saw that modern collectivism was working to undo the intellectual progress made during the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment. Collectivism was antithetical to reason, and would lead us to a new Dark Age if not reversed. Persons of the left with surely find this absurd, and their revulsion to Hayek's thesis is consistent with his thesis. The Left does not reject reason explicitly, it abuses reason unwittingly. People on the Left truly believe that they are progressive and scientific, but this is a false belief. Socialists and Welfare State Liberals abuse human reason by failing to see its limits.

The background to this book is simple. Hayek started his career writing technical economics. Hayek's efforts were initially met with success. Hayek initially swayed professional opinion on business cycles. Hayek also forced socialists to revise their early proposals. Yet professional opinion turned against Hayek during the mid thirties. Why? Had they proved him wrong? Did they fail to understand why he was right? How was it that intelligent and educated people could not see the strength of Hayek's arguments? Hayek's technical economics show how the capitalist system functions. Yet Hayek misunderstood the way in which his peers understood the term `technical economics'. That is, Hayek erred by underestimating the influence of positivist and other ideas. Hence Hayek turned to explaining why economists and other educated people were unable to understand correct economic theories: they had embraced a false notion of rationalism.

I find the sections on Engineers particularly interesting. Hayek's views on the role of engineers in society are so diametrically opposed to Veblen's Engineers and the Price System that one must wonder why he did little more than mention Veblen in passing. The Counter Revolution of Science is one of Hayek's best books, and that is saying a lot. The Counter Revolution of Science was important in the twentieth century because it penetrated to the core of intellectual problems of that time. We live in a new century now, but the old problem of abusing reason remains. One need only look at the policies of Bush/Cheney and Obama/Emanuel to see how the social engineering mindset prevails in modern America.

The CRS represents Hayek at his best, insightful, informative, and well reasoned in his conclusions. These are important ideas too, given that people still believe in false notions of rationalism, whereby most people still trust that the so-called best and brightest can best plan society. The Counter Revolution of Science should be read by the entire educated public.

Too often, Hayek is not given enough credit. Too many people see him as merely a critic of socialism and defender of libertarianism (not that there's anything wrong with that). But Hayek was a brilliant social philosopher too and this book is Hayek at his best.

Unfortunately, this book begs to be misunderstood. I fear that people will read the second section before the first (if they read the first at all), and frankly, I could've done without the second.

At base, this book is not a critique on planning. It is a philosophical explanation of how we gain and use knowledge in the natural and social sciences. After Hayek lays out what he feels are mistakes in the methods of social science (psychologism, holism, scientism), he examines the mistakes thinkers have made that brought them to these -isms. Then and only then does he offer a critique of planning but ONE WILL NOT UNDERSTAND IN FULL THE SECOND SECTION WITHOUT HAVEING READ AND ABSORBED THE IDEAS IN THE FIRST! One may even want to read Popper's 'The Poverty of Historicism' before or with this book.
In closing, if you're looking for a critique on planning and socialism, read 'The Road To Serfdom' or 'Individualism and Economic Order', but if you want a great critique of science (social as well as natural) and it's current methods, read this one WITH CARE!

In this dense book Hayek probes the origins of socialist thought. His account of the attempt to make history a mathematical science and the differences between subjective and objective thought is some of the most interesting and thought provoking discussion written this century.

It is a hard read but well worth the effort.

Hayek was probably the greatest thinker of the 20th Century. He certainly out ranked the counterparts of his day - think about his debates with Keynes or his discussions of the conceits of socialism. Hayek had the integrity to thik carefully about a number of issues.

After WWII he began to think about a set of issues that would not be considered economics - but then Hayek was never bothered by the narrow comparmentalization that some academics operate in. His address to the London Economic Club and his discussions on Economics and Knowledge (knowledge of time and place) are legendary.

This book is a caution to social scientists. In the early fifties, Hayek cautioned his colleagues who were fast rushing to adopt "scientific" approaches to their disciplines - to move into that arena with caution. Numbers tend to become real on their own and are not always helpful in explaining issues or in helping to clarify thinking. His arguments, like the rest of his writing, are clear and well done. The book is a bit dense for some who have not the depth of his references - but it is well worth the effort.

Friedrich August von Hayek (1899-1992) was a great Austrian-born economist and philosopher. When one considers the breadth of his work and the acuity of his analysis, he may very well be the pre-eminent sociopolitical thinker of the 20th century.

No one has been such an outspoken advocate for liberty, or such a devastating foe of all forms of socialism--what Hayek often calls "collectivism." In The Counter-Revolution of Science (1952), he deconstructs the illusions of the early socialist thinkers, notably the false doctrine of "scientism," the misapplication of scientific methodology to social phenomena, particularly history.

History, Hayek explains, is not a real thing, subject to the methods of the natural sciences. If we are to undertake a study of zebras, we need not hesitate to employ these methods. We see before us a type of animal that is clearly distinguished from other species. There can be little doubt that a zebra is a zebra. Our subjects behave in accordance with the characteristics of their kind. They cannot change themselves, and there is no emotional or intellectual bond between researcher and subject.

All this is completely different when it comes to human history. Our subjects do not behave in a predictable fashion, and they can remake themselves. There are many bonds (and enmity) between researcher and subject. But most importantly, the creation of history is itself a subjective act. The actors are implementing what they believe to be "their" history of the moment; moreover, each individual has a different perception of his own behavior, his neighbor's behavior, and indeed everything else occurring in the world. To say that this phenomenon is subject to laws in the same sense as natural laws is a serious error.

When I read Hayek, I am always struck by his vast command of history, culture, philosophy, and economics, as well as by his matter-of-fact tone. His attitude is distinctly non-ideological; he is never the advocate of a party or "program."

Hayek warned us about flirtation with the wily seductress that is collectivism. Will we take heed?

The other reviewers on Amazon have done an excellent job summarizing the main points in this book. I will briefly contribute to this discussion by detailing the arguments that stood out to me.

First of all, the book is dividied into two sections: (1) Scientism and the Study of Society; and (2) The Counter-Revolution of Science. The former expounds the differences and peculiar histories of both the social and natural sciences, while the latter seeks to understand the historical development of "scientism", finding its roots in the rationalistic tradition of French (continental) thought.

The first part is the more important section, and should be read carefully. Hayek traces the long escape of natural science from the anthropomorphic thought that characterized the Middle Ages. External events were believed to possess some transcendental reality. Slowly, however, science began to discover explanations of external reality that differed from our common sense perceptions. "Facts", it was argued, are different from "appearances." Note that in this discussion Hayek is not attacking the character of science when it is conducted in its own proper sphere. Science has much to say about the relation of material things to other things (cause and effect, etc.). Scientific study errs, however, when it begins to substitute material explanations for human affairs. There are some phenomena that cannot be explained by their material characteristics. In fact, most phenomena involving human opinions and beliefs cannot be explained by natural science. Hayek gives several illuminating examples to illustrate his case: "words", "sentences", "crimes" "family", "exchange", "money" etc. clearly can only be understood by finding out what people think about these things and not from their objective characteristics.

In this book Hayek shows that the social sciences are fundamentally distinct from the natural sciences because men can only be understood through their beliefs and opinions. A very important work.

This text is yet another testament to the extraordinary erudition of Dr. Hayek, and his ability to convey that methodological subjectivism (or individualism) is the foremost analytical technique for the several social sciences.

What is discomfiting in this work is the historical support that most of our basic ideas are formed early in our academic careers, and only painfully revised in subsequent years. This is particularly troubling for many trained in the scientistic legacy of Saint-Simon, August Comte, Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx, and Hegel. Hopefully, the recrudescent interest in the "economic sociology" of Mises and Weber will free sociology from its scientistic tethers. But I am not confident about that.

Hayek's long-lived philosophical commitment to methodological subjectivism is articulate, and is unmistakably clear in this work. And the Counterrevolution only restates the postulate that social scientists ought not to imitate their more highly paid colleagues in the "hard sciences." And this seems like eminently sound advice for sociologists, and particularly now that the flagship sociology journals are cluttered with, e.g., "religiousity scales," "mentoring scales," and other synechdichocal concepts that are amenable to various measurement scales.

The price of this work is a steal. It must be known, however, that Hayek is an author who challenges readers. And this book is no different.

In this book, F.A. Hayek sets some very important nerves blank.
Social sciences study the relations between men and things and between men and men. Some philosophers thought that social sciences should be treated like natural sciences and that the latter's laws were also valid for the former ones. This `scientistic' viewpoint led to the worst absurdities and aberrations in the history of philosophy.

One of the task of science is to constitute `wholes' by constructing models which reproduce the relationship between some of many phenomena observed in real life. `Wholes' (language, market, morals, money, social processes ...) are not natural `units' like flowers, but refer only to certain structures of relationships which we select because we think that we can discern connections between them. However, for some philosophers `wholes' are more than the aggregate of all constituent parts (e.g. human history, societies, economies) and are subject to relatively simple laws. This viewpoint led to the thesis that the coherence of these large entities must be subjected to conscious control.
As F.A. Hayek remarks, phenomena like language, markets, money or morals are not real artifacts, products of deliberate creation, but the outcome of spontaneous processes. There is a crucial difference between influencing spontaneous processes and attempting to replace them by organizations fabricated by conscious control. Nevertheless, for some philosophers, processes which are consciously directed are superior to any spontaneous ones. Man must have complete power to refashion everything in any way he desires. The outcome of these policies was pure determinism, relativism, totalitarianism, collectivism, compulsive planning.

A few examples quoted in this book:
For A. Comte, `freedom equaled the rational submission to the domination of natural laws. Liberty of conscience was an antisocial dogma and a revolting monstrosity.' `There is nothing good and nothing bad; everything is relative; this is the only absolute statement.'
For F. Hegel, `man cannot change the course of history, which is directed by the laws of the development of the human mind.' `All that is real is rational and all that is rational is real.'
The influence of these philosophers (and others) cannot be overestimated until today.

In this book, F. A. Hayek shows how the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness' generated (generates) disastrous policies for hundreds of millions of humans.
Not to be missed.

While none of Hayek's theses were new (except to those discovering his perspectives through his writings for the first time), they have become, due to his reputation and prolific writing, central to any education in the social and political sciences. The most important insight, in my opinion, offered by this work is the collectivist mentality at the heart of modern social "sciences," which attempt to analyze human behavior and its consequences (political and otherwise) in terms of defining collectives/groups -- where it is all-too-easy to make inaccurate or false (projected) assumptions about the nature of groups and behavioral characteristics being "analyzed." That is, "scientific" approaches can be, and have been, particularly in the social and political sciences, exploited to defeat reason/common sense by structuring inquiry along projected/desired lines that may bear little substantive relationship to underlying social and political phenomena.

Friedrich von Hayek has been one of the most ardent exponents of the dreamy hopes of progress and happiness that supposedly, would be brought by the Industrial Revolution.

When the triumph of the polytechnic spirit as he calls it, covers and comprises the whole of human experiences, in such extent to deny any other value it becomes a new sect and really, all of who maintain this belief become heretics due its own fanaticism. He wants to prevent us about the enormous risk of reducing the science to "scientism."

The rereading of this text is especially helpful in these times in which we are immersed in what we might call an ethical deficit of huge proportions that has underpinned the pragmatism to unexpected places. So the fact to expect the science and technology be by themselves the universal antidote, product of a superficial diagnosis or mistaking cause and effect, sooner or later a double cutting doge weapon.

Two brief examples may witness it: the use of DDT resolved a serious problem but also generated another one. And here we have: how to deal and even conciliate a dynamical vitality in our way of life without damage of our environment; because the imminent crisis of "the greenhouse effect" simply cannot wait any longer and obviously will demand and even affect a wide spectrum of the productive forces, no matter how effective negotiator you be at the moment to conciliate both interests in conflict.