The Clausewitz Delusion: How the American Army Screwed Up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (A Way Forward) (Hardcover)

~ Stephen L. Melton (Author)

Editorial Reviews

Product Description

In the aftermath of defeat in Vietnam, the American military cast about for answers--and, bizarrely, settled upon a view of warfare promulgated by a Prussian general in the 1830s, Carl von Clausewitz.  This doctrine was utterly inappropriate to the wars the U.S. faced in Iraq and Afghanistan.  It led the U.S. Army to abandon its time-honored methods of offensive war--which had guided America to success from the early Indian campaigns all the way through the Second World War--in favor of a military philosophy derived from the dynastic campaigns of Napoleon and Frederick the Great.  It should come as no surprise, then, that the military's conceptualization of modern offensive war, as well as its execution, has failed in every real-life test of our day.

 

This book reveals the failings of the U.S. Army in its adoption of a postmodern “Full Spectrum Operations" doctrine, which codifies Clauswitzian thinking.  Such an approach, the author contends, leaves the military without the doctrine, training base, or force structure necessary to win offensive wars in our time.   Instead, the author suggests, the army should adopt a new doctrinal framework based on an analysis of the historical record and previously successful American methods of war.  A clear and persuasive critique of current operative ideas about warfare, The Clausewitz Delusion lays out a new explanation of victory in war, based on an analysis of wartime casualties and post-conflict governance.  It is a book of critical importance to policymakers, statesmen, and military strategists at every level.

Book Description

This book reveals the failings of the U.S. Army in its adoption of a doctrine of "Full Spectrum Operations" that codified the thinking of Carl von Clausewitz, a Prussion general of the 1830s. Instead, the author suggests, the army should adopt a new doctrinal framework based on an analysis of the historical record and previously successful American methods of war.  A clear and persuasive critique of current ideas about warfare, The Clausewitz Delusion lays out a new explanation of victory in war, based on an analysis of wartime casualties and post-conflict governance.  It is a book of critical importance to policymakers, statesmen, and military strategists at every level.

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 320 pages
• Publisher: Zenith Press; First edition (November 8, 2009)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0760337136
• ISBN-13: 978-0760337134
• Product Dimensions: 9.1 x 6.3 x 1.3 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.3 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.2 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (5 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #241,770 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

5 of 5 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars ORIGINAL THINKING - and well WORTH THE WAIT !, October 27, 2009

By	i-Palikar "i-Palikar" (ALEXANDRIA, VA USA) - See all my reviews

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I waited months for this book to be released, shipped and delivered - and IT WAS WORTH THE WAIT!! You don't have to agree with Melton's views - but at least you will obtain some honest original thinking that does NOT conform to the tired, old, stale military mantras. As a senior officer of 28+ years, I honestly believe we are at a serious inflection point within the US military. We need to thoroughly re-evaluate our public military doctrines and our strategic perspectives - and even more so, what our hidden paradigms are. Thinking determines behavior - individually as well as institutionally. Melton makes an honest attempt to provide true original thinking in what has become an otherwise droll, redundant military genre of decreasing value due to a severe shortage of originality. I am purposely NOT providing an opinionated regurgitation of Melton's material - you can get that anywhere. Read Melton for yourself - make your own opinions. I am simply claiming that there are precious few original military thinkers out there - and Melton appears to be an honest one. So if you tend to not only read but reflect as well, then I strongly recommend this book to all military "thinkers".

5 of 6 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Lessons Lost to Win the Peace, October 29, 2009

By	Paladin (Orange Park) - See all my reviews

The more appropriate subtitle for this book is: "...and the Precious Lessons Lost on How to Win the Peace".

As a retired senior military officer of nearly 30 years service - I am truly impressed by Melton's work. If you read Clausewitz's own self-criticism in detail - Melton is only doing what Clausewitz himself believed in. For we WILL fight wars differently under different realities as the times change - we are already doing so - and the times have changed so our thinking must change! Melton's work is an integral part of that critical change in thinking.

Without doubt, Melton is very successful in using historical examples to press his point that Clausewitz is totally passé as a valid guide to modern strategic operations, much less so for guerilla operations - and virtually nil as a useful guide or winning the peace. Melton's use of historical examples is exceptionally clear, concise, and highly potent to his general argument to dismiss Clausewitz as a valid guide for strategic operations. Melton literally destroys such worn out stale notions of center of gravity, military genius, decisive battle - just to name a few of the archaic, decayed Clausewitzian bones that still rattle around in today's in the skulls of military thinking.

However, let's not throw out ALL of Clausewitz with the bath water just yet. Albeit what Melton proffers is highly potent, there is still much more to discuss as to what pieces of the Clausewitzian mantras are still valid timeless elements in understanding insights beyond strategic operations but rather into the broader phenomenon of war - e.g. war as a political policy tool. In summary, we should hope that Melton's work here is just the tip of the iceberg - and we should expect much more from him in the future. Melton should be mandatory reading and discussion material at all Staff and War Colleges thoughout the western world.

2 of 3 people found the following review helpful:

1.0 out of 5 stars A delusion, January 24, 2010

By	John Smooth "Reader" (USA) - See all my reviews

The authors' objection is really against the "neo-cons" that is where it should be directed not against Carl von Clausewitz. It is like blaming a poorly designed bridge on the use of calculus.

Gen. Eisenhower (graduated 1st Army War College) was very much a student of Clausewitz and was, of course, influential on WWII strategy, and guided the US thru the Cold War. Col. Harry Summers book "On Strategy" applies the principles of Clausewitz to the US strategic failure in Vietnam.

Clausewitz would not necessarily have agreed with intervening in Iraq. The principle of "center of gravity" may apply here i.e. it was not Bagdad, but south-western Pakistan, and that is what should have been confronted, one might argue, in the threat (War on terror) from the Middle East.

US Army did not "bizarrely, settled upon a view of warfare promulgated by a Prussian general in the 1830s, Carl von Clausewitz", and "screw up" and cause a US defeat.

U.S. Army was overwhelming successful in the first Gulf War, overwhelming successful in the overthrowing of Saddam Hussein thru aggressive use of force. And overwhelming successful in ousting the Taliban in Afghanistan. Therefore the doctrine that was developed after Vietnam has not "failed in every real-life test of our day" at all. Gen. Shinseki advocated overwhelming force in our occupation of Iraq. One can't say that Clausewitz would have disagreed with this. It was the US political leadership that disagreed with that.

Obviously the use of air-land battle doctrine is not the right `tool' in our occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. Gen. Petraeus and Gen. McChrystal have developed counter-insurgency tactics (again which is not against Clausewitz), that will hopefully prove to be successful, and with a few other factors result in achieving US objectives in a very difficult situation in the Mid-East.

Is the author saying we need a Sherman's "march to the sea" through Afghanistan? Hey through south-western Pakistan, there is an idea.