The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third (Johns Hopkins Paperbacks)

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Editorial Reviews

Review

"Luttwak has done scholarship an immense service...Every page brings detailed insights into the working of Roman military organization, in strategy and tactics."--E. Badian, 'New York Review of Books' "Lucidly and vigorously written."--'Times Literary Supplement'

"Lucidly and vigorously written." -- Times Literary Supplement

"Luttwak has done scholarship an immense service... Every page brings detailed insights into the working of Roman military organization, in strategy and tactics." -- E. Badian, New York Review of Books

Review

"Luttwak has done scholarship an immense service... Every page brings detailed insights into the working of Roman military organization, in strategy and tactics." -- E. Badian, New York Review of Books

"Lucidly and vigorously written." -- Times Literary Supplement

--This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

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Product Details

• Paperback: 272 pages
• Publisher: The Johns Hopkins University Press (January 1, 1979)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0801821584
• ISBN-13: 978-0801821585
• Product Dimensions: 8.8 x 5.7 x 0.5 inches
• Shipping Weight: 12.8 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.3 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (30 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #39,556 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

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  #32 in	Books > History > Ancient > Rome
  #70 in	Books > History > Europe > Italy
  #93 in	Books > History > Military Science

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

20 of 20 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars In Praise of Grand Strategy, April 5, 2001

By	steve warren (Victoria, BC) - See all my reviews

In a field that still remains open...and, in fact, in many ways, depends on the contributions of knowledgeable and dedicated amatures, Luttwak's work stands out as truly original contribution in the field of Roman military history. His thesis, that there was, in fact, a coherent, centrally controlled and over-arching and outwardly directed, military strategy that was actualised through an evolving empire-wide frontier policy that is both traceable in and understandable through, the archaeological record is a singularly original contribution that has potentialy major implications for our approach to and understanding of, roman socio-political, military, economic, and governance mechanisms. Luttwak has implicitly reinterpreted the conventional understanding of the roman world and in so doing he has opened the door to a broader, more coherent and,ultimately, more satisfying understanding of the functioning of the empire.

It is the kind of contribution that perhaps only someone with the background and ability to apply a strategic vision and strategic frame of reference, could possibly make. As far as I know, it has never been done before in this field.

Its now 25 years since Luttwak published Grand Strategy and the work continues to resonate in the field. Judging from the rate of continuing citations, it would appear to be virtually impossible to write on the subject of roman military history, frontier policy, or even imperial governance without dealing,in some way, with Luttwak. His contribution simply won't go away.

Much time has passed since Luttwak wrote and, in the interim, Isaac has published his exhaustive, excessively detailed and, ultimately, convincing, refutation of Luttwak based on his review and analysis of the roman southeast frontier. But I don't think it matters...and besides, Isaac himself may be wrong...because what Luttwak has really achieved is to force a decisive shift in the frame of reference that we use to think about, analyse, and understand the Empire. Luttwak has reminded us, emphaticaly, that not withstanding the absence of a coherent body of written source material,we can and should think about the forest once in a while instead of endlessly pursuing counting and identifying only the trees that make it up. He shows us that such an approach can be highly rewarding.

In my opinion this is NOT a dry work and, more than anything, it simply requires an interest in the roman empire and its functioning in order to be read and understood. Luttwak does not take the relentlessly scholarly approach that Isaac does but he does do his homework and he is familiar with his topic. Because he's not Isaac, he's infinitely more readable...and my copy, which I bought in soft cover about 5 years ago, had virtually all of its pages out of order...and I still got thru it!

I

18 of 18 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Great strategy book, January 20, 2000

By	Michael Valdivielso (Alexandria, VA) - See all my reviews (TOP 500 REVIEWER)

Really helps you to see the Rome Empire as a nation, not just a army. Luttwak helps you to understand the goals and stragtegy used to reach those goals by the Romes who DID not want to spend all their money and manpower on defending their frontier, YET still wanted some kind of defenese, which would to be flexible enough to handle both raiders and full scale invasions. Makes a lot of sense. It is a tad dry, as one reviewer pointed out and you might not agree with all the view points, but if you are interested in the Roman Empire, this is a book to think about.

18 of 19 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Eye-opening analysis, May 19, 2005

By	H. Raeder "holgerraeder" (Allen, Tx United States) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

This book is a very interesting analysis for everybody who wants to know more about the strategy of the Roman Empire. While also very accessible to non-experts, even experts or people who have read a lot about Rome will learn a lot and see things a new way.

Mr. Luttwak splits the time of the roman empire into time periods of same strategy. This strategy changed a few times through the centuries.

One of the most interesting points is that the Roman Empire did have trouble expanding its Empire beyond the size of Augustus Principate because the roman army could not apply its full military force in the border areas because of the evironment there. The roman army's core was the heavy infanterie and with this the legions were strong and hard to stop or defeat but they were also slow. Therefore in areas where enemies had something to defend (cities, fields, etc), the power of the roman army (also using their siege capabilities) was very high and therefore it could apply this potential military might either in direct military success or into political power which then helped the romans to create client states around their empire which served as buffer states against any potential enemy attack.

But the forested middle Europe, the desert areas of Arabia and North Africa and the plains of Iran and Ukraine were wide and the people who lived there did not depend on a city structure which they needed to defend. Therefore they could avoid a direct confrontation with the Romans (which was their main strength) and apply their way of fighting to the Romans. The Roman army could still penetrate these areas, but only under above average costs and had trouble keeping this area under their control. Examples of this are the losses of Crassus against the Parthians and the losses of 3 legions against the Cherusci in the Teutoburg Forest.

Very good book!