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Dick Morris is one of America's sharpest political minds. As a professional consultant, he has helped candidates from both parties understand public opinion and win elections--most notably President Clinton in 1996 (an experience Morris described in the bestselling book
Behind the Oval Office). He is also a founding father of "triangulation," a strategy Clinton employed to great effect; according to Morris, George W. Bush also uses it quite well. "The identification of certain problems with certain parties or factions opens up a magnificent strategic opportunity: the chance to solve the other side's problems," writes Morris in
Power Plays. In other words, if public concerns about welfare dependency drive voters toward the GOP, then Democrats ought to confront this issue head-on. "Solve the problems that keep the other side in business, and it will go broke. Give them what they want and they will go away."
Power Plays, however, is not simply a primer on triangulation; it is an analysis of how various political strategies have helped and hindered candidates. Morris writes at length about determining when standing for principle works and when it doesn't, as well as a number of other approaches, including "divide and conquer" and "reform your own party." This is a first-rate book for readers who enjoy the gamesmanship of politics.
--This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
From Publishers Weekly
Aspiring politicians who can't afford to hire high-priced campaign consultants could do a lot worse than to buy this election manual from former Clinton political guru Morris (Behind the Oval Office). He offers 20 case studies illustrating how history's greatest politicians sealed their fate by following or ignoring six classic Morris rules: "Triangulate," "Divide and Conquer," "Reform Your Own Party," etc. These strategies work, Morris maintains, regardless of party affiliation or ideological bent. For example, Morris shows how both Bill Clinton (on welfare) and George W. Bush (on education) managed to trounce the opposition by co-opting its core issues a classic "triangulation" maneuver. In contrast, Morris says, both Woodrow Wilson and Barry Goldwater failed to provide a convincing explanation as to why their fringe ideas (the League of Nations and passionate anticommunism, respectively) were right for America. This is quintessential Morris ideology: the content is less important than the approach. Ronald Reagan, in this understanding, won the White House because he was able to "Stand on Principle" and present a clear, consistent description of who he was and what he stood for. Al Gore lost because he failed at the same task. Obviously, such a reductive analysis oversimplifies an extraordinarily complicated process. Morris's arguments are broadly convincing, however, and work well in the context of a "beginner's manual" on political strategy, despite some occasionally spooky language Reagan's move toward social conservatism in the 1960s, Morris writes, was like an "established corporation launching a new product line."
Copyright 2002 Cahners Business Information, Inc.
--This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
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