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20 of 21 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Essential reading. Highly recommended!, September 21, 2007
Based on extraordinary research and more than thirty years of professional experience as Professor of History and Founding Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Chicago, Dr. Polk has definitely produced an excellent read to educate us the intrinsic nuances of insurgency and the cost of occupancy through brilliant comparative analysis.
Dr. Polk compares a dozen or more insurgencies and guerrilla wars of the past three centuries ( from the American Revolution to struggles in Ireland to Algeria to Spain and finally to Afghanistan and Iraq), and concludes that they share a universal characteristic --opposition to foreign rulers.
The conclusion of Polk's study is scary.
He lays out the enormous human and financial costs of trying to impose a foreign solution on people who do not want to be controlled by outsiders. It's just devastating when you look at the Iraq numbers alone. The monetary costs of running the Iraq war is $10 million an hour - and rising more than 20% a year. What about the precious lives?
Dr. Polk's historical knowledge of this subject makes him probably the best person on this planet to advice our future policy makers on starting a war (if they are willing to listen.)
"Violent Politics" is a must read, not only for those who make the decisions, but also for those who vote for them.
Author of:
America Misunderstood: What a Second Bush Victory Meant to the Rest of the World
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11 of 11 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
A good review of insurgency, terrorism, and guerilla warfare, December 8, 2007
This is a book about insurgency and some of its major tools--terrorism and guerilla warfare. William Polk begins by observing that one factor is common to insurgencies (page xiii): "no matter how they differ in form, duration, and intensity, a single thread runs through them all: opposition to foreigners. Occupation by outsiders creates the conditions for insurgency, then. That is the central thesis of his book.
Throughout the book, he explores his thesis by examination of a number of case studies--some well know and some less so. The first case study has an ironic twist to it--it is the American Revolution. He then considers, in order by chapter, the Spanish resistance to Napoleon, the Philippine insurrection, the Irish case, Yugoslav partisans in World War II, Greece after World War II, Kenya and the Mau Mau, Algeria, Vietnam, and Afghanistan.
One commonality across many (but not all) of these examples is that the insurgency begins with a ludicrously small number of militants. However, there are circumstances where this small group will expand and, in the end, triumph over the occupation. Other trends: as the small bands successfully carry out ambushes and otherwise annoy the foreigners, others within the occupied country begin to pay attention. Often, the dominant government then seeks to suppress the rebellion. Sometimes, they become so oppressive and repressive that it begins to trigger larger and larger numbers of people joining the insurgency.
Another factor that is important is Mao's famous argument that in a successful insurgency, the rebellious ones are like "fish" in a "sea" of sympathetic people, able to hide among and operate within the supportive masses.
One interesting tidbit in this book focuses on current American counterinsurgency theory. The current handbook, the 2006 Counterinsurgency Field Manual, has as one of its authors Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, currently in charge of the American action in Iraq. Many people assess the current counterinsurgency doctrine as sound (and, indeed, if you read Petraeus' manual, you will find it pretty convincing), but Polk demurs. He contends that despite its apparent freshness, the American doctrine is still flawed. Polk remains deeply skeptical of any occupying power being able to determine beforehand if the occupation will be successful or if insurgency will develop and, in the end, triumph over the occupier.
I'm not sure that I am in accord with Polk in all details (his conclusion does not convince me), but it is a thought provoking work, and the various case studies provide historical examples of what can go right and what can go wrong for both insurgencies and occupying powers.
Worth a read. . . .
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5 of 6 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Condensed But Powerful, November 17, 2007
Foreign Service and State Department people are immensely knowledegable about their areas. It means learning an odd language or two, absorbing many volumes of history and past international relations, becoming respectful of myriad social customs and religious practices and consequently forming a political astuteness that will be useful to the boss in Washington. Of course, when the boss communes with God and gets direction from a higher authority, all this can be ignored. Just bring'em on.
William Polk examines eleven insurgencies from 1776 to the present. This is a short book. The author has distilled hundreds of books and many years of service into 223 refined pages of text. The simple message is that occupiers are always unwelcome. Supression may succeed temporarily, but the day of reckoning eventually arrives. This book is filled with important history lessons that our leaders have ignored.
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