Philosophy and Social Hope (Paperback)

~ (Author) "The epithet 'relativist' is applied to philosophers who agree with Nietzsche that ' "Truth" is the will to be master of the multiplicity of sensations'..." (more)
Key Phrases: extra added ingredient, legal pragmatism, classical pragmatists, New York, William James, New Testament (more...)

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Product Description

A superb introduction to one of today's leading and most provocative thinkers.

Since Plato most philosophy has aimed at true knowledge, penetrating beneath appearances to an underlying reality. Against this tradition, Richard Rorty convincingly argues, pragmatism offers a new philosophy of hope. One of the most controversial figures in recent philosophical and wider literary and cultural debate, Rorty brings together an original collection of his most recent philosophical and cultural writings. He explains in a fascinating memoir how he began to move away from Plato towards William James and Dewey, culminating in his own version of pragmatism. What ultimately matters, Rorty suggests, is not whether our ideas correspond to some fundamental reality but whether they help us carry out practical tasks and create a fairer and more democratic society.

Aimed at a general audience, this volume offers a stimulating summary of Rorty's central philosophical beliefs, as well as some challenging insights into contemporary culture, justice, education, and love.

About the Author

Richard Rorty is a professor in the Department of Comparative Literature at Stanford University and the author of many books of philosophy, including Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature; Contingency, Irony & Solidarity; and Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in 20th Century America.

Product Details

• Paperback: 320 pages
• Publisher: Penguin (Non-Classics) (January 1, 2000)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0140262881
• ISBN-13: 978-0140262889
• Product Dimensions: 7.6 x 5.6 x 0.8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 8 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.4 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (26 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #32,611 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

25 of 27 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Acid on the Dross, April 21, 2003

By	Dr. D. E. McClean (Dix Hills, New York) - See all my reviews

Rorty is one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries not because he offers a new theory or new system, but precisely because he is so good at warning us about getting addicted to theories and systems. For this he is hated by many philosophers, despised by many in the literati, scorned by metaphysicians and clerics (as a nihilist or relativist), and reviled by philosophical purists who believe he gleefully misreads the works of their heroes and masters.

But like acid on the dross of idiotic or, to be more charitable, useless ideas which have led many a thinker into the deep and twisted woods of high theory, never to be seen again, Rorty pours out his neo-pragmatist criticisms on the various "isms" that claim to be more in touch with the "real world" than their competitors. What is left after the acid bath is a stark realization that there is little that we have to build a better world than our strenuously forged concessions, compromises, agreements, collaborations, and conversations about what in fact having a better world means. This antifoundational view leaves wholly unsatisfied people who believe that something more concrete is needed to build the world into something more salutary and livable than it was yesterday. Rorty tells the reader that there is nothing more concrete than he or she, that the need for rationalist foundations is a diversion from the true font of social hope and freedom. In this, he surpasses even John Dewey in democratic credentials, although such a claim is seen as heresy in many philosophical circles. Unlike Dewey, Rorty offers no decision procedure for democratic practice. He bids us only to go and be democrats (his preference), or come up with your own good reasons for going in another direction. He will not clobber you with arguments proving the link between democracy and human nature. He will ask you to consider the advantages of his own preferences, and try to convince you to give them a shot.

While Rorty does overstate his case, it isn't by very much, for in his view we must shake off the idea that we need more (or will get more) to resolve issues such as cloning, capital punishment, abortion or hyper-nationalism than consensus. Ultimately, every attempt to lay a philosophical foundation, to provide a rationalist bedrock for our choices and conduct, fails. Even the notion of "inalienable rights" is a fiction, but a good one that we embrace because of its use, because of how it organizes the societies that believe in it. Each foundation can be picked to pieces by other arguments and other social imperatives, or other changes in what the culture believes is relevant to itself. Democracy isn't better than Islamic or Christian fundamentalism; it is only better if a certain kind of freedom is more relevant than paradise in the next life. Rorty argues in this volume and elsewhere that we must get over philosophy and theory and instead roll up our sleeves and get to work in public debate, meaningful social criticism, and engagement with the world that is. The best a philosopher can hope to do is help along conversations big and small about issues big and small, bringing no particular expertise to the process save for the value of a good education and the intellectual virtues honed during play with arguments and ideas.

For those who find Rorty's message unsettling, all I can say is that they should take up Philosophy and Social Hope, allow the unsettling to take place, enjoy the ride where enjoyment is possible, and then put the book aside. They may return to it years hence, to challenge it, to find new points of agreement, to throw it across the room as an attack on their souls and the Gods of their fathers and of their countries. But, like so many important thinkers, Rorty cannot be ignored -- whether you like him or not.

34 of 39 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars No professional philosopher should write this well!, January 6, 2000

By	Jeff Bricker (Columbus, Ohio USA) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

Richard Rorty has been enlivening the American intellectual scene for two decades now. His prose is fluid, clear, and graceful. This is perhaps his first collection of essays aimed at the average educated reader (as opposed to his fellow philosophers). It opens with a wry mini-autobiography, followed by three linked essays where Rorty, once again, makes his case for American pragmatism. There is also a fine discussion of Thomas Kuhn and a provocative piece about Heidegger's Nazism. The essay on Religion As Conversation-stopper is also first-rate. Unfortunately, Penguin has issued this book on cheap paper and the print font is minuscule-- America'a most interesting philosopher deserves better!

12 of 14 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Excellent:) Wow! Bang! Zoom! The Thrilla in Manila!, August 28, 2000

By	Alex Sydorenko (Chicago) - See all my reviews

This book serves as an excellent introduction to Pragmatism (or at least Rorty's interpretation.) Pragmatism is pretty radical--it challenges basic philosophic assumptions such as the Greek search for truth, as well as the Cartesian self. Consider this quote, which is quintessential Rorty from his essay "Ethics Without Principles": "Just as the pragmatists see scientific progress not as the gradual attenuation of a veil of appearance which hides the intrinsic nature of reality from us, but as the increasing ability to respond to the concerns of ever larger groups of people--in particular, the people who carryout ever more acute observations and perform ever more refined experiments--so they see moral progress as a matter of being able to respond to the needs of ever more inclusive groups of people (...) Pragmatists do not think of scientific, or any other inquiry, as aimed at truth, but rather at better justificatory ability--better to deal with doubts about what we are saying, either by shoring up what we have previously said or by deciding to say something different. The trouble with aiming at truth is that you would not know when you had reached it, even if you had in fact reached it. But you can aim at ever more justification, the assuagement of ever more doubt. Analogously, you cannot aim at 'doing what is right', because you will never know whether you have hit the mark. Long after you are dead, better informed and more sophisticated people may judge your action to have been a tragic mistake, just as they may judge your scientific beliefs as intelligible only by reference to an obsolete paradigm. But you can aim at ever more sensitivity to pain, and ever greater satisfaction of ever more various needs. Pragmatists think that the idea of something nonhuman luring us human beings on should be replaced with the idea of getting more and more human beings into our community--of taking the needs and interests and views of more and more diverse human beings into account. Justificatory ability is its own reward. There is no need to worry about whether we will also be rewarded with a sort of immaterial medal labelled 'Truth' or 'Moral Goodness.'"