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33 of 33 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Stimulating and Synoptic Account of Philosophy's Concerns, May 16, 2004
This is a major work in metaphysics, epistemology, and value theory. It's essentially a summary of a career of thought concerning the central issues in philosophy, and it is built around Nagel's big idea: that the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity can help us to understand the nature and source of the central problems of philosophy. It's an interesting and fruitful idea--though perhaps not as interesting and fruitful as he thinks--and it leads Nagel to lots of interesting ideas about how to understand, appreciate, and maybe even solve the central problems of philosophy. The main subject of the book is the relation between subjective and objective views of our minds, our selves, our thought, our actions, our moral views, etc. The subjective view is our limited point of view: it's the point of view we have when immersed in our own perspective on the world. We reach more objective points of view by subtracting the parochial elements from our perspective. In attempting to arrive at a more objective point of view, we step back from ourselves and place ourselves, along with our subjective points of view, in a broader conception of the world. This involves trying to see the world as it would appear to a being with a "view from nowhere." But problems arise when we realize that it's difficult to integrate subjective and objective perspectives. There is a tension between subjectivity and objectivity, and this tension appears in all areas of philosophy. As a matter of fact, it's the source of most of the fundamental problems that plague philosophers. When we take up a more objective viewpoint, the central elements of our subjective viewpoints are inexplicable. When we arrive a more objective conception of the world by, say, doing more science, we find it hard to understand how we can have minds, how our ways of forming beliefs allow us to know the objective world, how we can make sense of objective reasons for action, etc. But these apparently inexplicable things are among the crucial components of our subjective conception of the world and ourselves. And we encounter a similar problem in the other direction. When we are immersed in our subjective viewpoints, we find it hard to place ourselves and our viewpoint within an objective account of the world. That is, we find it hard to see how our ways of knowing could be backed up in a way that makes them more than simply our ways of knowing, and we find it hard to see how our ways of acting could be backed up in a way that makes them more than simply our ways of acting. Nagel treats most of the traditional "solutions" to the problems of philosophy as based on two general tactics for dealing with the tension between objectivity and subjectivity. According to Nagel, neither tactic is fully satisfactory. The first tactic is to understand everything as objective, and the construe the subjective as mere appearance. In contemporary thought, this tactic is manifest in overreaching forms of naturalism and scientism. Nagel agrees that the sciences do provide us with an objective conception of the world, and with an objective conception of the world that is likely to be largely accurate. But he doesn't think this means the sciences do or can provide us with an account of all the facts about the world, for they leave out our own subjective point of view. This leaves us with a residual unease: overarching naturalism provides us with an account of how things are that seems to leave something important out. We do have conscious experiences, there is a way things seem to us, we do seem to act freely, we do seem to be under moral obligations, etc. The second tactic is to search for an answer by going to the opposite extreme: that is, by collapsing everything into the subjective point of view. This is to claim that there is no way to draw back from our perspective in order to arrive at an objective perspective on the world and on our place within it. And this view can result in even more extreme views according to which there is no objective world out there to discover, and according to which we can't even make sense of the very idea that there could be such a world. In other words, to accept such a view is to acquiesce in some sort of skepticism, relativism, subjectivism, etc. Again, though, such a solution leaves us with a residual sense of unease: there is more to our ways of thinking and acting than that, isn't there? There is the further question of whether we're really right about what we think, and whether we're really right to do what we do. Is there any way to avoid these problems? Yes, we need a view of the world that is complex enough to accommodate both perspectives on the world; we need a view of the world that doesn't deny the reality of either the subjective or the objective. But this isn't really an answer; it's just a statement of what any answer is going to need to look like. Nagel doesn't claim to be able to offer a detailed solution to these problems. The final conclusion is that the success of attempts to solve the problems of philosophy straight will require our having something we don't have yet--namely an understanding of these two perspectives and their relations to one another. Can we have it? Here Nagel is cagey. At some points he offers some speculative suggestions about how this might go, at others he seems to doubt that it can be done. Notwithstanding the lack of answers here, Nagel thinks that understanding the problems of philosophy as he does provides us with some important insights. It allows us to explain the nature and source of philosophical problems, and it allows us to understand these problems as closely related to one another. It also helps to explain why the usual "solutions" to them don't convince. Moreover, it allows us to see these problems as real problems, and as problems lacking obvious solutions. This also supports our intuitions concerning the hopelessness of attempts to dissolve the problems of philosophy or to construe them as mere pseudo-problems.
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