Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Paperback)

~ (Editor) "The articles in this part address foundational questions about the nature of the mind and about the relationship between the mental and the physical..." (more)
Key Phrases: epistemic intension, subjunctive content, waterish stuff, New York, Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical Review (more...)

Editorial Reviews

Review

a splendid introduction to the subject ... offers an attractive, timely alternative to the more empirically engaged perspective of Lycan's Mind and Cognition. Teachers, students, and non-specialists looking for a comprehensive overview of issues in the general philosophy of mind, de-emphasizing empirical concerns, need look no further. Philip Robbins, Philosophical Psychology --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

Review

"By far the best selection of readings in the field. The hard-to-find are represented (Huxley) as well as the often neglected (Hill, Yablo). This is the best of all possible anthologies in the philosophy of mind."--Don A. Merrell, Arkansas State University

"An excellent volume of essays organized in a way that captures the issues that are most important to contemporary researchers in the field."--Casey O'Callaghan, University of California, Santa Cruz

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Product Details

• Paperback: 688 pages
• Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA (July 25, 2002)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 019514581X
• ISBN-13: 978-0195145816
• Product Dimensions: 9.8 x 7 x 1.3 inches
• Shipping Weight: 2.6 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (3 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #89,347 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

22 of 25 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Great!, May 5, 2005

By	Jonathan M. Knight - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

This is a fantastic collection compiled by David Chalmers, one of the leading philosophers of mind today. The best papers in here are "Quining Qualia" and " True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works" by Dan Dennett, "The Rediscovery of Light" by Paul Churchland (all you hard-problemers out there should be forced to read at least the ending section of this paper), "What Experience Teaches" by David Lewis, "Sensations and Brain Processes" by J.J.C. Smart, "Is Consciousness a Brain Process?", and a good excerpt from "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" by Wilfrid Sellars. Non-reductive materialists and property dualists also will like this book as they are represented as well with papers from the likes of Jackson (classical paper of his is included in which he expounds the knowledge argument, "Epiphenomenal Qualia") Mcginn, Nagel, Block, Levine, and of course Chalmers himself. All in all this is a fair sampling of the competing views in the Philosophy of Mind.

10 of 11 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars A Neuroscientist's Perspective, January 5, 2008

By	Camilo Libedinsky (Harvard University, Dept. of Neurobiology) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

This review is from: Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Hardcover)

I want to start by saying that I highly recommend this for a scientific audience. Before starting the book I felt a bit like I was going into enemy territory. I didn't want to hear about Chalmers' dualistic views. I didn't want to get convinced by them. I'm a scientist for crying out loud!

This compilation gave me exactly what I was looking for. A balanced view with articles written by the luminaries in the field. Ideas and concepts that philosophers usually throw around as a matter of fact are clearly explained by the people who actually coined these very ideas.

It was surprisingly accessible for a non-philosopher, although some sections did get a little technical, so I had to skip them. But this didn't break the flow of the book or hinder the understanding of other articles.

Chalmers gives great introductions to every section in the book, so you never lose track of the development of different ideas and how they stand with respect to each other.

Finally, after learning so much (and even though it goes against Chalmers' own ideas) I am a much more confident materialist (Type A ;)

9 of 31 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Outstanding collection of papers, March 10, 2004

By	magellan (Santa Clara, CA) - See all my reviews (TOP 100 REVIEWER)    (COMMUNITY FORUM 04)

This is an outstanding collection of papers, the most comprehensive probably ever published, on the issues relating to the philosophy of mind. They range from classical considerations such as the Cartesion dichotomy to modern analytical philosophy. They're really too diverse to summarize here, but if you already have a background in the subject, this book would be a great way to get up to date on what's going on.

This is an area I've worked in myself, and I thought I'd add a few more of my own comments to the debate, by way of considering a certain proposition. This is the statement that "You cannot know who you are and be who you are simultaneously. I owe the Canadian philosopher, Stephen Garvey, for this fascinating question, and he did the very interesting thing of opening up a "philosophy competition" to debate this proposition on a website he created expressly for this purpose. My background is both in philosophy and psychobiology, and so I would like to consider this proposition in the the light of that information.

Although it may be difficult to overcome this proposition, I don't see that the statements that we cannot know who we are and be who we are simultaneously are necessarily mutually exclusive.

Because of the existence of the condition "at the same time," this proposition really has three parts, not just two. If we can in fact know who we are at certain moments in time, and be who we are at certain moments in time, but these moments are contiguous but not overlapping, then we have achieved two of the three conditions. Then the only issue that remains is the one of simultaneity.

If it is thought that this is in fact the case, then the problem really comes down to a matter of the temporal exclusivity of the two main statements, and whether this one issue can in fact be overcome.

However, if we concede that being is a constant as long as we are alive, and that it cannot be isolated into discrete moments of time, then in that case, the condition of simultaneity can be removed for the statement "be who we are" since our being is not simultaneous with anything, it is simply continuous or a constant. If this is conceded, then the proposition is overcome if one can attain knowledge of one's self or who we are at any point during our existence.

In regard to the above, Garvey asked, "What is behind our knowing that allows us to know who we are without being who we are? How can we know, eat, or walk without being who we are?" I don't think that is possible either. However, even if it is conceded that knowledge, and perhaps even the knowledge of who we are, is not a constant and may be fragmentary or isolated in time, this is not a problem if it can be demonstrated that we can know who we are at any point in time (no matter how infinitesimally small) while we exist, which as we have concluded, is a constant.

Therefore, if during a typical lifetime of 70 years or so (a period comprised of approximately 2.2 billion seconds) we are able to know who we are for even a second, or even a millisecond during that period, we shall know who we are and be who we are simultaneously, and the proposition is overcome.

Then the problem really comes down to what is acceptable proof of the knowledge of who we are. Garvey pointed out that this is really a matter of knowing who we are either as what we know or knowledge as form, and the temporal exclusivity argument from the standpoint of being as a temporal constant. Since we have conceded being is a constant, there is nothing inherent in being itself that precludes the possibility of knowing who we are and being who we are simultaneously.

Therefore, is there anything in knowing who we are that precludes it from being simultaneous with being who we are? If it is conceded that it is not then we are now much closer to overcoming the proposition.

Anyway, just a few comments of my own on the thorny problem of the mind-brain question that are appropos of the subject of the current book.