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Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise
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Product Description
David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature is famous for its extreme skepticism. Louis Loeb argues that Hume's destructive conclusions have in fact obscured a constructive stage that Hume abandons prematurely.
Working within a philosophical tradition that values tranquillity, Hume favors an epistemology that links justification with settled belief. Hume appeals to psychological stability to support his own epistemological assessments, both favorable regarding causal inference, and unfavorable regarding imaginative propensities. The theory's success in explaining Hume's epistemic distinctions gives way to pessimism, since Hume contends that reflection on beliefs is deeply destabilizing. So much the worse, Hume concludes, for placing a premium on reflection. Hume endorses and defends the position that stable beliefs of unreflective persons are justified, though they would not survive reflection. At the same time, Hume relishes the paradox that unreflective beliefs enjoy a preferred epistemic status and strains to establish it. Loeb introduces a series of amendments to the Treatise that secures a more positive result for justified belief while maintaining Hume's fundamental principles.
In his review of Hume's applications of his epistemology, Loeb uncovers a stratum of psychological doctrine beyond associationism, a theory of conditions in which beliefs are felt to conflict and of the resolution of this uneasiness or dissonance. This theory of mental conflict is also essential to Hume's strategy for integrating empiricism about meaning with his naturalism. However, Hume fails to provide a general account of the conditions in which conflicting beliefs lead to persisting instability, so his theory is incomplete.
Loeb explores Hume's concern with stability in reference to his discussions of belief, education, the probability of causes, unphilosophical probability, the belief in body, sympathy and moral judgment, and the passions, among other topics.
About the Author
Louis Loeb is currently Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. His publications include Continental Metaphysics and the Development of Modern Philosophy.
David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature is famous for its extreme skepticism. Louis Loeb argues that Hume's destructive conclusions have in fact obscured a constructive stage that Hume abandons prematurely.
Working within a philosophical tradition that values tranquillity, Hume favors an epistemology that links justification with settled belief. Hume appeals to psychological stability to support his own epistemological assessments, both favorable regarding causal inference, and unfavorable regarding imaginative propensities. The theory's success in explaining Hume's epistemic distinctions gives way to pessimism, since Hume contends that reflection on beliefs is deeply destabilizing. So much the worse, Hume concludes, for placing a premium on reflection. Hume endorses and defends the position that stable beliefs of unreflective persons are justified, though they would not survive reflection. At the same time, Hume relishes the paradox that unreflective beliefs enjoy a preferred epistemic status and strains to establish it. Loeb introduces a series of amendments to the Treatise that secures a more positive result for justified belief while maintaining Hume's fundamental principles.
In his review of Hume's applications of his epistemology, Loeb uncovers a stratum of psychological doctrine beyond associationism, a theory of conditions in which beliefs are felt to conflict and of the resolution of this uneasiness or dissonance. This theory of mental conflict is also essential to Hume's strategy for integrating empiricism about meaning with his naturalism. However, Hume fails to provide a general account of the conditions in which conflicting beliefs lead to persisting instability, so his theory is incomplete.
Loeb explores Hume's concern with stability in reference to his discussions of belief, education, the probability of causes, unphilosophical probability, the belief in body, sympathy and moral judgment, and the passions, among other topics.
About the Author
Louis Loeb is currently Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. His publications include Continental Metaphysics and the Development of Modern Philosophy.
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Inside This Book Citations: This book cites 67 books Explore: Citations | Books on Related Topics | Concordance | Text Stats Key Phrases - SIPs: immaterial substrata, claim that causal inference, quasi content, ascribing propensity, inference from coherence (more) Key Phrases - CAPs: Kemp Smith, Perhaps Hume Browse Sample Pages: Front Cover | Copyright | Table of Contents | Excerpt | Index | Back Cover | Surprise Me! |
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Inside This Book
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First Sentence:
In the course of drawing a distinction between calm and violent passions, on the one hand, and weak and strong passions, on the other, Hume says: Tis evident passions influence not the will in proportion to their violence, or the disorder they occasion in the temper; but on the contrary, that when a passion has once become a settled principle of action, and is the predominant inclination of the soul it commonly produces no longer any sensible agitation. Read the first page Key Phrases - Statistically Improbable Phrases (SIPs): (learn more)
immaterial substrata, claim that causal inference, quasi content, ascribing propensity, inference from coherence, unphilosophical probability, conflicted resolution, empiricism about meaning, less demanding theory, treating constancy, regulative disposition, uncorrected judgments, epistemic discriminations, customary transition from causes, pretheoretical distinctions, successively assent, causal inference results, imaginative propensities, antient philosophy, distinction between calm, doxastic states, resembling perceptions, observed constant conjunction, constancy cases, doxastic conditions Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
Kemp Smith, Perhaps Hume New!
B
In the course of drawing a distinction between calm and violent passions, on the one hand, and weak and strong passions, on the other, Hume says: Tis evident passions influence not the will in proportion to their violence, or the disorder they occasion in the temper; but on the contrary, that when a passion has once become a settled principle of action, and is the predominant inclination of the soul it commonly produces no longer any sensible agitation. Read the first page Key Phrases - Statistically Improbable Phrases (SIPs): (learn more)
immaterial substrata, claim that causal inference, quasi content, ascribing propensity, inference from coherence, unphilosophical probability, conflicted resolution, empiricism about meaning, less demanding theory, treating constancy, regulative disposition, uncorrected judgments, epistemic discriminations, customary transition from causes, pretheoretical distinctions, successively assent, causal inference results, imaginative propensities, antient philosophy, distinction between calm, doxastic states, resembling perceptions, observed constant conjunction, constancy cases, doxastic conditions Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
Kemp Smith, Perhaps Hume New!
B