China: Fragile Superpower: How China's Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise (Hardcover)

by Susan L. Shirk (Author)
Key Phrases: one policy advisor, antisecession law, peaceful rise, United States, Communist Party, Jiang Zemin (more...)

Editorial Reviews

From The Washington Post
Reviewed by John Pomfret

Susan L. Shirk starts out her revelatory book on China with a nightmare scenario. A Chinese SU-27 fighter and a Taiwanese F-16 collide over the Taiwan Strait. The incident spirals out of control when the Chinese do what they always do in a crisis: blame the other guy. Demonstrations erupt in Beijing. Protesters demand that the Communist Party confront Taiwan and the United States. "When will China finally stand up?" read the signs. Washington scrambles as Beijing readies for war.

This brief, fictional opening frames Shirk's book, dramatizing the possibility that China's communist leadership could lurch into combat with Taiwan and the United States, which is obligated to defend the island nation under the Taiwan Relations Act. She sets out to explain why it is not a mere fantasy and why we, basically, need to be nice to China to keep the nightmare at bay.

At a time when much writing about China frothily presumes the unstoppable rise of a global titan, it is refreshing that a respected academic and former government official (Shirk was the deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia during the second Clinton administration) questions the notion that China is going to run the world. "China may be an emerging superpower," she writes, "but it is a fragile one."

Inside China, she argues, the party leadership is hemmed in by threats to its stability: a rapidly aging population, the rise of the Internet, privatization of the economy, a widening gap between urban rich and rural poor, a restive population fed up with corruption, pollution that not only sickens but kills, mounting unemployment in an economy that needs to grow 7 percent annually just to provide jobs for 25 million new people entering the workforce. "All around them," Shirk contends, "the leaders see new social forces unleashed by economic reforms that could subvert the regime." Moreover, Shirk describes a regime -- half Mafia, half corporate board -- so obsessed with staying in power that it is ill-equipped to deal with these challenges. In a country where communist ideology is dead and a dog-eat-dog form of capitalism is ascendant, you'd think economic interests would be supreme. That's not the case, Shirk argues. After the crackdown on student-led protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989, the military and security services gained even more power than they already had in a society built on Chairman Mao's maxim that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The minister of public security is a Politburo member for the first time since the Cultural Revolution, Shirk notes, but only one person with business experience has become an alternate member of the party's Central Committee, a significantly lower rank. The security services have joined with the organizations that handle propaganda and personnel to create what Shirk calls "the control cartel" devoted to pushing the party's new ideology, a virulent form of nationalism.

Force-fed to China's people through programs such as the "Patriotic Education Campaign" (for all college students), nationalism nurtures "popular resentments against Japan and America and an expectation that Taiwan would soon be reunified," Shirk writes. Look at China's reaction to the food, toy and toothpaste scandals created by shoddy products: Instead of acknowledging the concerns of Western consumers, the Chinese Communist Party's propaganda organs have gone into attack mode, branding these worries as a campaign to isolate and weaken China. The problem, Shirk says, is that this form of nationalism has "boxed the CCP and its leaders into a corner." With reactions like these, she asks, "how can they stabilize relations with these important countries on which China's economic growth, and its political stability, depend?"

Shirk's book shines when she shows how this resentful nationalism has hurt China's relations with Japan and the United States. She depicts ties with Washington as prone to troubles, partly because the Chinese government lacks a crisis-management system. Shirk uses two case studies -- the accidental U.S. bombing of China's embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999 and the collision between a U.S. spy plane and a Chinese jet fighter in 2001 -- to show how the Chinese leadership has become hostage to the expectations churned up by the very nationalism it has fomented. She contends that the Ministry of Propaganda and the People's Liberation Army jumped to blame the United States for both crises and presented unrealistic demands that made it difficult for the Chinese government to back down.

So how to deal with this economic giant that exhibits all the maturity of a muscular teenager? Here Shirk's fine book breaks down. She wants the United States to soft pedal China's human rights violations because, she argues, "America's overriding national interest lies in averting a war." In addition, she calls on the U.S. government to stop pressuring Japan to build up its military. And she advises U.S. officials to give China "face" -- or respect -- whenever possible.

I'd counter that, while Shirk is right to be vigilant about preventing a conflict, she exaggerates the threat. To bolster her argument that Chinese nationalism needs our utmost attention, she compares resurgent China with Japan and Germany in the 1930s. Squeeze China too much, she argues, and you'll get World War III. But, historically, China has been a far more fragmented society than either Germany or Japan. Faced with a grave threat to their nation's survival from the Japanese invasion that began in the '30s, what did China's elite do? They barely battled the Japanese and continued their civil war. One Chinese person is a dragon, a Chinese saying goes, but three of us are just an insect.

Shirk has written an important book at an important moment, with the Beijing Olympics approaching and a new Chinese product scandal breaking practically every week. China: Fragile Superpower should change our assessment of China's leadership, which is a lot less stable than many of us thought. But her overriding fear of war skews her view of the Chinese and of how America should deal with them.

Copyright 2007, The Washington Post. All Rights Reserved.

Review

"One of the best books I read on China."--Nicholas D. Kristof, The New York Times
"Susan Shirk has written the definitive book at the right time. For those seeking an objective look at the new China, your search is over. The bonus is that Fragile Superpower is as fascinating as it is informative. A great accomplishment."--Madeleine K. Albright, former U.S. Secretary of State
"Ms. Shirk's magisterial book gazes down on China from above."--The Economist
"Revelatory...Shirk has written an important book at an important moment, with the Beijing Olympics approaching and a new Chinese product scandal breaking practically every week. China: Fragile Superpower should change our assessment of China's leadership, which is a lot less stable than many of us thought."-Washington Post Book World
"Shirk's depth of knowledge about China - including personal acquaintance with many of its leaders - makes this book a valuable read."--Christian Science Monitor
"In her extremely convincing book, she shows that there is another emotional side which, driven by unresolved internal tensions, could still push China into a military confrontation."--Financial Times
"Now more than ever we need a realistic approach for dealing with China's rising power. Susan Shirk has an insider's grasp of China's politics and a firm understanding of what makes its leaders tick. China: Fragile Superpower is an important and necessary book."--Brent Scowcroft, former U.S. National Security Advisor
"In this eye-opening work, Susan Shirk details China's incredible economic progress while lifting the rug on its severe internal problems. She has injected a dose of realism into a distorted vision of China which has been promoted by gushing China watchers who focus on Shanghai's skyline."--James Lilley, Former American Ambassador to South Korea and China
"Although other problems dominate the news today, a rising China presents America's greatest long-term challenge. Susan Shirk's excellent book argues compellingly that it also poses the greatest challenge to China's leaders. How they meet this challenge affects not only China, but also the U.S. and, indeed, the world."--William J. Perry, former U.S. Secretary of Defense


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Product Details

• Hardcover: 336 pages
• Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA (April 16, 2007)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0195306090
• ISBN-13: 978-0195306095
• Product Dimensions: 9.3 x 6.3 x 1.5 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.4 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.1 out of 5 stars See all reviews (27 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #332,382 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

24 of 28 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars China at Times Its Own Worst Enemy, July 9, 2007

By	Serge J. Van Steenkiste (Atlanta, GA) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

Susan Shirk gives her readers some useful tools to better assess the future behavior of a fast-resurging China after being "humiliated" for a century and a half (pp. 153 - 55, 185 - 87). Shirk clearly explains that Chinese communist power has two faces. China wants to be seen as behaving responsibly to foster economic growth and social stability (pp. 105 - 139). Shirk correctly states that actions rather than words will make it more credible. Establishing this reputation requires China to accommodate its neighbors, to be a team player in multinational organizations, and to use economic ties to make friends (pp. 109, 199, 223, 257 - 61).

In case of a major crisis, especially one involving Taiwan, Japan or the United States, China could show its other face by acting irresponsibly due to the absence of effective checks and balances of the Chinese system. Party leaders could recklessly play the nationalistic card again as they did with Taiwan in 1996 or with Japan in 2005 if they need to look strong domestically with other leaders, the mass public, and the military (pp. 10 -12, 43, 63, 69, 77, 139, 151, 173, 179 - 80, 186 - 90, 197, 205, 219).

The Communist Party has bet on jingoism since the 1990s because communism in China is a dying ideology in which almost no Chinese believes (pp. 11, 63 - 64, 145, 148, 164 - 70, 186). The Party implausibly claims that ordinary Chinese are unworthy of Western democracy because their country, unlike India, does not have religion to manage them responsibly (p. 53). Chinese leaders know that Chinese nationalists can turn against the Party if they appear too weak to deal with foreign pressures (pp. 61, 66, 173, 180).

Economic interdependence has had a somewhat moderating effect on the relationship of China with the outside world, including Taiwan, Japan, and the U.S. (pp. 24, 96, 145 - 46, 190, 195, 233, 241, 247). Due to their fear of widespread instability and their lack of political legitimacy, Party leaders, however, have not displayed much courage in taking unpopular measures such as enforcing intellectual property rights or stopping currency manipulation in trading abroad (pp. 26 - 27, 53 - 54, 60, 73 - 74). Chinese leaders are well aware that the increased protectionism in the U.S. against the fast-growing trade deficit with China and the rampant piracy of U.S. products in China are not politically sustainable, especially in case of a majority change in Washington in 2009 (pp. 25 - 26, 248). At the same time, Shirk correctly points out that the ongoing fiscal profligacy of the U.S. is weakening the country at the profit of China (pp. 26, 249).

Of all China's challenges, the need for "social stability" overrules all other considerations, even it means sacrificing long-term diplomatic objectives for short-term domestic political gains (pp. 38, 52 - 54, 109, 148, 183 - 87, 197, 224, 234, 254 - 55). For the Chinese communist leaders and their families, losing power could result in the loss of their possessions or even their death (pp. 7 - 9). To keep its authoritarian grip on power, the Communist Party has articulated a three-pronged policy (p. 39):

1) Avoid public leadership splits

Shirk gives a useful overview of the "selectorate," the group of Party members who have the power to choose the leaders, and the modus operandi of the Party (pp. 39 - 52). The Communist Party is not known for its openness in framing domestic and foreign policies (pp. 43 - 44). Patronage is essential for keeping the Party in power, which feeds an endemic corruption from which many communist bigwigs enrich themselves at the expense of ordinary Chinese (pp. 60, 68 - 69). Party leaders learn from the Tiananmen fiasco that destabilizing internal dissent can undermine the Party's grip on power (pp. 48, 53, 162). Keeping elite contests for power hidden from the public is increasingly difficult as the audience-driven media are testing the limits on what can be reported (pp. 39, 50, 52, 55, 78, 183). Although China is a still a long way from having free mass media, resourceful Chinese increasingly give the Communist Party a hard time for censoring "undesirable news (pp. 82 - 83)."

2) Prevent large-scale social unrest

Shirk demonstrates with conviction that Communist China's obsession with internal stability paradoxically makes the Party very sensitive to public opinion due to the lack of any democratic institution to allow ordinary Chinese to express themselves peacefully (pp. 52 - 53, 66). Shirk overviews with mastery the multiple possible threats to one-party-rule and which means the Party uses to either neutralize or reduce these threats (pp. 52 - 69). Paradoxically, the more developed and rich China becomes, the more insecure and threatened Communist Party leaders feel (p. 5).

3) Keep the People's Liberation Army on the side of the Party

Unlike their predecessors, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, Communist Party leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao are less politically secure and have a greater need to keep the military satisfied to safeguard them from domestic rebellion (pp. 46, 73, 77, 158 - 60, 202). Communist Party leaders seem to have a harder time saying no to the military demands for weaponry buildups and aggressive policies (pp. 70, 75 - 76, 222 - 23). The senior leadership of the PLA uses the Taiwan issue as the paramount factor for getting more "toys" approved (p. 74). By covering foreign policy, audience-driven media are making it harder for Communist Party leaders not to treat foreign policy as domestic politics (pp. 78 - 104, 140 - 254). Furthermore, history is not on the side of China because rising powers are likely to provoke war (pp. 4, 9 - 10, 210 - 11, 219, 243 - 45, 261 - 69). All of these factors undermine the credibility of the "peaceful rise" that Jintao - Wen Jiabao have promoted since 2002 (pp. 108 - 09, 252).

To summarize, China's behavior cannot be correctly understood without a proper grasp of the tectonic forces that have molded the country's history, geography, and culture.

5 of 5 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars China: Very interesting reading, May 29, 2007

By	Phillip Lawrence - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

This is a powerful book. Starting off with some frightening scenarios it paints at first a gloomy picture of potential conflict. It then goes on the describe the foundations on which the scenarios could eventuate with some great insights into the inner workings of the China public and political system. In the end it portrays a future world with a China as a legitimate global power, returning to a rightful position possibly, in a role not incumbered by capitalist history.

15 of 19 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars China's fragility lies elsewhere, September 9, 2007

By	Li Hak Yin "gindeini" (Hong Kong) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

Honestly, China - Fragile Superpower caught my attention as well as curiosity. How fragile is China? This is my very first question before reading the book. The poor rural peasants, increasing laid-off workers, the rise of civil and democratic consciousness among Chinese citizens, the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)...? I have thought about various reasons for a fragile China.

Unexpectedly, a "fragile China" is not the comment or viewpoint from the west, but from the Chinese president Hu Jintao, "although China looks like a powerhouse from the outside, to its leaders it looks fragile, poor and overwhelmed by internal problems". Indeed, everyone knows that the Chinese leaders are facing numerous internal problems, apart from dealing with poor peasants and laid-off workers, environmental degradation, the Chinese product safety, the gap between the rich and the poor as well as the income gap between coastal and inland are also the imminent challenges to the rise of China.

Susan L. Shirk is the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in managing US-China relations. She has another perspective towards a "fragile China" - the rise of internet and mass media. The whole threatening mechanism begins with the young "netizens". The "netizens" search the foreign website in getting the uncensored international news and post it to the local forums. Other "netizens" start to discuss the issue and post some radical responses like protesting the Japanese prime minister's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. Shirk also studies the similar cases such as the US bombardment on Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, the clash of aircraft between China and the US near South China Sea in 2001 and the provocative issue such as Taiwan. Since the Chinese leaders seek to get the collective consensus (to avoid personal responsibility) before formally reacting to international crisis, their replies always come late. In the meantime, the Chinese leaders cannot control the spreading news, especially those from the internet. In order to remain the legitimacy of the government, the Chinese leaders are forced to address according to the public opinion. This is the reason why China reacts toughly towards Japan, the United States and Taiwan even though the Chinese leaders treasure the economic interdependences between China, Japan and the United States as well as the positive image of mainland China among Taiwanese.

Besides, by interviewing some Chinese military generals, Shirk finds that the Chinese leaders have compromised to the People's Liberation Army (PLA) for regime security. Some PLA generals heavily criticized Jiang Zemin's leadership in dealing with foreign countries. For example, Jiang is regarded as too pro-American, too soft on Japan while too optimistic towards the unification of Taiwan. To pacify the discontents among the PLA generals, Jiang enlarged the PLA's budget with an increase of double digit percentage annually. Not surprisingly, the west believes that the rise of Chinese military power is a potential threat to the Asia-Pacific region, not because of the modernization of the PLA, but for the growing influence of the Chinese military generals who are not accountable to the civilian government.

Therefore, according to Shirk, China is a fragile superpower because there are too many constrains on the Chinese leaders in making both their domestic and foreign policy. Even worse, as Shirk writes, "The CCP's ability to control the information that reaches the public is declining at the same time as the country's military capabilities are improving. And these two trends combine dangerously to intensify the pressure to use force to defend China's honor".

Though Shirk develops a model in explaining the dilemmas of the Chinese leaders in facing the demands of public opinion and the belligerence of military generals, it seems that the role of the internet in China is a bit exaggerated. In fact, many foreign websites are blocked in China. Even though there are limited occasional cases which the "netizens" posted uncensored news on local website, these news were removed within hours. There is a doubt whether a concrete public opinion can be formed within a few hours via internet. Shirk also admits that the huge Chinese demonstration against the US for the bombardment of Belgrade in 1999 and the clash of Chinese and American aircrafts in 2001 were acquiesced if not encouraged by the Chinese government. The Chinese government kept the demonstrations under control in order to get better bargaining position over the US. However, Shirk should also take into account that there was a call up of anti-Japanese demonstration in April 2005 on the internet for the Japanese prime minister Kozumi's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. But this time, the Chinese government firmly prohibited the demonstration since the previous anti-Japanese demonstrations went radically by attacking the Japanese stores. Also, the Chinese leaders want to send a signal to Japan that China is willing to restore their bilateral relations. The point here is that no demonstration can be appeared without the consent of the Chinese government, no matter the demonstration is called up through the internet or not. Besides, Shirk believes that the CCP will stand firm towards Japan, Taiwan and the US because the Qing and the Kuomintang government lost their regime for failing to expel foreign aggressions. It is indeed too early to justify whether the ordinary Chinese will overthrow the CCP only because of its soft stance towards Japan, Taiwan and the US, given that the situation is not the same for the CCP now when compare the previous regimes.

China is a fragile rising power, but its fragility lies on the peasants who have no land to farm and the laid-off workers who have no social security net to rely on rather than the public opinion on the internet.