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Worst-Case Scenarios by Cass R. Sunstein
$18.21
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Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency (Inalienable Rights) by Richard A. Posner
$12.89
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Risk and Reason: Safety, Law, and the Environment by Cass R. Sunstein
$23.48
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The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable by Nassim Nicholas Taleb
$17.79
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Worst Cases: Terror and Catastrophe in the Popular Imagination by Lee Clarke
$18.00
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Posner groups catastrophes into four types: natural catastrophes (e.g., a massive asteroid collision); catastrophic accidents caused by unfettered scientific exploration (e.g., a "strangelet" scenario in which hyper-dense quarks produced in a physicist's lab compress the Earth in seconds); unintended byproducts of technological progress (e.g., abrupt climate change); and intentional catastrophes (nuclear terrorism, bioterrorism or even nuclear winter). Catastrophe is worth the price of the book simply for Posner's lively and readable summary of the apocalyptic dystopias that serious scientists judge to be possible. (For a similarly sobering account from one of the world's premier astrophysicists, see Martin Rees's 2003 book Our Final Hour.)
But how can sophisticated citizens think productively about such staggering possibilities? Indeed, is it even worth worrying about such appalling but unlikely tragedies? While the first two chapters of Catastrophe present fascinating information for general readers, chapters three and four will likely leave statistic-phobes cold. Posner advocates using basic cost-benefit analysis -- a widely applied technique developed from economics for carefully weighing pros and cons -- not only to structure the questions, but also to derive some answers. Moreover, based on those answers, Posner recommends that Washington act now. Reviewing the best scientific estimates of likelihoods and consequences, he concludes that the U.S. government should seriously consider prohibiting some types of scientific research, creating new international oversight agencies and imposing blanket restrictions on the study of dangerous subjects by all students from suspect nations. No orthodox University of Chicago conservative he.
The cost-benefit framework Posner recommends is good as far as it goes. Unfortunately, it doesn't go very far in dealing with this class of problems. Students of cost-benefit analysis have long recognized this tool's limits in dealing with extremes. In the classic social science formula, risk equals probability times consequences. Since a species-extinguishing event like Earth colliding with a huge asteroid would be infinitely bad, even the slightest probability of such an event occurring would swamp any cost-benefit calculus.
Posner acknowledges these theoretical difficulties but attempts to finesse them. He does so by making heroic but arbitrary assumptions that leave his conclusions unpersuasive.
If cost-benefit analysis cannot provide convincing answers to questions about what our society should be doing about potential mega-catastrophes, where else can we look? My best suggestion is that we draw lessons from recent practice. The most instructive case is the Cold War threat of total annihilation in nuclear war. For decades, American policymakers faced a grim reality: Soviet nuclear bombs that could destroy American cities and kill millions. This possibility drove policymakers to a categorical imperative: Do everything feasible to prevent such a war. President Reagan expressed it best in his oft-quoted bumper sticker: "A nuclear war cannot be won and must therefore never be fought." To prevent that, Republican and Democratic administrations, with broad public support, spent more than $2 trillion developing and deploying missiles, nuclear weapons, satellite-alert systems,