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1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Start thinking about "Being" with this challenging but satisfying meal..., October 26, 2008
In a downloadable iTunes UC Berkeley lecture from 2007, Professor Hubert Dreyfus makes a startling claim: he feels Martin Heidegger's influence on American philosophy has increased and Ludwig Wittgenstein's has waned. Anyone who studied Analytic Philosophy in the 1990s during Wittgenstein-mania will likely drop their mandible at this claim. First at the mere notion of sagging influence (which is likely disputable), and second, and most shockingly, at who his influence has supposedly sagged to. Historically, Heidegger has not been embraced by the Analytic school. "Anathema" may even sum up his general reception in that camp (reference his infamous "debate" with Rudolph Carnap). And though both famous philosophers in question hail from Germany, they have remained largely entrenched in opposite, and warring, philosophical schools. The divide originates within the grand schism between Analytic and Continental philosophy. Scholars tend to subsume Heidegger in the latter school and Wittgenstein in the former. These two sides rarely speak and when they do fur may fly. But times change, and some in the Analytic school have turned towards the once exiled Heidegger to explore epistemological problems. As such, Heidegger studies in English, at least in philosophy departments, usually examine his work with an Analytic attitude. Enter this deceptively small book called, appropriately, "Heidegger's Being and Time." In the introduction author William Large suggests he wants to provide an alternative for the Analytic attitude towards Heidegger. "This present book," he writes, "comes from a serious engagement with the French Heideggerians for many years, and I have indicated what some of the debates are within this reception in the end notes to the chapters." And in the end notes they stay, with a peppering of Levinas, Derrida, Foucault, and others rarely mentioned off the continent. But, as Large also states, this dimension stays out of the main discussion. Completely out. The end notes do point to Continental references and provide at least a taste of "the other side." Nonetheless, this is no Continental introduction to Heidegger. But, more importantly, it is a facile, clear, challenging, and accessible introduction to the ideas of Division I and II of Heidegger's magnum opus. Heidegger's influence will likely grow, a la Dreyfus, if such introductions flourish in English.
The book has three parts: 1. Historical Context; 2. A Guide To The Text; 3. Study Aids. Part 1 delves into the phenomenological origins of "Being and Time" via the work of Edmund Husserl. This early 20th century school tried to reawaken the "doing" of philosophy outside the classroom, in that it attempted to bring method to theory. Using phenomenology, someone can go out in the world and explore. Heidegger studied under Husserl and appropriated the phenomenological viewpoint for his own work, but not before changing it irrevocably. Using some of Heidegger's early lectures (notably "The History of the Concept of Time") this section traces the morphing of phenomenology under Husserl into ontology under Heidegger. Ultimately, Heidegger felt that Husserl had left out the world ("bracketed out," to use Husserl's terminology) in his phenomenological analysis of consciousness. This provides a launching pad for Heidegger's investigation into the question of Being, a notion absent or presupposed in Husserl's work, and the being that asks "what it means to be," Dasein. This crucial section outlines the background framework of phenomenology briefly and effectively, especially for newcomers. It also provides a brilliant segue for the next section.
Part 2, "A Guide To The Text," provides a holistic, and sometimes vertiginous, summation of "Being and Time." This is the bulk of the book. As an overview it excels in capturing the main points, as well as some nooks and crannies, of Heidegger's turgid masterpiece: the question of Being (Large follows the MacQuarrie and Robinson translation and capitalizes "Being"); Aristotle's definition via "Genus"; categorical vs. existential; Dasein; everydayness; ontic vs. ontological; "The Destruction of Philosophy" (uprooting traditional concepts to expose the neglect of the question of "Being"); "Being-In-The-World" and "worldness"; the place of science (Heidegger is not anti-science as often thought); spatiality measured ontologically as "concern"; "the 'They';" Thrownness and moods; equipment ("ready-to-hand" precedes "present-to-hand" and never vice versa); the nothing at the foundation of our existence which leads to anxiety, falling, idle chatter, and inauthenticity; "Being-Towards-Death" which can lead us to own our existence, our embracing of the nothing and our possibilities (authenticity); the future orientation of Dasein in possibility (authentic temporality), the facticity of its past, and the fallenness of its present. The discussion sometimes veers from the order of "Being and Time," but claims to do so for reasons of clarity. In the end, Large follows Levinas in bemoaning the absence of ethics in "Being and Time." Though he finds Heidegger's infamous Nazism irrelevant to a discussion of his work (he even says, in the Introduction, that biography doesn't illuminate philosophy, and that he has eliminated biography due to the glut of information available today). Following this section the brain will feel as the stomach does following a large but satisfying meal.
The final part, "Study Aids," will prove extremely useful for newcomers to Heidegger. Apart from a very handy glossary of Heidegger's voluminous and beguiling terms, a "Further Reading" section outlines and critiques works by and about Heidegger. In particular, the subsection called "Recommended Secondary Works on 'Being and Time'" will help determine where to go next before braving the imposing source itself. Lastly, students may benefit from the discussion on writing essays on "Being and Time."
Large's book looks deceptively small, but each page penetrates deep. It is not an easy read. Heidegger never is. Nonetheless, those looking for an overview of one of the 20th century's most influential books would do well to start here.
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2 of 3 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
"Being" is a revealing way of seeing; it is world disclosive, December 30, 2008
I read this book for a graduate seminar on philosophy. William large's book helps to illuminate one of the most influential philosophical books of the twentieth century, Martin Heidegger's "Being and Time," he deconstructs phenomenology. Heidegger's kind of phenomenology has to do with the idea of phenomenon, which means something that appears and shows itself. His criticism of traditional philosophy is that it gets started with categories, concepts, and notions, departing from the way human comprehension of this world first shows itself. This is Aristotelian and Aristotle is an enormous influence on Heidegger.
Yet, there is something very radical going on here, and that is the idea of "being" is connected to meaning and negativity. In the history of philosophy, being has a positive concept, something that "is" thus, the opposite of being is none being. Heidegger wants to show how the meaning of being is distorted by this understanding of being as a purely positive concept, as a "thing" a full present entity. For Example, he also very much critiques in modern art, the modern conception of objectivity, the world is transformed into an object independent of art, of its significance, its meaning, or interest in it. This was due in large part because of modern science, and its strong sense of objectification converting nature into a set of mere objects, time, and space that are measurable and analyzable through scientific means. Meaning, importance, and significance for Heidegger equals value; science and nature have none of this as pure objects. Therefore, anything of meaning, and of significance would be transferred into the subject it would be simply the human estimation, nature itself has no meaning or significance in that respect.
Heidegger critiques this scientific model. As he says in his phenomenology, "Well how is it that human existence first understands itself? Here he is talking about things that are very ordinary and complex. We are in a world that has significance, it is meaningful to us, it matters to us, it fits into our interests in such a way that we are absorbed into its significance. So, when we come across the world, first and foremost it is not a mere object that is standing apart from us or our mind, but rather it has significant elements of our environment that fit into our lives. Some things are significant, or they are useful, or dangerous, or satisfying, etc. What Heidegger wants to say in his phenomenology is we have to pay attention to this way of being. Therefore, first and foremost he says "being" matters, it matters to us. "Being" is a significance, it is not just a bare object or a bare fact. Heidegger doesn't accept this idea of subject on one side and object on the other side, that means that when humans have their understanding of the world, it is not just a human projection, it is not just a human construction. It is a revealing way of seeing; it is world disclosive. The meaning of the world wouldn't happen without us, because we are the ones that find it meaningful. Therefore, it is most important to understand that for Heidegger there is no object subject distinction. The term he uses to illustrate his idea is "Dasien" which means "human existence," Heidegger chooses it because he doesn't want to deal with the subject, or mind or consciousness, he wants to use a word that does not subjectivefy things. He uses "Dasien" as "humans being there" in this world and not just staying apart from it.
Humans are a being in the world, a term he uses is, "we dwell" in the world, we don't come across it as some bare thing in the world we "dwell" in it. Therefore, "meaningfulness" is a primary notion of being. Secondly, the meaning of "being" is connected with the notion of negativity. This is the notion of "being" moving toward death, and anxiety. Thus, the way that humans understand being is in part because of opposite of non-being and death is a perfect example of that. Humans are distinct because we understand that we are mortal, that we die. We are aware of death even when we are not in danger, which means we understand being and our world. Heidegger made a lot out of the fact that the Greeks understood this, that they were mortals, and that was no accident he thought. That death is a primary aspect of what it means to be human. If you are aware of death as he says, then you can be aware of the meaning of life. The meaning of life comes to us because we understand that we are finite, that we are mortal and not in control.
Another way to understand Heidegger is a wonderful analysis of the idea that the word "being" has become a noun in philosophy, like first things of beings, or things that are. Yet Heidegger says in the Greek language and other western languages this idea of "being" grammatically in language is derived from a verb, the primary verb "to be." Moreover, as a verb it is tensed which means it has to do with time. All verbs are tensed, even Aristotle said, "That is the difference between a verb and a noun." The difference between a verb and a noun, a verb is something that has to do with time, not just action, but time. That is why all verbs are tensed as future, and past. The very fact that time is another perfect indication of negativity, because time is ever changing, ever moving, and when we are in the present, the past is time of negativity it is no longer. When we are in the present, the future is kind of negative it is not yet. Yet we understand these negatives as meaningful, that is why we can get upset about the past that it is not happening anymore, and why we can become excited about the future even though it hasn't happened yet, they have meaning to us.
Another important feature of Heidegger's book is where he takes on the notion of skepticism. Skepticism is a classic problem in philosophy, it is really fostered by Descartes and Hume, and it has to do with the subject/object division. Skeptics argue that the mind is on one side of the fence, the outside world is on the other side, and the mind is something that comes across the world and just processes it, according to its categories of thinking, this is a very common modern construction of skepticism. If this skeptical construct were true, then it is very possible for someone to ask the question; "well how do we know that our minds that are on this side of the fence can ever really know that it is accurately talking about what is on the other side of the fence? If it is separated like this, how can we be sure that what we think about is actually the case? Heidegger is not talking here about ordinary skepticism, like wonder or "I am not sure" kind of skepticism; but what Heidegger argues against is the kind of radical skepticism, which asks, can we be sure of any of our knowledge. This idea plays on two objects, the subject object divide if we are on this side of the subject how can we ever know we are accurately talking about something. Secondly, is the certainty because the skeptic is someone who says well, "I really want to find with 100% certainty, and if I can find any reason for doubt then I am not going to commit. Heidegger says this is a classic philosophical problem that doesn't make any sense whatsoever. Because, no existing human self could ever radically call into question its environment and this world. It doesn't make any sense. You can call into question this or that aspect of it, but never the whole thing and never to say; "well it's possible that what humans say about the world may not have anything to do with the world." Even Descartes and Hume knew this was perverse, but they said this is what philosophy has to do. Radical skepticism is perverse to Heidegger. Skeptics like Descartes and Hume if right why are they writing to an audience. The very practice of skepticism undermines the idea of skepticism. Heidegger says, "Well if our practices betray the project of skepticism, which even Hume admits, he says I would go mad." You can't live as a radical skeptic. This skepticism can apply to things like morals and beauty values and artistic things, because they don't satisfy strict standards of knowledge and certainty.
To reiterate, it is important to know that Heidegger primarily wants to say that the meaning of being, is something that humans are involved with in a significant meaningful way, and it can't be either subjective or objective, those two ideas he says are polarizations that both account for how the world matters to us. The fact that it matters to us means it can't be a pure objective thing. Secondly, the fact that what matters to us is our world not just our opinions and our inner dispositions mean it can't be just a subjective thing. We are absorbed in the world; we are caught up in it. Heidegger's phenomenology wants to give voice to these notions rather than start with the modern categories of subjectivity and objectivity.
I recommend this work for anyone interested in philosophy, epistemology, and ontology.
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by Reiner Schürmann
by S. J. Mcgrath
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