Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning) (Studies in Continental Thought) (Hardcover)

by Martin Heidegger (Author), Parvis Emad Emad (Translator), Kenneth Maly (Translator) "The public title must now necessarily sound bland, ordinary, and saying nothing and must give the impression that it is dealing with "scholarly contributions" aimed..." (more)
Key Phrases: essential swaying, inceptual thinking, hesitating refusal, Middle Ages, Vom Wesen, Basic Questions of Philosophy (more...)

Editorial Reviews

From Library Journal
Considered by scholars to be Heidegger's most important work after Being and Time, this book was written during the 1930s but did not become available to the public until 1989. (This is the first translation from the German.) Here Heidegger attempts to carry out what he calls "being-historical thinking." Since the way in which "being" discloses itself throughout history varies, he sees his task as describing the key moments of the process. As usual, Heidegger's analysis proceeds from careful attention to the origins of philosophical terms. He writes in an aphoristic style and often employs new and strange words, but students of Heidegger will surely find this book indispensable.
-David Gordon, Bowling Green State Univ., OH
Copyright 2000 Reed Business Information, Inc.

Review

"Publication of this volume is the most important event in Heidegger scholarship in English since the 1962 publication of the first English translation of Sein und Zeit. Although a new translation of Being and Time has appeared (CH, Mar'97), it is difficult to imagine that this inventive and highly readable translation of Beiträge (Beitrage) zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis), by Emad (emer., DePaul Univ.) and Maly (Univ. of Wisconsin -- LaCrosse), will ever be superseded. Indeed, Being and Time appears almost conventional in light of the global transformation of ordinary language that characterizes Contributions to Philosophy. Emad and Maly acknowledge that the German original itself is not readily accessible to German readers. Since the 1989 posthumous publication of the Beiträge (Beitrage), the relation of this 1936 -- 38 manuscript to Heidegger's thinking has become a major topic. Contributions is about the turn toward Seyn (be -- ing -- the archaic spelling of Sein -- being), which implies a turn toward the resistant enigma of another origin. The major decisions in this translation (e.g., Ereignis as enowning instead of appropriation; Wesung as swaying instead of essencing) make Heidegger's thinking more accessible to English speakers. This translation will contribute greatly to establishing Contributions as Heidegger's second masterpiece and his greatest work. Essential for all collections. General readers; upper -- division undergraduates and above." -- N. Lukacher, University of Illinois at Chicago, Choice, July 2000

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 424 pages
• Publisher: Indiana University Press (January 1, 2000)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0253336066
• ISBN-13: 978-0253336064
• Product Dimensions: 9.2 x 6.2 x 1.1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.5 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.9 out of 5 stars See all reviews (7 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #135,694 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

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Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

56 of 60 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Agree with the previous reader, January 8, 2000

By	"aphilosopher" (New York) - See all my reviews

I am fluent in German and own a copy of the Beitraege and am reading the English together with the German. Even the translation of "Ereignis" as "Enonwing" is problematic, since "eignen" in the German means to make fit or suited or appropriate to. Krell's translation of Ereignis as appropriation or event of appropriation is much better, since it captures both owning and fitting. Besides, the accompanying "er" words (such as erdacht) often get translated in a bizarre way (erdacht becomes the horrible "enthought"), so that the parallelism becomes ludicrous to maintain. I wish the editor John Sallis had taken more of a hand in editing this translation, since it's really important. In the (self-justifying, historically barren)introduction, the translators go on and on about Heidegger's "syntax" and "ambiguity" in a way which is embarassing, since Heidegger would question a style of translation which seeks to isolate syntax and minimize ambiguity. So they also show themselves to be well outside the spirit of Heidegger's thought. In the end, if you don't read German, I would still highly recommend this translation since you can get discern the main thrusts of Heidegger's involvement with the question within it and it is THE essential text which joins his later work. But for the subtlety and grace of Heidegger's thought enacted in English, we are still waiting for a suitably gifted translator, except perhaps for Sallis' Essence of Truth translation. Once again, it is a pity he did not find the time to involve himself more with this translation.

44 of 48 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars An essential book, a problematic translation, January 6, 2000

By A Customer

This difficult text is essential to understanding Heidegger's later thought -- cryptic, rich, provocative. Unfortunately, you should keep a copy of the German by your side at all times, because the translation is very quirky and sometimes unreliable. Some choices are nice (such as "be-ing" for "Seyn"). Others are just plain weird. For example: archaic language (lots of "untos" and "yeas"); nongrammatical usages ("gift" as a verb, "heretofore" as an adjective); silly words with embarrassing connotations ("cleavage," "charming-moving-unto"); and a bewildering lack of definite articles. Heidegger's German is strange, but not this ridiculous. Is it worth suffering through the translation for the sake of the thinking? I vote yes.

2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Preliminary concerns beginning to mature, December 9, 2008

By	Rexford J. Styzens (Long Beach, CA United States) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

I have only begun to study this book, but I bring to it 35 years of living with awareness of Heidegger's work and struggling with many of his texts. So far it seems to me that this work is a struggle to do what he confessed he could not do--overcome metaphysics or cross-over to a second beginning.

My German is so primitive that I could never read this text in its original language. I see that saves me from feeling a need to compete with this translation. I am thankful for small blessings. The unique poetic vocabulary invented by H to avoid metaphysics and promote the cross-over presents a challenge.

The unique vocabulary by Emad and Maly means I must not depend on solitary words, even while H is at such pains to set them in context. (On continued study of this book, I am increasingly admiring of the translation, with the picyune exception of the use of English words with "-ness" and "-hood" that typically shout *metaphysics.*)

As with Sein und Zeit which I first read about 30 years ago and then reread 5 years ago, I can only resort to a developing appreciation of this volume. It is hard work for me.

Yet I should not want to die without even a meager acquaintance, as mine is, with our age's version of Aristotle. Even he was libeled for political incompetence. Opportunities such as are offered in this volume do not come around everyday.

Upon beginning the reading I would have been satisfied to call what I found a Heidegger "worldview;" that is, avoidance of philosophy as erudition. Yet early on H makes clear it is philosophy he is doing, because philosophy, contrary to worldview, calls itself into question. That thread is built around H's sense of our distress and a need to accept it. Is that an answer as found in metaphysics and worldviews? Only if it is an unsettled settlement, a willingness to stay on a path with no end in view.

Addendum
Herrmann, the editor, tells us that he moved what began as the second of the eight joinings (not chapters) of the text, "Be-ing," to the very end in accord with a note by Heidegger. Overwhelmed by the volume, I have now concentrated study on that final section which H's note characterized as "an attempt to grasp the whole once again." I do find that reading and rereading it does help my understanding; maybe even enough so that one day I can return to the other sections. That is, if I am able to recover my balance from the stunning assertions now coming through.

A Reader's Digest or Cliff Notes version might go something like this: Although the ancient Greeks alerted us long ago to the differentiation between a being or beings and be-ing as such, from Anaximander to Nietzsche (the last great philosopher) be-ing as such has only been understood on the basis of a being or beings. As a consequence, it does not bother us that being as such is treated as most-being or being in general. It ought to bother us a lot, for all the confusion it has caused and for the emptiness it has left us with.

Whenever it was we came to realize that we are mortals and that we can predict our inevitable end-of-life, we also were offered the opportunity to realize ourselves as historical. That is, we come to realize that as there was something here before we got here (rendering us as thrown) there will also be something after we are gone. How does it happen that we so seldom wonder about that amazing state of affairs? Or wonder about it at least as much or more than we wonder about what things, entities, objects, beings are made of? That blind spot is what ought to bother us.

Maybe we still have a chance to recover from our neglect. We have hints of another beginning to philosophy scattered in both the triumphs and the failures of Western thinking. In addition, we have the phenomenon of language, with all its possibilities. If we think of language as a gift to us, maybe even a gift from be-ing as such, we might reassess our place. We then could think of ourselves as granted that gift of language in order to be guardians of be-ing as such. And then we could see ourselves as participants in "the sway of be-ing," which is a kind of destiny, our destiny and our truth. If nothing else, our lives then can be richer in contingencies.

The hardest part is being silent enough to hear what, if anything, be-ing has to say to us. Our history back to most ancient times is seeking for ground when abground is t/here. We account for it by naming it "nothing," but that misses it. (ed. note: Sartre's mistake?) The poets enable us to hear the message of the gods, even while they are few who can bear to listen.

My study of section "VIII. Be-ing," has steadily increased my appreciation for a feature that drew me to Heidegger originally: his insistence and capacity for coherence. His task is both to account for how we have arrived at our ontological predicament and then to offer hints of further possibilities. It is his welcoming of "possibility" that currently most intrigues, as ordinary philosophy gives little weight to the concept.

His innovative vocabulary mimics what must have been his experience studying the Attic Greeks where meaning only emerges in a context of otherwise undefined words. Heidegger's new concepts depend on the whole context of his work. Innovative vocabulary is the task he assigns to poiesis, and its measure is the horizon of our understanding. We can think only as far as our concepts will take us.