Captain Gary Prado Salmon commanded the unit that captured Che Guevara in Bolivia in 1967. Prado also grew up in Vallegrande where Guevara established his base. His reflective, intelligent, insightful, and candid book will stand as an authoritative, if unofficial, account of the sad demise of the most flamboyant Latin American guerrilla fighter of the 20th century. Based on the field diaries of Guevara as well as on Bolivian military sources, Prado's book dispassionately discusses the difficult local geography, the local and international climate at the time, and the entire operations of both sides on virtually a daily basis. Prado evaluates the strategies and errors of both the guerrillas and the Bolivian army, and he clarifies the confusion surrounding the death of Guevara. The Bolivian guerilla campaign suffered from poor planning, limited resources, and a pathetic ignorance of local geography, politics, and history. Adequately translated and readable, this book is enhanced with maps and photographs. All levels.
Product Description
A thoroughly documented account of the 1967 guerrilla challenge in Bolivia, this volume reconstructs events leading up to, during, and after the defeat of the insurgency. Against the background of the 1960s' attempt to extend Cuban influence throughout Latin America, the book offers an analysis of trends in Bolivian politics from 1952 to 1967. General Prado then evaluates the geographical setting of the insurgency, guerrilla preparations, and the Bolivian response. Prado identifies key strategic errors, including Che Guevara's failure to capture peasant support, and analyzes Che's own theories. Military historians will find no sensational revelations here but, instead, previously unknown details that form a concise reconstruction of The Defeat of Che Guevara. Recently retired from the Bolivian Army, Prado avoids partisan tones and provides an unusually balanced account of the 1967 guerrilla insurgency in Bolivia. A four-part volume, Part I presents a thorough discussion of the international, national, and military climate. Part II assesses the geographical setting. Part III details operations from preparations to defeat. The volume concludes with a thorough evaluation of the insurgency--causes for its failure, an analysis of Che Guevara's theories, and the Bolivian army's mistakes.
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