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4 of 4 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Foundation Stone for Serious Global Understanding, May 30, 2009
This is a sensational book, dry as only a serious academic can be, but so absolutely original and fundamental as to make me smile and cheer. This is what a book should be--original, properly sourced, wonderful appendix that is a chronology of Chinese and Iranian substantive state-level contacts, and so on.
Although the author cannot cover it all, the length of the book and the totality of this work move the book from four stars to five. This is a VERY important book for anyone who wants to move beyond the failed analytic frameworks and corrupt policy frameworks of the past and into reality in the 21st Century.
The bottom line up front: when it gets down to "either or" China will favor its desire for US comity over its respect for Iranian anti-hegemonism, but over time, China has executed a very skillful balancing act that has helped Iran restore its role as the central power in the Persian-Middle East region.
For me the huge eye-opener--I actually have goosebumps and am posting a variation of the map on page 292 of this book to share my appreciation--was the role that Pakistan and Iran play in giving China access to the sea and Middle Eastern energy as well as African natural resources.
Although India is not discussed in this book, I learn that the author has written Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century and that will be in my stack for my next long trip. This book is vitally important and as I reflect on all the books that I have absorbed over the years, this one stands out as "the way it should be done." This is a perfect book at the strategic level. It could be complemented by others writing companion books, for example, I would love to see a book studying both Chinese and Iranian inroads into Africa and Latin America, illuminating both the processes and the cross-overs. The kind of thing CIA should be doing but does not, for at least four reasons: children as analysts; security obstacles to outreach; lack of a holistic analytic model; and lack of access to open sources that are not online, in English, and easily processed.
There are chapters on Iran and China in relation to Xinjiang Muslims; Chinese support to the Iranian nuclear program both directly and via Pakistan (siginficantly, China stood down on support related to weaponizing nuclear and also stopped Iranian use of Silkworm missiles from China against shipping). The three page chronology on this aspect is fine detail. The chapter on Chinese-Iranian military exchanges draws heavily on the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and I am reminded of that organization's priceless contributions. The last three chapters cover US-Taiwan in relation to China-Iran; economy, and energy.
The 1000 word limit is a good one for reviewers, so I will be concise in the sharing of my other flyleaf notes:
1. PRIMAL FACTORS. The Chinese-Iranian relationship can be traced back and has been active since centuries before Christ. At the same time, China and Iran represent the apex of regional powers who have not been co-opted or corrupted by Western colonial hegemony backed by unilateral militarism. I can only anticipate they will be the "last man standing" on their home ground.
2. Iranian Constancy. Both Shah and Post-Shah have played US and Russians consistently, and both have been concerned about US and Russian incursions into the Indian Ocean.
3. Pakistan. Both China and Iran have convergent interests in Pakistan, and Pakistan is a key player on many fronts--a book by this author on Pakistan in relation to China, Iran India, Central Asia would be phenomenal.
4. China Core Concept. The strategic core concept that China pursues is "Unified Front." The author elaborates. I note the contrast with US core concept of "American exceptionalism" and unilateralism (Obama is Empire as usual, I have sponsored a new meme, "Free Obama." Between the two corrupt parties working for Wall Street, and the persistent special interests and Versailles bureaucracy, nothing has changed). At the operational level, the author discusses Chinese "Realistic Prudence."
5. China-Iran Geopolitical. The map with embedded text on page 46 is so very good I am uploading that at well. This book is well illustrated, well-documented--a pure pleasure.
6. Civilizational Rhetoric. The author opens with this, and I love it. The author makes it clear that this matters [for decades I have called for historical intelligence, i.e. show me every Chinese, Vietnamese, Philippine, and Malaysian statement on the Spratley Islands going back 200 years, but to no avail--CIA does not do history or culture in any meaningful sense of the word, partly because they cannot read in the original languages and do not access ofline original books.]
7. Concerns About Iran. The author enumerates Chinese concerns about Iran, one wonders if any US policy bubbas have pursued this aspect of US-Chinese relations. See page 28.
8. End of the Shah. The author documents how China missed the rise of the Khomeini regime as did the USA. The clerics did not know China had 20 million Muslims, and this ultimately helped the dialog.
9. Stage Two. The author provides a lovely review of how China ramped up its relations with Iran in the aftermath of negative global opinion over its repression of demonstrations, the collapse of the USSR, and the unilateral aggressiveness of the USA in the Middle East.
10. Iranian Roadmap. The author outlines how Iran's strategic plan began with Lebanon, then moved over to Afghanistan, and next plans to focus on Central Asia and Xinjiang in China, the latter in the face of Chinese resistance. Pakistan needs its own book.
11. Gulf I and Gulf II. The public record available to the author suggests that both Iran and China opposed both US invasions (Gulf I and Gulf II) because they put a US armed presence or footprint in the area. My personal view is that Iran played the US for a sucker with Chalabi as an agent of influence, and got the US to knock of Hussein and displace the Taliban.
I have to stop here. This is a wonderful book, a deep serious contribution, a real original, absolutely essential for both undergraduate and graduate students as well as policy and business adults.
Other strategic books I admire that are top down in nature (this is a bottom up strategic book. You have to search for my summary reviews, Amazon buries serious reviews with any negative votes:
The Lessons of History
The Fifty-Year Wound: How America's Cold War Victory Has Shaped Our World
The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence and the Will of the People
A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility--Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
High Noon 20 Global Problems, 20 Years to Solve Them
Anthropological Intelligence: The Deployment and Neglect of American Anthropology in the Second World War
Global Values 101: A Short Course
Modern Strategy
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2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
China's Iran Card, March 21, 2008
The Kingdom of Iran and the People's Republic of China established diplomatic relations in 1971. Of course, relations between these two great ancient civilizations vastly predates the twentieth century, with the silk road a testimony to the strength and duration of their bonding. Both China and Iran are inspired by a sense that their outstanding civilizational achievements over long stretches of history entitle them to an esteemed rank in the community of states, and a feeling that the current international order, dominated as it is by the Western power that stripped them of their earlier high status, is profoundly unjust.
This sense of grievance and victimization with the course of modern history has led to various discourses on the desired international order. In the 1970s and 1980s Beijing extolled unity of the developing, Third World countries seeking liberation from superpower interference, domination, and exploitation. During the immediate post-Cold War period, Beijing framed world trends in terms of trends toward multipolarity and against U.S. attempts to uphold unipolar domination. By the late 1990s Beijing downplayed the theme of incipient multipolarity, but condemned U.S. unilateralism, power politics, bullying, double standards, and interference. In all these periods Iran provided a valued card in China's strategic game. Relations between the two countries were underpinned by concrete interests: containing the Soviet Union in the 1970s, countering U.S. hegemonism in the 1990s, developing the economies and military forces in their own countries, supplying and consuming energy, etc.
Opposition to U.S. unipolar domination and aspiration to a more balanced international order therefore creates considerable common interest between the two powers. In the wording of communiques, "Iran and China share common views on many major international issues, although they pursue independent foreign policies". The last qualification should however be emphasized. China's cooperation with Iran has frequently come into conflict with the imperative of maintaining a broadly cooperative relation with the United States in the sake of China's economic development. When the chips are down, the requirements of China's "peaceful rise" trump all other considerations, and Iran's wild card is simply too dangerous to play.
Developments in the nuclear arena illustrate the trade-offs between China's cooperation with Iran and maintenance of Sino-American comity. Support for Iranian nuclear programs was a key element of Beijing's effort to forge a partnership with Iran in the 1980s and 1990s. While China was not Iran's only partner during that period (Pakistan's Abdul Qadir Khan provided key technologies for uranium enrichment), it was by far the most important. During these years, Beijing turned a blind eye as Iran's nuclear program large and covert military dimensions came into public view. In 1997 however, China abandoned its nuclear cooperation with Iran under intense U.S. pressure to do so.
Safeguarding China's vital relation with the United States was not the sole motivation. The desire to be recognized as a sober, responsible leading nation of the world gradually led China to support the nonproliferation regime. Although an Iranian bomb did not directly threaten China, Beijing recognized that as an NPT nuclear weapon state China's interests were best served by limiting the number of states that possess nuclear weapons. The desire to access U.S. and Europe's advanced nuclear power technology to ease the country's energy bottlenecks also provided a strong incentive. The terms the U.S. set for accessing that technology were China's compliance with global nonproliferation norms and, in the case of Iran, severance of all nuclear ties, including cooperation permitted under international law.
Developments in the Middle East also illustrate this basic trade-off. Although Chinese diplomats have consistently held that "the affairs of a given region must be managed by the countries and people's of that region", China has decided not to antagonize the United States in the Middle East. China depends on the Persian Gulf for the greater part of its oil imports, and therefore indirectly benefits from the security guarantee provided by the U.S. The only scenario that would balance this dependence on the U.S. securing the Gulf would be in the advent of a conflict over Taiwan. Should a conflict in the Taiwan straits become protracted, the United States would be likely to cut off China's oil imports one way or another. The willingness of a major petroleum power like Iran to continue supplying China could be highly important under these circumstances.
The Sino-Iranian relation can therefore be best described as a second-order relationship in the sense that both parties have periodically subordinated that relationship to other objectives. In the 1970s Iran insisted on subordinating its relation with China to Iran's relation with the Soviet Union, and used the rivalry between the two powers to its own advantage. Similarly, in the 2000s Beijing insists on subordinating its relation with Iran to China's far more important relation with the United States, and uses the Iranian card both as a leverage and as a hedge.
In the long run however, the author sees much potential for cooperation between the two powers. There has been no incident of armed conflict in the long history of interaction between Chinese and Persian states, but rather lots of mutually beneficial exchanges, including occasional convergence of strategic interests. Among all regional powers having to cope with China's "peaceful rise", Iran promises to be more comfortable with greater Chinese power than does any other major Asian state. China and Iran are ancient partners that may be drawn ever closer together in a post-imperial world.
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1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World, January 17, 2008
Between 2005 and 2007, Iranian trade with China doubled to US$20 billion. On September 30, 2007, the Chinese ambassador to Tehran said, "China will never do anything against Iran's interests." (1) With the increase of relations between Beijing and Tehran, so, too, have U.S. policy concerns grown. Despite that, the literature on Sino-Iranian relations has been sparse until now.
To fill the gap, Garver, a China scholar at the Georgia Institute of Technology, puts together an impressive exploration of Sino-Iranian relations in China and Iran. Unfortunately, he breezes through twenty centuries of pre-modern Sino-Iranian relations in just eight pages, depriving the reader of context for the recent flourishing. Garver may be too cynical when he suggests that Chinese and Iranian emphasis on their earlier ties is convenient revisionism for there does exist a rich Persian literature--yet to be translated into any Western language--discussing earlier generations of ties with China. (2)
Garver's focus begins in 1971 when the Peoples' Republic of China established relations with Iran. He then traces the ebb and flow of contacts through China's liberalization and Iran's Islamic revolution. Throughout much of the 1990s, Tehran and Beijing found common ground in an "anti-[U.S.] hegemony partnership." Separate chapters examine the Iranian approach to China's Muslim Uighur population; Chinese assistance to Iran's nuclear program; and Sino-Iranian energy cooperation.
China and Iran is straightforward, well-indexed, and well-sourced, if a bit dry. Garver does not offer earthshaking analysis, but for any policy practitioner wishing to understand the context of the current Sino-Iranian embrace, China and Iran offers a handy, reliable resource.
Michael Rubin
Middle East Quarterly
Spring 2008
(1) Fars News Agency, Oct. 1, 2007.
(2) Ali Akbar Khata`i, Khataynameh [The Book of China], Iraj Afshar, ed. (Tehran: Center for Documents of Asian Culture, 1993).
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