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25 of 28 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
China's Effective Soft Power, May 24, 2007
If you are wondering how China has been able to effectively exert their soft power around the world, Joshua Kurlantzick's Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World is a good place to start.
Kurlantzick is a Visiting Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Special Correspondent at the New Republic, and Senior Correspondent at the American Prospect. Many of his articles on Asia and U.S. foreign policy have appeared in Foreign Affairs, The New York Times Magazine, The Washington Post, Harper's, The Atlantic Monthly and other well-known publications. Much of the observations he writes about are the result of many years of on-the-ground experience while living and traveling in various countries and tracking down China's policies in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa.
As mentioned in the Preface, Kurlantzick states that the book represents an attempt to close the knowledge gap about China's soft power and its increasingly sophisticated diplomacy, which has and will transform international relations. He was quite taken aback when a few years ago he started to ask Washington's policy makers about China's new global influence- its soft power. The reaction was one of blank stares and even some of these individuals had asked him to brief them about the topic. In other words, while the Americans were asleep at the switch, China was spreading the word around that it was no longer to be perceived as unsophisticated in matters of diplomacy. It was now willing to become involved in aid programs and other ventures where in the past it was the Americans who dominated this terrain.
Using his personal experiences and knowledge, Kurlantzick offers readers an excellent synthesis as to how China began to court the world with its soft power- a term that was invented more than a decade ago by Prof. Nye of Harvard. Quoting from Nye, Kurlantzick describes soft power as resting on the ability "to shape the preferences of others...It is leading by example and attracting others to do what you want. If I can get you to do what I want, then I do not have to use carrots or sticks to make you do it."
The way in which it can conveyed is through a variety of means such as a country's popular and elite culture, its public diplomacy such as government funded programs with the intention of influencing public opinion abroad, its businesses' actions abroad, international perceptions of its government policies and the gravitational pull of a nation's economic strength. However, as Kurlaznick points out, soft power as it is applicable to China is more than the original concept advanced by Nye, as now it is broader in its scope. China perceives soft power as anything that is outside of the military and security realm and this includes not only popular culture and public diplomacy but also coercive economic and diplomatic levers such as aid and investment as well as participation in multilateral organizations-something that China shied away from in the past.
The book is divided into eleven well-written chapters that illustrate how China has built its global soft power and how it has drastically made over its image in many parts of the world from dangerous to benevolent. Moreover, readers will learn how China uses that power and how nations are responding particularly those whose relations with the United States have been faltering such as Venezuela and others whose leaders display autocratic traits.
It should be mentioned that in the main, Kurlantzick focuses on China's pursuit of developing nations in Southeast Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Central Asia-areas of the globe that have been alienated in one way or another by the USA. It is here where China succeeds in promoting itself as having an effective model for social and economic success and where it turns a blind eye to the dictatorial shenanigans, even atrocities that are common in these parts of the world.
In his concluding chapter, Kurlantzick makes various suggestions as to how the USA can respond and as he states, it still enjoys crucial advantages over China, particularly with its military power that if used correctly, can compliment soft power. Case in point is its deployment for humanitarian missions such as the tsunami response that demonstrated that only the USA had sophisticated military to move aid overnight.
Kurlantzick should be applauded for this timely book particularly when American foreign policy has suffered several set-backs over the past few years. Although, for some more knowledgeable about the subject matter, the book is hardly terra incognita, however, for the vast majority it very enlightening and certainly an eye-opener.
Norm Goldman, Editor & Publisher Bookpleasures
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15 of 19 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
A political discourse of Chinese Soft Power, July 21, 2007
In the academic field, many scholars of Chinese studies and international relations are studying the various impacts of the rise of China. Will China upset the existing international norms and world order? Will the boom of Chinese economy threaten the economic growth and environmental condition of other countries? Will China challenge the American hegemony?
Indeed, Joshua Kurlantzick attempts to answer the above questions in his latest work - Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World.
At the very beginning of his book, Kurlantzick defines soft power from the Chinese perspective as "soft power means anything outside of the military and security realm, including not only popular culture and public diplomacy but also more coercive economic and diplomatic levers like aid and investment and participation in multilateral organizations", which is different from Joseph Nye's values, ideals and norms.
Chinese government has paid more attention in building up its soft power, mainly because of the theory of "China Threat", the concerns of economic and technological interdependencies between China and other countries, and the Chinese regional hegemonic interests. According to Kurlantzick, China would like to use "peaceful development" in order to replace or fade out the "China threat"; China would like to check the unilateral American moves by using its soft power rather than hard power (direct political and military confrontation) since China treasures its economic and technological interdependencies with the United States, Europe and Japan; China would also like to establish its influence in Southeast Asia through soft power, which can minimize the suspicions among Southeast Asian countries.
Kurlantzick carried out interviews and case studies about the rising Chinese influence in various developing countries. China sets up Confucians institutes from Kenya, South Korea, Uzbekistan to Australia; promotes Chinese language in Southeast Asian countries by offering wide range of scholarships and academic exchanges, provides diplomatic professional training to officials in many developing countries, builds up close relations with Chinese diaspora; gives economic aid and loans to poor countries for building economic infrastructures and social facilities; last but not least, encourages Chinese investment in developing countries for boosting their local economic development.
However, not all the Chinese influences can be regarded as good to others. Kurlantzick points out that China also exports labour, environmental and governance problems to others. Chinese firms often neglect the safety of workers and pay little salary to the local workers. In order to avoid labour strike, Chinese firms sometimes employ Chinese to replace the local workers. Besides, some Chinese firms launch illegal logging in Burma and Indonesia. Chinese government built dams on the upper course of Mekong River which have threatened the Cambodian fish stocks and fertilize arable lands in the lower course of the river. In addition, China tolerates authoritarian rule in Cambodia, Laos and Angola for its unconditional aids and loans while the World Bank and International Monetary Fund always demand the recipient countries to comply good governance. China is also criticized for its non-intervention policy in Darfur which finally caused humanitarian disaster.
Kurlantzick's efforts should be given credit in figuring out the latest pattern and development of Chinese foreign policy. The qualitative works such as case studies and interviews with diplomats, business people and Chinese diaspora are also valuable to the study of Chinese foreign policy. However, as a student of international relations, I would expect a finer definition of the Chinese soft power rather than putting the Chinese political influence and economic capability under the category of soft power. Besides, since China has engaged with many regional institutions by advocating multilateralism, the power and influence of China can be explained in terms of structural realism or institutionalism, but not necessarily soft power. Moreover, Kurlantzick concludes that there are mutual interests between China and the United States, thus he holds an optimistic view that "if America seems popular and strong, allowing China to assume more responsibility for the globe will become easier for America to accept". It seems that the conclusion simplifies the interactions and mechanisms between China and the United States in shaping the world order. The political significances and implications of the Chinese charm offensive towards the existing international norms and values as well as world order should be further examined. What is the role of Chinese norm of non-intervention and multilateralism in upsetting the status-quo or making the new world order? Does the Chinese soft power cause any political cost to the United States?
Nevertheless, Kurlantzick points out the determining pivot between the Chinese and American soft power, "More important, the United States still offers a political and social model, a set of values, which can appeal to average people around the world. China's values - noninterference, respect for other nations' internal affairs, economic gradualism directed by the state - can enjoy appeal. But China's values appeal only to specific groups: elites in authoritarian nations..." Since the Deng's era, the Chinese foreign policies are regarded as pragmatic in the quest of national interests, may be it is the time for the Chinese government to review its previous diplomacy by concerning more about international public interests.
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2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Extremely Good Effort for One Mind--Missing Some Links, October 25, 2008
I first studied China, the "Middle Kingdom," in 1975 when I found Mao relevant to my primary interest, understanding and addressing revolution in all its forms. The image above is the heart of my graduate-level quick look at how the PRC exercised foreign influence back then. In addition, my father was a Chinese "guest" in 1967-1968 after pirate militia sank his trimaran enroute from Saigon to Hong Kong, a story told in Yachtsman in Red China.
The author has done a superb job of observing, interpreting, and documenting. I take away one star for a certain amount of naiveté and incompleteness--the book ends somewhat weakly--but I totally disagree with those who consider this book disorganized or less than four stars in merit. I found the book absorbing, consistent with my own recent observations tracking Chinese irregular warfare including both electronic warfare and waging peace in Africa and South America, and over-all, I cannot think of a finer book for American diplomats, politicians, and students of serious mien.
The author opens with a very personal and relevant account of how he watched the fall of US influence and the rise of Chinese influence in Thailand, marking the late 1990's as the time of change. To his surprise, when he asked US diplomats about this, he found them unaware. Today, they are aware, but powerless in the face of a White House that under Dick Cheney has totally destroyed the policy process (for an account of how this was done, see The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O'Neill.
He follows the 1990's in Thailand with a very compelling comparison of how George Bush was heckled by Australian senators and booed by the Australian public in 2003, while a few days later the Chinese leader Hu Jin Tao was welcomed as a hero. He points out that Australians now see US unilateral militarism as a threat to Australian peace and prosperity fully co-equal to the threat of radical Islam. For one balanced take on foreign public perceptions on America, see The Eagle's Shadow: Why America Fascinates and Infuriates the World
He properly credits Joe Nye with the term "soft power" but I am in agreement with the anthropologists and others who now choose not to use that term because global presence has to be managed as a Whole of Government/Whole Earth enterprise, something Stewart Brand and others understood decades before the rest of us. Of all Stewart's books, my favorite remains Clock Of The Long Now: Time And Responsibility: The Ideas Behind The World's Slowest Computer, a book I fear the Chinese appreciate vastly more than the two idiot parties now looting the US commonwealth on behalf of their Wall Street masters.
The author says that the Chinese think of their primary power as everything outside the military and security realm. See my image above for a nuanced understanding that is still valid--the names have changed, but the Chinese are simply playing a modern version of Middle Kingdom ubber alles.
The author reviews the mis-steps under Mao (Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution, export of revolution), and then gives proper credit to Deng Xiao Ping as the transitional and transformational leader who adopted pragmatic reforms. The deal China made, in substituting enhanced nationalism for absolute communism, was "make money, not trouble" and all would be allowed.
The new leaders are college graduates and in many cases have graduate degrees. The end of the Cold War freed China from fear of Russia, and now China is focusing on the Second World. For good reasons why, see
The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order
The new era leaders clearly understand that global problems impact on them, and they must pursue global solutions.
Here are the 20 elements of China's global strategy as I understood them from the author's excellent account.
01 Stability in the 14 countries on its borders
02 Cease military confrontation (e.g. Spratleys), use non-military assets
03 Go after resources all over the world
04 Create ring of allies as buffer against US and other interventionists
05 Non-interference in affairs of others
06 "Born-again Multinationalism" (Susan Shirk)
07 Cooperative agreements (7 with Mexico, 14 with Venezuela, etc)
08 Help those the US shirks or slights (Mexico, Venezuela, Bolivia, Uzbeckistan...)
09 Offer socio-economic model in which state, not market, is steering
10 Focus on small nations ignored by US and others
11 Cultural and public diplomacy ****needs its own book****
12 Direct recruitment of overseas Chinese in 1980's, used their wealth, $30B or 7% of external investment, as seed crystal for 1990's boom
13 Aid, trade, easy loans, investment (a fraction of what US does, but they get more mileage out of theirs by how and when and why they do)
14 Easy fit with corruption and deals outside the rule of law
15 Lots of construction including free buildings for headquarters (the author does not say this, I do: "no extra charge for the electronic bugs")
16 Junkets to China, junkets with issue training for the staffs
17 Exporting men (this could have used more attention--Argentina will be majority Chinese by 2020 or so)
18 Exporting visual media (#2 in the world right now)
19 Rolling Taiwan back, everyone withdrawing recognition
20 Direct influence both good and bad (good: anti-drugs, some effort on human trafficking, on disease; bad: illegal lumber harvests in Myanmar, Indonesia)
The last three chapters are not as arresting, but still good:
IX: America's soft power goes soft, both Clinton and Bush killed us overseas
X: Shanghai Cooperation Organization, giving US "wedgies" all over the world
XI: Rest of World waiting for two things from USA: live up to our values and stop our bad policies
The author is a big naïve (or less informed) when he lambasts the Chinese for supporting dictators and fails to realize that our two corrupt political parties love 42 of the 44 dictators as their best pals (see Breaking the Real Axis of Evil: How to Oust the World's Last Dictators by 2025).
Serious book by a serious person for serious people. Well done.
My last four allowed links:
Election 2008: Lipstick on the Pig (Substance of Governance; Legitimate Grievances; Candidates on the Issues; Balanced Budget 101; Call to Arms: Fund We Not Them; Annotated Bibliography)
Running on Empty: How the Democratic and Republican Parties Are Bankrupting Our Future and What Americans Can Do About It
The Battle for the Soul of Capitalism
Collective Intelligence: Creating a Prosperous World at Peace
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