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21 of 23 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A crippling blow to the transnational Robber Barons, December 28, 2001
Pat Buchanan's "The Great Betrayal" is an emphatic rallying cry for a renewed economic nationalism. Throughout fifteen myth-shattering chapters, Buchanan unleashes a fury of statistics damning to free-trade and poses some tough questions to its advocates along the way. For instance, was it "free-trade" that transformed thirteen diminutive coastal agrarian colonies into the world's leading industrial superpower? Why is an involuntary income tax a preferable method of gathering revenue than a voluntary 15 percent tariff? (Before 1913, imported goods were taxed at 40 percent while income, savings and investment were taxed at 0 percent. Today, the exact opposite is the case.) Why didn't free-trade, which supposedly eases tension between nations that practice it, prevent Germany from waging war against her chief trading partner, Russia, twice, prevent Japan from attacking both the US and China, who she traded with in the thirties, and prevent the American Civil War, where free-trade was being carried out domestically? What's the point of a trade agreement that is indirectly subsidizing the Chinese military -- which they'll use to invade Taiwan -- by allowing the Devils of Beijing to run up a $80 billion trade surplus? And finally, why are cheap foreign goods more important than high-paying industrial jobs? Needless to say, Buchanan is nothing if not fiercely polemical.
The modern era of free-trade was ushered in, Buchanan contends, in 1967, with the Kennedy Round concessions, but its framework had been layed fifty-four years earlier by a congressman (and future Nobel Peace Prize recipient) from Tennessee named Cordell Hull. Hull authored the Underwood Tariff, which replaced America's primary source of revenue for over a century with the involuntary income tax, thereby establishing the fertilizer of the Leviathan state, the IRS, in the process. Hull's more immediate plans for a world trade conference were postponed by America's entrance into WW1 and the GOP sweep in 1920. And although Hull was later made secretary of state by FDR, both the House and Senate ensured that none of his major globalist schemes saw the light of day. It wasn't until the Eisenhower administration, imbued with a "Marshal Plan mentality," took power that the US began propping up the Japanese economy (cosseted behind a barricade of protective tariffs) by gradually opening their markets during the Cold War to bind Japan to the Free World. (As a way of saying thanks, Toshiba sold US submarine-propeller technology to the USSR in the 1980s.) Japan, whose unregulated car factories were employing workers at a fraction of US wages, were permitted to dump cheap foreign imports at prices US car manufacturers couldn't compete with. By 1970, Japan was selling a million cars in the US, and by the mid-eighties, had captured nearly a quarter of the US auto-market. Thus, Japan's "economic miracle," as Buchanan persuasively argues, was brought about by economic nationalism -- not "free-trade."
Buchanan also points out that classical liberal Adam Smith, who many libertarians not only model themselves after, but approvingly cite as the intellectual architect of free-trade, listed several "exceptions" to unhindered free-trade in his magnum opus "The Wealth of Nations" (pgs 429-36) that have conspicuously gone unnoticed by laissez-fairies. Smith felt that tariffs ought to be imposed as "revenge" on countries who close their markets to Britain, something the US should do to China if we're to follow Smith's wisdom. Additionally, Smith thought tariffs ought to be imposed on foreign goods "for the encouragement of domestic industry," when certain domestic industries are being taxed and the imports they have to compete with are not. Smith's authorative testimony on this issue is especially vindicating to nationalists given his godlike status to frothing-at-the-mouth libertarians.
Buchanan fever -- catch it.
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