The Generals' War : The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Paperback)

by Michael R. Gordon (Author), General Bernard E. Trainor (Author) "WHEN CHARLIE ALLEN saw the satellite photos on the morning of August 1, 1990, he knew that it was time to sound the klaxon..." (more)
Key Phrases: third world drivers, allied warplanes, jamming support, Saudi Arabia, Saddam Hussein, Republican Guard (more...)

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly
Drawing on interviews with senior officials and newly declassified documents, Gordon and Trainor provide a behind-the-scenes look at the Gulf War's generalship. The dominant figure, then-chairman of the joint chiefs General Colin Powell, is spotlighted as a politico-military maestro overseeing the dawn of a new era in military technology. In their review of the short, violent, one-sided war, the authors uncover the problems of cooperation among coalition forces and reveal details of interservice tensions, as well as difficulties within the U.S. branches themselves. This meticulous reconstruction of American leadership in Desert Shield/Desert Storm presents the conflict as a laboratory for testing new weapons and doctrine and the services' capacity for cooperation in the field. It also serves as an object lesson in the failure of deterrence and the problem of war termination, with a discussion of President Bush's premature cease-fire order. Gordon is chief New York Times Pentagon correspondent; Trainor is military columnist for the Times. Photos not seen by PW.
Copyright 1994 Reed Business Information, Inc. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

From Library Journal
If the Vietnam War was conducted by politicians in Washington, the war for Kuwait was, according to New York Times correspondent Gordon and retired general Trainor, our "generals' war." The authors astutely conclude that President Bush understood what his predecessors never did. Neither Johnson nor Nixon, nor for that matter National Security Council adviser Henry Kissinger, allowed the military to wage a winning war. The lesson was well learned by the savvy Gen. Colin Powell, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who directed his subordinates to lash out against the Iraqis with everything we had save for nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Kuwait was not Vietnam, however, and the unmotivated Iraqis were not the Vietcong. Aggrandized as "the world's fourth largest military," the enemy fizzled away within hours when confronted with the world's premier military force. Thus, it came as no surprise that Washington won the battle, but with Saddam Hussein still in power four years after hostilities ended, has it won the war? This cogent analysis provides several disturbing answers worthy of our attention. Recommended for informed lay readers and specialists.
Joseph A. Kechichian, Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Cal.
Copyright 1994 Reed Business Information, Inc. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

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Product Details

• Paperback: 576 pages
• Publisher: Back Bay Books; 1 edition (November 9, 1995)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0316321001
• ISBN-13: 978-0316321006
• Product Dimensions: 9.3 x 6.2 x 1.4 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.6 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.4 out of 5 stars See all reviews (23 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #194,625 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

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Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

16 of 16 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars A Good Companion Piece to "Crusade", January 23, 2001

By A Customer

This is the third book that I, a veteran of Desert Shield and Storm, have read about the Gulf War. I agree with the previous reviewers' comments that the book is judgmental (sometimes on peripheral issues). However, "judgmental" is not always a dirty word. The bottom line is that we failed to destroy the Republican Guard. Failing to do so made Saddam's survival much less problematic (see "Out of the Ashes" by the Cockburns for a good account of Hussein's astonishing resilience.

I also thought the argument about the battle of Khafji was intriguing. I didn't think it at the time, but our victory there should have told us we would roll over the Iraqis and that VII Corps' plans for a long campaign were unrealistic.

But as they say...

the saddest words of tongue or pen, are the words 'it might have been.'

18 of 19 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Well-documented, slightly biased history of Gulf War, June 17, 1997

By A Customer

This review is from: The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Hardcover)

The authors provide interesting, behind-the-scenes accounts of the political and military players in this war, based on many interviews. What unfolds is far different from what was said publicly at the time. Occasionally, the New York Times reporter's and the retired Marine's apparent biases show through, detracting from an otherwise very good book. They seem to blame President Reagan's administration for not buying mine-clearing equipment for the Marines and the Navy, but then blame the Air Force--and not the administration--for using its money to buy items other than the latest survival radios for its aircrews. They also inaccurately claim that the Air Force developed a new doctrine for this war where they would be in charge of all theater airpower (a doctrinal concept developed by them during the North African campaign in World War II) and that the Strategic Air Command had controlled the B-52s deployed to Southeast Asia during the Viet Nam War (they actually were operationally controlled by the Theater), as well as a few other inaccurate items regarding the Air Force. It became rather apparent that all Services that were not Marines (and to a lesser extent, Navy) were denigrated. An example is their claim that the Air Force required that friendly aircraft obtain two means to verify an unknown aircraft's identification before firing on it in order to hold down the Navy's 'kill' rate (since the Navy had not invested in the systems to install two separate means of identification on each of their aircraft, they needed to contact the AWACS to obtain the second means). The Viet Nam War demonstrated this requirement and for whatever reason, the Navy had not addressed it in the interim--which the authors evidently refused to say. After summarizing what the politicians and military should do differently next time (after acknowledging that the media's outcry that the military had created killing zones north of Kuwait City partially caused the premature ending of the war), they also conveniently omitted a recommendation on what the media should do differently. Although the items cited above and a few similar ones throughout the book are distracting and cast some doubt on the entire book, their documented sources were sufficient (approximately one per page) to make them generally believable. I would recommend the book to anyone wanting to know what occurred behind the scenes, with a caution that it should be read critically and not be used as the reader's only source.

12 of 12 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars A detailed and hard-hitting account of the Gulf War, December 29, 2005

By	Michael J. Mazza (Pittsburgh, PA USA) - See all my reviews (TOP 100 REVIEWER)    (REAL NAME)    (COMMUNITY FORUM 04)

In "The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf," Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor have crafted a fascinating work of military history. As the title indicates, the book places a heavy emphasis on the actions of the senior military officers involved in the planning and execution of the U.S.-led coalition's 1991 war against Iraq. In the preface, the authors note that this conflict "is without precedent in the annals of warfare. It was the dawn of a new era" (page x).

In their acknowledgements section, the authors discuss in detail the research that went into the writing of this book. They note that they interviewed administration officials, diplomats, allied military officers, and intelligence experts; they observe further that some "talked on the record; others on a not-for-attribution basis." They also drew on written responses that former president George Bush provided to their questions. Their research is meticulously documented in a lengthy set of endnotes (pages 479-520), thus enhancing the book's credibility. The text is further enhanced by thirteen detailed and clearly drawn maps that illuminate many aspects of the war: the Iraqi air defense system, coalition force deployment and movement, locations of oil fields, and more. Also included are photographs of many of the senior leaders involved in the war.

The book is full of fascinating details about many aspects of the war. The authors discuss the participation of various coalition forces in the campaign, as well as the diplomatic activities involving the USSR, Egypt, and other nations. Also discussed are friendly fire incidents and Iraqi POWs. I was particularly interested in the many details about the military hardware used by both coalition and Iraqi forces; the authors cover aircraft, naval vessels, sea and land mines, mine-clearing gear, tanks, and more. There are some really noteworthy battle scenes; particularly vivid is a description of a tank battle between U.S. and Iraqi forces--"an impressive tableau of destruction."

Gordon and Trainor are pointedly critical of many aspects of the conduct of the war. They discuss examples of rivalry and poor coordination between the different branches of the U.S. military, and also criticize the French and the Saudis. But the strongest and most sustained criticism is directed at General Norman Schwarzkopf. The authors assess both his command style and planning of the war and ultimately fault him for failing to achieve true joint warfare. The book places a heavy emphasis on the battle of Khafji; the authors discuss this engagement in detail and criticize both Schwarzkopf and General Colin Powell for failing to grasp its lessons.

Gordon and Trainor note that the Persian Gulf War was "a laboratory for the American military's new weapons and fighting doctrines." This well-written book vividly shows how hardware, tactics, diplomatic concerns, and personalities came together in the fighting of this war. This is a valuable addition to the military history of the late 20th century.