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11 of 11 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
The Crisis: A must read, November 15, 2004
The Crisis is a must read for anyone interested in the situation in the Middle East today. David Harris has written an insightful, informative book on the three leaders who were involved in the Iranian hostage take-over. It is the best written book I have read on the subject. The book is clearly written and with such sensitivity that I didn't want to put it down. By focusing in on the personalities of President Carter, the Ayatollah Khomeinni and the Shah of Iran, I came away with a much better understanding of the three men and the incredible mistakes and misunderstandings that can happen in the world of international politics. Harris writes with a dramatic and visual flare that makes it a pleasure to read.
Judith Dwan Hallet
Documentary Filmmaker
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7 of 7 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Why We Are Where We Are, April 4, 2005
This is an excellent book because it puts a pivotal period into sharp focus. Consider that, in the 70's, Nixon had been removed. The Republican ascendancy had hit a major speed bump. Carter edged out Morris Udall for the Democratic nomination, but Carter was a man with no experience whatsover in Washington politics. As Carter stumbled through his single term, the Iranian hostage crisis emerged to, ultimately, finish him off.
Of course, Iran and the Middle East are still a major problem for the US. This book goes a long way toward explaining why. It does not get very deeply into why we were tied to the Shah, but it's clear the Shah was not a gifted leader. His troubles were quite complex. Carter wanted a 'moral' foreign policy that respected human rights. He hoped he could work with the Shah to get gradual change in Iran, but he was also pathologically naive about how his support of the Shah might work out. The Iranians were not impressed. With the Shah, Carter and the Dems lost their share of the 'beacon of democracy' vision, and now Bush seems to own it.
There are two major threads in this book, aside from the gripping historical narrative. First off, there is a sense of tragic farce that can almost be seen as whimsical in hindsight. How could everything go wrong. And I mean everything. From the inability of the UN Secretary General to follow a plan, to the failed surgery by a brilliant heart surgeon, to the sequence of failure in the desert rescue mission. Then there was the emissary going back to Tehren, to finalize the release, on the day Iraq invaded, thus delaying flights for 2 weeks. It just goes on and on and on. In the epilogue, someone is quoted as saying Carter was a man who used up all his luck becoming president. This is a book about a talented man who, indeed, had no real luck. His final bargaining chip was being able to tell the Iranians "Well, in 10 weeks you can negotiate with Reagan." That seemed to be enough, although Iran badly needed war materiel, as well. One can (should) ask if Nixon and Kissinger were setting Carter up, in various ways. They insisted the Shah come here. That precipitated the crisis. But why did Carter have Vance and Brzrzinski, perhaps a more bipolar pair than Rumsfeld and Powell. The extremes did not create any kind of viable policy. The weakness was shown when Russia went into Afghanistan. With Reagan, we got the hard right.
The other fascinating thread is the whole 'democratic' and revolutionary process in Iran. Revolutions have a nasty way of getting, well, nasty. This one got fractured and violent. It had spurts of energy and then things would dissipate. The people with power behaved like politicians, but they felt a need to succeed beyond this giant media event. The clerics were difficult to work with, especially Khomeini, and as the situation unraveled, the fundamentalist religious factions filled the political vaccuum. The people involved were not demons, entirely. They did hate the US, in many ways, which was somewhat understandable. They could not create a viable government or maintain the economy. Unfortunately, the process of weighing secularism, Islam, law, and so on, was not very successful, and we still see the effects. There's something to learn about bringing democracy to the rest of the world. It just ain't that easy. The events in this book are still with us. In the Fall of 1980, as Reagan and Carter were campaigning, Iraq invaded Iran. Partly this was due to the inability of Iran to form a strong government. Partly THIS was due to the hostages and the emotionalism wrapped up in the Shah who had, actually, just died. The Iranians needed to focus on something other than the Great Satan. We, of course, ended up giving some support to Iraq and propping up Saddam. (How did that work out?)
Now we would like to see democracy in Iraq, but the same kinds of political and religious winds blow across Iraq, and democracy is only a process, not a solution.
One can isolate out the period of American foreign policy where we protected our economic interests, and the interests of the Cold War paradigm. Carter certainly championed a different focus, but without defining a process to get there. In Iran, a country where our 'legacy policy' had to be unwound, everything just imploded. We were on the wrong side of the thing, and couldn't get right with it. One can also look at the various issues that must be resolved to have a pluralistic and enlightened form of democracy in the Sunni-Shia, Kurdish, and Islamist, etc, Middle East. Because ultimately the Hostage Sideshow deflected the Iranians from the task of making their country work, and the revolutionary ideology continues to corrode real advance.
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6 of 6 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Memories of American Ignominy, March 12, 2005
This well written book brought back unpleasant memories of America's first ignominious encounter with radical Islam. I was just out of high school, and can vividly recall the national despair and exasperation over the hostage crisis. In many ways, 1979-80 was the nadir of our post-Vietnam national funk.
Harris' book provides an excellent window on the hostage crisis, and the machinations in Washington and Tehran to resolve it. Harris portrays most Carterites in sympathetic terms (perhaps no surprise considering the author's leftist politics), especially Ham Jordan, whose secret, trans-continental diplomatic efforts had him functioning as a de facto Secretary of State. Brzezinski is cast in a much less flattering light, and is derided for his hawkish posture. It's interesting that Harris chose not to (or was unable to) interview Carter's National Security Advisor. The diplomacy advocates Vance and Christopher come across as naive in their aversion to military force or coercion of any kind.
On the Iranian side, Bani Sadr (president) and Ghotbzadeh (foreign minister) are gullible in the extreme. From their days together in exile in Paris, it is clear that Khomeini was using these moderates to mask his extremism and advance his legitimacy internationally. The Shah ("His Imperial Majesty," "Light of the Aryans," etc) is venal and weak, although when the moment of truth arrived, he blanched at unleashing the Iron Fist to quell the rebellion.
UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim is untrustworthy and through arrogance, incompetence or both, did more than anyone to undermine the secret Jordan-Ghotbzadeh agreement to spring the hostages.
The book is a surprisingly brisk read, given the weightiness of the subject matter. The author's decision to focus primarily on a small number of key players certainly helped speed the narrative pace. But I was a little put off this technique. For example, the State Department official who participated in Jordan's diplomatic gambit is referred to repeatedly as "the Assistant Secretary of State" - no name, ever, is associated with him. I kept wondering who this mystery diplomat was. Other characters are referred to generically as "the NSC official" or "State's Iran specialist."
The author also errs in the epilogue when he asserts that Warren Christopher served as President Clinton's Secretary of State for eight years -- what about Madeleine Albright? These mild criticisms aside, "The Crisis" is an excellent read and highly informative.
The Hostage Crisis was one of the more dismal episodes in recent American history. It helped to fell a sitting president, underscored the perception of American impotence and served as a capstone to the nation's decade-long diminishment on the world stage.
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