The Path to Victory: The Mediterranean Theater in World War II (Hardcover)

~ (Author) "BENITO MUSSOLINI was the son of a village schoolteacher and an intermittently employed blacksmith and bar owner..." (more)
Key Phrases: pivotal theater, peripheral theater, desert war, North Africa, Eighth Army, Free French (more...)

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly

Most writing on the Mediterranean theater in WWII addresses specific campaigns: the desert war, the battle for Tunisia, the long struggle for Italy. A professor of national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Porch (The French Secret Services) brings the entire story together, integrating land, sea and air operations from the first shots of 1940 to Germany's final collapse in 1945. His sweeping narrative incorporates encyclopedic mastery of a massive body of source material, and is written in a style that holds attention from first page to last. Porch argues that rather than being the sideshow or strategic dead-end it is portrayed as in most literature, the Mediterranean was the pivotal theater of WWII in Europe. Geographically, the Mediterranean provided a focal point for the U.S., Britain and a still-powerful French Empire to come together and attack a critical Axis flank by sea. In policy terms, the Mediterranean gave the Anglo-American alliance an opportunity to coalesce, under conditions where the consequences of failure and disagreement were less than catastrophic. Strategically, once Britain pounced on the Axis decision to open a theater in the Mediterranean, British victories encouraged Hitler's decision to attack the Soviet Union. The collapse of Italy forced a westward reorientation of German strategic priorities, absorbing resources previously available for Russia. Operationally, the Mediterranean offered no major opportunities for the Wehrmacht's lethal combination of air power and mechanized forces; a military system configured for the offensive found itself from the autumn of 1942 fighting a series of high-cost defensive battles. On the other side, campaigning in the Mediterranean gave the Western allies time and opportunity to master modern war at all levels. The Italian campaign, so frequently used to illustrate the alleged futility of the Mediterranean, produced less than half the casualties of the operations in Northwest Europe while lasting twice as long. In paradigm-shifting terms, Porch's terrific book asks what the odds of success would have been had D-Day been mounted without the Mediterranean campaigns under the allies' belt, with unproven leaders, untested troops and immature weapons systems.
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From The Washington Post

Americans commonly link the defeat of Nazi Germany with the dynamic campaigns of 1944-45 across Northern Europe. Of course, the West also had an important southern theater of operations -- the Mediterranean -- where the Allies battled fascist Italy as well as Germany beginning in 1940. But the vast sweep of historical scholarship focusing on D-Day and its aftermath has often subjected the Mediterranean to neglect -- and sometimes even dismissal as a costly sideshow.

Despite the celebrated victories that Montgomery and Patton achieved in the region in 1942-43, critics of the Allied effort in the Mediterranean have minimized the overall campaign as little more than discrete, small-scale battles far afield from the mighty, decisive clashes in Northern Europe. Such critics single out the 1943-45 campaigns in Sicily and the Italian peninsula, where they claim the Allies employed a flawed strategy in pursuit of ill-conceived goals in an area of only limited military importance.

Now, in a major work of synthesis and interpretation, drawing on recent work by others such as Rick Atkinson and Carlo D'Este, military historian Douglas Porch contests or modifies many of those views. Following the lead of the great Annales historian Fernand Braudel, Porch argues that the Mediterranean was in fact an "extended" region of significant global influence. So Porch provides a supple and absorbing analytical account of the fighting and the politics in North Africa, Italy, Greece and southern France, on the islands of Crete, Malta and Sicily, and as far as Yugoslavia, East Africa, Syria and Iraq.

Acknowledging that Eastern and Northwestern Europe were the decisive fronts, Porch claims that the Mediterranean nevertheless played a crucial supporting role. It was "a pivotal theater for the Allies, one that made the difference between victory and defeat." Without the Mediterranean alternative, the Western Allies might have tried a cross-Channel invasion of German-occupied France in 1942 or 1943. Porch declares that such a premature attack would have failed, consequently fragmenting the Western Alliance and diverting U.S. priorities and strategy away from Europe to the Pacific.

The Mediterranean campaigns against smaller Axis forces were crucial, Porch contends, because they forged a working Anglo-American alliance and allowed these Allied armies to acquire fighting skills, to identify able leaders and staff and to develop the technical, operational, tactical and intelligence systems that would allow the allies to successfully carry off the Normandy invasion in 1944. The Mediterranean was also a critical testing ground of personnel as well as fighting systems: When the Northwest Europe front opened up, the ablest Allied commanders in the Mediterranean left to fight the main German forces.

Porch describes the colorful mosaic of common soldiers who made up the Allied forces in the Mediterranean: Americans, Britons and their imperial forces (including Canadians, Anzacs, South Africans and Indians), as well as a Polish Army Corps and a French Expeditionary Corps. The last included de Gaulle's Free French forces and the more numerous former Vichy officers. The French colonial force was largely made up of Muslim troops of the old Armée Afrique, who fought alongside the Allies beginning in 1943. Porch, who specializes in French military history, is especially adept at untangling France's effort to rehabilitate itself as a military power and all the various agendas and intricate rivalries, tensions and intrigues that accompanied it.

Unlike many traditional accounts, Porch's narrative goes far beyond the armies and the ground war. He provides detailed descriptions of naval warfare and logistical support strategies, while also underlining the importance of air power in the region. He gives clear breakdowns of Anglo-American Ultra intelligence operations, as well as other critical work in signals and intelligence. Porch examines the various Resistance movements across the West's southern theater, and he briefly treats the stumbling occupation policies of the Allies in North Africa, Italy and the Middle East.

Vivid biographical sketches of leading commanders punctuate Porch's battle chronologies, and, as is the case in the main military narrative, he supplies judgments of his various dramatis personae that are forceful and sharply etched. He pointedly dissents, for example, from German Gen. Erwin Rommel's reputation as the "Desert Fox." Porch gives due credit to the flamboyant American Gen. George Patton's flair for operational experimentation and relentless ability to win battles -- but he also notes that these virtues came close to being offset by Patton's emotional instability and "straight-backed histrionic militarism." Porch is more sympathetic than many American historians toward British Gen. Bernard Law Montgomery. Porch acknowledges Monty's tactless conceit and risk aversion but credits him with careful planning and the morale building of his hodge-podge Commonwealth army. In contrast, Porch sees few redeeming qualities in Gen. Mark Clark, the American Fifth Army commander in Italy, whom Porch depicts as close-minded, arrogant, merciless and obsessed with capturing picture-worthy objectives to advance his career.

As for Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Porch recognizes his diplomatic skills and growth during the war but finds the Supreme Allied Commander often indecisive and lacking in imagination. After the failure of Operation Garden's attempted thrust into the Ruhr in September 1944, he writes, "Eisenhower ran out of ideas, merely pushing forward on a broad front in the attempt to wrest territory from the Germans, rather than destroy enemy forces or concentrate on vulnerable points."

The Path to Victory is an indispensable single-volume guide to the war in the extended Mediterranean. No other treatment of the subject approaches Porch's narrative and thematic sweep, his eye for telling detail and his forcefully expressed judgments. Porch may not persuade everyone of all of his contentions, but he has given us a monumental work and a major contribution to our understanding of World War II.

Reviewed by John Whiteclay Chambers II
Copyright 2004, The Washington Post Co. All Rights Reserved.

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 816 pages
• Publisher: Farrar, Straus and Giroux; 1st edition (May 19, 2004)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0374205183
• ISBN-13: 978-0374205188
• Product Dimensions: 9 x 6.3 x 1.8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 2.6 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 3.2 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (26 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #522,953 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

18 of 18 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Flawed but Comprehensive and offers a new perspective, May 1, 2005

By	Griswel (Rochester, NY) - See all my reviews

The Path To Victory is a comprehensive one volume review of World War 2 in the Mediterranean and vicinity. It has flaws, but it provides a wealth of information and is easy to read.

The scope of the book is an uncommon one. Most titles deal with individual people or battles, or cover one country's contribution (e.g. An Army At Dawn), or look over the whole war in a general way. The auther here, Douglas Porch, deals with the whole war, but restricts himself to the Mediterranean sea. His descriptions of circumstances surrounding the battles is excellent, his short histories of the people involved are quite good (his handling of Juin is outstanding, finally, a French General to admire). His description of battle in Africa tends to be anti-climactic, however, as though the reasons for the outcome rendered the actual fighting superfluous. This is often true, but the reader of WW2 books is used to a different style. However, his description of the Italian campaign is quite good in all respects.

His story is as comprehensive as you could expect for one volume covering so much area and so much time. His argument, that the Mediterranean was critical for Allied victory (not a sideshow or distraction, as many accuse), is something you might not agree with, but is nevertheless well worth considering.

The main flaw in the work is that Porch does not have a constant command of his timeline. Often in the early to middle part of the book he will rock back and forth over the same time period, and he does not always keep the reader well grounded. I often found myself thinking of the abducted woman in Minority Report: a psychic used to living in a constant stream of flshbacks and premonitions, asks "is it now?"

The last half of the book, however, is firmly grounded. I would also liked to have seen more on the impact of the USAAF operating out of Italy, which, as I recall, accomplished far more than just the Ploeti raids Porch deals with in some detail, but then, in anything well written, one always wants more.

One picky error, that bothers me as a math-literate person, occurs on page 76. He says an influx of refugees increased the population of Greece by 28%, thus "nearly one in three" Greeks was a refugee. If you add 28% to something, you get 128%, and the proportion of the influx to the new total is 28/128, or 21%. Thus, barely one in five was a refugee. His point was that there were rather alot of refugees, and I guess that's true enough, but I hate to see basic errors in math a work that one assumes was read by many people before publication.

The Path To Victory is easy to read, does a very good job on an under-appreciated theatre of the war, and provides a new perspective that is well worth reading.

A Note on the five-star rating: In my view the stars are not a judgement on the literary perfection of a title, but on whether or not a person reading the review ought to read (and buy) the book. It's a relative judgement of the quality of the book, the subject matter, and the available alternatives.

17 of 17 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Valuable study of the Mediterranean Theater, November 12, 2007

By	Mannie Liscum (Columbia, MO United States) - See all my reviews

This review is from: The Path to Victory: The Mediterranean Theater in World War II (Paperback)

Douglas Porch's "The Path to Victory: The Mediterranean Theater in World War II" is an outstanding piece of historiography. While its 683 p. length may deter some from picking it up, this is a book worthy of a read by anyone with even passing interest in the Second World War, especially that portion of the war oft referred to as the 'backwater war'. Aside from Porch's clear mastery of the English language that lends itself to easily digestible prose, the most significant strength of "The Path to Victory" is related to how it can change the way the reader/historian looks/appreciates the Mediterranean Theater.

Porch, unlike most historians of note, argues that the Mediterranean Theater of Operations in WWII was not in fact a 'backwater war', but was THE definitive theater of the war in Europe. This is the base thesis of Porch's book, and he presents his historiography around this idea. Although Porch's thesis goes against the grain he does not simply spin history to fit his ideas, as other controversial authors have done. Instead, Porch presents a thoroughly researched story that in it's content is not significantly different from that presented elsewhere, but is analyzed in a more open fashion, thus allowing his thesis to be properly tested. After reading "The Path to Victory" the reader is likely to conclude that previous conclusions that the Mediterranean Theater was a 'backwater war' may have been made under quite restrictive analyses; namely, that few authors have not taken a biased, almost predetermined, approach to the analysis of this portion of the war. Much of this bias is derived from strong nationalistic feelings (e.g., American authors often see the Mediterranean Theater as a 'backwater' because of the American belief that this geographical portion of the war supported British imperial desires), or a question of simple public interest (e.g., the general reader is usually much more interested in the battles in Normandy or the Ardennes than what happened in the Po Valley in the summer/fall of 1944). Although Porch is a Brit, he seems to give the theater a fair shot without obvious nationalistic bias. In fact when he discusses the decisions/actions of the various commanders he is equally critical of all, British (yes even Monty) as well as American. In short, Porch appears to approach the topic critically but fairly.

Overall, "The Path to Victory" is a single volume treatise covering the Mediterranean Theater as a whole, within the context of the greater European war. Moreover, while many historians express their comfort zones very clearly in their writings, Porch discusses multiple areas of historiography with equal zeal and competence. For example, Porch seems equally comfortable discussing both naval and ground actions in detail, from command level decision making to unit level actions. He engages the relationships and decisions among the leaders of the Allied venture (e.g., Churchill, Roosevelt, and de Gaulle) with much confidence, while simultaneously providing the reader considerable detail with respect to various battles that were fought within the theater. However, the reader should be aware that this is not a regimental history, it is much more broad in coverage. This is not however to suggest that Porch neglects the value of discussions at this level.

In the end Porch's prose takes the reader from North Africa to the Balkans and the end of the war in a way that is likely to make most readers stop and reconsider how important (or not) the Mediterranean Theater was to the greater European Theater of Operations. Any book that makes one think has value and when it's done well and written with flair it's a bonus. Porch does all of these things. Solid 4 star effort.

14 of 15 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Impressive, October 18, 2004

By	Michael Licari (Cedar Falls, IA United States) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

Reading The Path to Victory is like eating a nice steak. It's filling. It's rich and satisfying. It's to be slowly chewed and savored. It's meaty and juicy. And occasionally there's a bit that just isn't very good. Porch has a daunting task in his book: to relate the entire war in the Mediterranean in one volume. This is a difficult job, for a number of reasons. First, the conflicts in that theater were far-flung, ranging from Morocco to Iraq, and they had only indirect strategic links. In other words, many of the events do not fit in one single story. Second, conflict there lasted the entire war, without interruption, so there is a lot to tell.

Porch does an admirable job of telling this long, twisted story. His main purpose is not to simply chronicle combat operations. Rather his goal is to demonstrate the strategic importance of the Mediterranean in World War II. In many US histories, The Mediterranean theater is dismissed as a sideshow, a strategic dead end that diverted resources away from the main effort in northeast Europe. In many British histories, the critique is that the Mediterranean garners far more attention than it deserves, El Alamein notwithstanding. Porch takes on these assessments. He argues that while the theater was not sufficient for victory over Germany, it was necessary. The bases of his argument can be broken down into several parts.

First, Porch shows that Allied leadership needed a place to improve. He refers to the theater as the "graveyard of the generals", and rightly so, when one begins to tally all the failures in command. The UK and the US badly needed an opportunity to weed out poor commanders, and the theater (primarily in North Africa) gave them this opportunity in a strategically safe environment where operational reverses were not war-enders.

Second, Porch argues that the Mediterranean provided an opportunity for the US and the UK to improve it soldiering. Doctrine improved, tactics improved, and amphibious landings were executed, all of which gave the Allied militaries practical experience necessary for the eventual invasion of northeast Europe.

Third, although the Mediterranean theater was on the periphery of US and German strategy, it was decidedly not on the periphery of British or Italian strategy. In the United States, we view the war from a US- and German-centric perspective. We forget that the Mediterranean represented an important region for the UK, with its interests in Egypt and the Middle East, and the Suez canal represented a lifeline to India. For Italy, the importance of the region is obvious. Some historians complain that the US was "sucked into" the Mediterranean and wound up fighting for British strategic interests. Possibly so, but Porch argues that the practical experience of fighting outweighed this. Additionally, the US put its fighting in the Mediterranean to good use: clearing Sicily and much of Italy allowed for ANVIL, the amphibious invasion of southern France, which was instrumental in producing the strategic withdrawal of the Germans.

Porch also demonstrates that the Germans, like the US, got "sucked into" the Mediterranean in order to help its ally (Italy). However, for the Germans, the theater certainly was a dead end and ended up costing Germany a great deal of resources (squandered in Tunisia, or occupying Italy and the Greece and the Balkans).

The largest contribution of the Mediterranean theater was to clear up political and strategic ambiguities. El Alamein was a badly-needed victory, politically and for morale, for the British. Another significant strategic advance was to resolve the French situation. Action in the Mediterranean theater swept away Vichy and firmed up power for the Free French, important in the short term for fighting Germany and in the long run for the political stability of France. Allied offensives also knocked Italy out of the war, which was significant for politics and morale. Bombers stationed in southern Italy could reach significant targets, such as the Ploesti oil fields. ANVIL could not have happened without the liberation of North Africa, Sicily, and most of Italy.

While I think Porch does an admirable job of demonstrating the worthiness of the Mediterranean theater, his book does have some problems that keep it from being uniformly excellent. He is too quick to excuse Churchill's strategies. Although Porch notes that many of his ideas were either wrong or impractical, Porch still gives him the benefit of the doubt, claiming that British "effort" was required in order to ensure US support. Since this support was almost certainly forthcoming (Porch never demonstrates that perhaps was not) these simply excuses for Churchill's disastrous and amateur meddling.

On the issue of command, Porch is hard on most generals, except Mark Clark of all people. Clark is almost universally recognized as a disaster. Although Patton and Monty were both insufferable egomaniacs, neither let that get in the way (very much) of the command decisions they had to make. Clark, on the other hand, did put egotistical competition before sound military judgment and rightly deserves to be labeled a disaster. Porch dismisses his functional insubordination, by turning to Rome out of Anzio instead of bagging the retreating Germans, stating that encirclements were hard to carry out and the Germans usually escaped anyway. With Rommel, Porch is equally off-base, stating that his battles were wasteful with no strategic purpose. Of course, his whole "strategic purpose" was to prop up the Italians and bother the British. This he accomplished and his efforts, strategically, must be considered a success.

Finally, Porch never questions why the Allies made the decision to continue pushing up Italy after Rome fell, and after ANVIL was carried out. By this time, the Germans were shifting troops away from Italy and there was no longer any strategic value in further offensives. If any lives were wasted in the Mediterranean, clearly they were wasted in northern Italy starting in the Fall of 1944.

This is a big meaty book. Porch presents a satisfying argument, even if bits of it are questionable.