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179 of 197 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Breathtaking Grasp of History, April 30, 2001
This book is of critical importance to any student of Middle East history. Fromkin recounts a great deal that he might have left out of a less complete survey. Its inclusion is but one thing that makes this work priceless. What emerges, before one is even halfway through, is a sweeping portrait of the many tragedies that seeded conflicts still plaguing the Middle East today. One major culprit can only be described as legendary British stumbling throughout World War I. At the core of Britain's Middle Eastern advisers was a group of bigoted, bumbling idiots, who could not see past the end of their noses. Sir Mark Sykes, for example, described many groups whose destiny he influenced with disgusting pejorative. Town Arabs, he described as "cowardly," "insolent yet dispicable [sic]" and "vicious as far as their feeble bodies will admit." Bedouin Arabs he called "rapacious, greedy...animals." Sykes was also obsessed with fear of Jews, Fromkin writes, "whose web of dangerous international intrigue he discerned in many an obscure corner." Not the least of these was the sadly mistaken view that the Young Turks party were governed by Jews, when in fact none were privy to their inner circle. This pathetic distortion of reality was informed by oriental affairs interpreter Gerald FitzMaurice, and shared by Gilbert Clayton, an adviser to Lord Kitchener. Like too many other British misconceptions about the Middle East, it was never investigated or much less corrected. Disasters resulting from the "Cairo group's" ill-informed advice abounded. Take the bungled attack on Gallipoli--caused horrific 500,000 combined casualties, which could have been sharply reduced, if not eliminated, had the allies acted swiftly. Another was the reliance on the "diplomacy" of an Arab imposter, Lt. Muhammed Sharif al-Faruqi, who pretended to represent the Emir Hussein, Sharif of Mecca, but whom neither Hussein nor his son Feisel had ever met, much less entrusted with diplomatic powers. But there is plenty of blame to go around. Fromkin also plumbs the weakenesses of the Ottoman lords themselves, as well as those of duplicitous Arab leaders. Emir Hussein's actual emisaries neglected to inform the British that he did not know al-Faruqi--perhaps because he advanced an agenda which suited Hussein in many respects. But it caused problems. Worse, Arabs often negotiated in bad faith, knowing that they could deliver on few if any of the promises they made in pursuit of their goals. David Fromkin's intense scholarship is informed with the grace of a classic novel. Had there ever been any doubt, he proves that fact is stranger than fiction--and often a great deal more tragic. Alyssa A. Lappen
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