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19 of 21 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Short, sweet guide to the radical behaviorist point of view, June 12, 2003
By A Customer
Written late in Skinner's life, this broadly-scoped statement of Skinner's philosophy is not only an outstanding, clear, and relatively nontechnical primer to Skinner's philosophy, but it is also one of the few places where Skinner undertook to defend his positions against critics, on exactly the same points that are still widely assumed to neatly dismiss not only Skinner, but all of his ideas - and sometimes the entire notion of behavioral science - in one specious swoop.In mid-century, Skinner became strongly associated with the word 'behaviorism' (so much so that it is now common to see famous, well-published academics confusing him with Watson, the originator of the word 'behaviorism,' whose views and approach were fundamentally different.) Skinner's views are actually called "radical behaviorism" to distinguish them from others like Watsonian S-R behaviorism, Hull's neo-behaviorism, Tolman's purposive behaviorism, and so on. Radical behaviorism, as many prior behaviorisms, held that behavior was caused in ordinary natural ways, and hence that it could be studied just as scientifically as, say, biology was, with just as little unnecessary mystery. What made it 'radical,' however, was not really that it was more behaviorist than other behaviorism, but that it embraced the existence of only-privately-observed events, like one's thoughts and feelings, in such a way that they were also considered behavior. (cf. Skinner's quote, 'The skin is not so important as a boundary.') Skinner's philosophy had other notable and idiosyncratic properties: Skinner held that behavior was profoundly controlled by the environment (read: that what we do is done with relation to the world - compare this to Pylyshyn's absurdly contrary claim that "human behavior is stimulus free," in other words that we are so stupid that we act without regard, e.g., to what time it is, what the judge just said, or how this restaurant was awful last time.) Skinner emphasized direct application of behavioral study to political problems, was a humanist who hated coercion and punishment, and - perhaps most famously - he was excessively picky about what words were used to describe behavior (going so far as to reject, on principle, virtually any use terminology smacking of 'mentalism,' - e.g., 'thought,' even though he took pains to point out his acceptance of private life). It is the persistent emphasis of environmental influence and the persistent suspicion of anything that smelled like 'mentalism' - appeal to spirits, res cogitae, homunculi, a vis viva, or a virtus dormitiva - that are now the most noted characteristics of Skinner's philosophy. Skinner's own words will naturally be the most reliable representation of what he thought, and this is the best place to read those words. Whether or not you have any understanding of behavioral science or of Skinner's particular take on it, this book will give you the essential and relatively authoritative philosophical views contained in radical behaviorism - unpolluted by politically motivated revisionism. With an honest reading of an accurate source, one can evaluate each idea on its own merit, without needing to take sides pro or con in order to evaluate the basic plausibility of the many and strident competing claims about radical behaviorism. (One point is left off because Skinner's philosophy is still somewhat confusingly explained and incomplete, albeit expansive, even at its best).
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