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169 of 174 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Provocative and Alarming, October 30, 2003
I think Bonner and Wiggin artfully present an alarming and important idea: that American consumer capitalism may doom the stock market and the economy. However, in making their case, they favor metaphors and provocation over tightly organized logic. The authors are truly right to call their approach "literary and historical," for many of the book's facts and hard data are attached to historical stories and anecdotes. The first two-thirds of the book is an epic-and sometimes meandering-sweep of selected economic themes and characters. Against broad themes, the writing is often ponderous but sometimes it is simply brilliant and poetical. The tone was a bit overwrought and patronizing for my taste. I winced a few times when, writing from their offices in Paris, they compare America to Rome before the fall, seeming to bask in their self-described spectator role, and taking glee in the perceived plight of the average investor, "bless their greedy little hearts." I found the first three chapters hard trudging. Chapter One rehashes the bursting of the internet bubble and blames the Internet for amplifying the hasty judgments of the mob. Chapter Two aims to show us that every binge must be followed by a hangover, economically speaking. To prove this, they indulge in many, many military metaphors, like the Japanese "expansion" into Pearl Harbor that led to the hangover at Midway. I'm not much for military history so this was of passing interest to me, but I was interested in the introduction of Hyman Minsky and his theory that "stability [itself] is destabilizing." The idea is that when everything is going well economically, the banks and other "merchants of debt" will inevitably market their liabilities and send the economy into a vicious cycle of credit. Chapter Three tells the story of John Law's early attempt to create a paper currency and the ensuing speculative bubble; but mostly it a broadside against central banks who think they can save an economy merely by printing more money. After this, with the exception of the Chapter Six, the book really started to grab my attention. Chapter Four presents the comparison between our economy today and Japan's ten years ago. Sure, the metaphor isn't perfect (e.g., American capital markets are arguably more nimble and ruthless) but I bet it will spook you if you have money in the stock market. Chapter Five dethrones Alan Greenspan and laments his reversal from a "gold bugger" (i.e., money should be backed by gold) to a devotee of managed paper currency whose overconfidence helped fuel the bubble, and who, the authors plainly believe, cannot save us with interest rate cuts. Regarding Chapter Six, I'm with another reviewer who thought this part was tough. It's an abstract philosophical treatise on why the masses are, you know, bunk. Maybe they needed to make a place for the obligatory Nietzsche quotes? I would have much rather they elaborated on their all-to-brief discussion of fiscal policy, where they start to make a case for the dangers of a Bush-inspired expansion of fiscal spending. Chapter Seven (The Hard Math of Demography) is a great chapter and is the heart of the matter. Whereas in the earlier Chapter they drew the cosmetic analogy to Japan ten years back, here they outline the causes that doom us to repeat Japan's performance. Drawn largely from a study by the Cowles Foundation, they show that the stock market has historically trended along with demographics. Specifically, when the proportion of people who are "peak-investors" (i.e., people in their 40s) is high relative to spenders (in their 20s) and retirees (who pull money out of the market), then demand for equities runs high and the market rises. But this ratio has recently peaked, and we are looking at two decades where the proportion of investor-aged population is going to decrease as more people move into retirement and will be selling, not buying, stocks. This is the authors' concern: that as American depends increasingly on debt-financed consumer consumption, fewer investors will demand equities, so we will have less investment capital. Compelling, but the authors did not cover all their flanks. For example, they do not seem to acknowledge that consumer spending provides companies with revenue and retained earnings that can be a source of investment capital; they seem to imply throughout that the only investment capital comes through savings which are invested in the equity markets. Also, you can argue that the historical comparison between U.S. Equity markets and domestic demographics is challenged going forward given increasing globalization. In other words, the US stock market hardly depends only on domestic investors for demand; as we mature, other economies are supplying plenty of prime-aged investors. So this is a worthwhile debate for any long-term investor and this book is sure to make you think about the risks in holding equities into the next decade. I was not at all disappointed that the authors' go-forward advice amounted to "sell equities, buy gold, we think." It was a welcome bit of humility from them. But the book is really a case for selling equities, it is not by itself a very persuasive argument for buying gold, unless you simply believe that historical inverse relationships between the two asset classes is going to hold up.
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