The computational theory of mindthe belief that the mind can be likened to a computer and that cognitive states possess the generative and compositional properties of natural languageshas proven enormously influential in recent philosophical studies of cognition. In this carefully argued critique, Steven Horst pronounces the theory deficient. He refutes its claims and assumptions, particularly the assertion that symbolic representations need not have conventional meaning. Horst goes on to sketch a new methodology for looking at the philosophy of psychology, one that provides a more fruitful way of comparing computational psychology with rival views emerging from connectionism and neuroscience. Original and comprehensive, his book is certain to provoke controversy and stimulate debate.
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"A first-rate contribution to the literature on the foundations of cognitive science, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of psychology. It is clear, powerfully argued, highly original, and provides one of the best general critiques to date of the claims of the advocates of the computational theory of mind."--Jay L. Garfield, Hampshire College
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