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Nobody expected India--the country that produced pacifist leader Mahatma Gandhi--to go nuclear so soon or so suddenly. But that's what it did in May 1998, detonating five nuclear weapons, to the world's astonishment. George Perkovich offers a comprehensive survey of how India got the bomb, starting with early technical efforts dating back 50 years and concluding with a full treatment of exactly what India did in the Rajasthan desert and why. He challenges the conventional wisdom holding that countries pursue nuclear power mainly for security reasons. Perkovich says the motives, at least in India's case (and, he believes, in the case of other developing countries), were much more complex. An overwhelming desire for global recognition and national pride trumped everything else. He suggests the United States might have done more to head off recent events had the nation not lacked a coherent policy toward South Asia thanks to cold-war politics. India's rivalry with Pakistan didn't help, either; it's extremely difficult to be on very good terms with both nations at once. The footnotes are extensive and the details sometimes can seem overwhelming, but the book's topic may be one of the most important issues of the 21st century. In short, George Perkovich and India's Nuclear Bomb are to India what Richard Rhodes and The Making of the Atomic Bomb are to the United States. --John J. Miller
From Library Journal
Perkovich (W. Alton Jones Foundation) painstakingly describes the evolution of India's nuclear arsenal from 1947 to 1998. The stockpile resulted not from military need but rather from the efforts of India's scientific community and an extremely small number of politicians. Opposition groups, including several prime ministers, lambasted the diversion of funds from education, health, sanitation, and welfare programs to building bombs. Perkovich interweaves the complex relationships among India, the United States, Pakistan, and China regarding nuclear bombs, pointing out that none remained steadfast to principles. The work concludes with sets of principles that are then applied to other nuclear programs. Essential for any library concerned with nuclear issues.ADonald Johnson, Univ. of Minnesota Lib., Minneapolis
Copyright 1999 Reed Business Information, Inc.
See all Editorial Reviews
Nobody expected India--the country that produced pacifist leader Mahatma Gandhi--to go nuclear so soon or so suddenly. But that's what it did in May 1998, detonating five nuclear weapons, to the world's astonishment. George Perkovich offers a comprehensive survey of how India got the bomb, starting with early technical efforts dating back 50 years and concluding with a full treatment of exactly what India did in the Rajasthan desert and why. He challenges the conventional wisdom holding that countries pursue nuclear power mainly for security reasons. Perkovich says the motives, at least in India's case (and, he believes, in the case of other developing countries), were much more complex. An overwhelming desire for global recognition and national pride trumped everything else. He suggests the United States might have done more to head off recent events had the nation not lacked a coherent policy toward South Asia thanks to cold-war politics. India's rivalry with Pakistan didn't help, either; it's extremely difficult to be on very good terms with both nations at once. The footnotes are extensive and the details sometimes can seem overwhelming, but the book's topic may be one of the most important issues of the 21st century. In short, George Perkovich and India's Nuclear Bomb are to India what Richard Rhodes and The Making of the Atomic Bomb are to the United States. --John J. Miller
From Library Journal
Perkovich (W. Alton Jones Foundation) painstakingly describes the evolution of India's nuclear arsenal from 1947 to 1998. The stockpile resulted not from military need but rather from the efforts of India's scientific community and an extremely small number of politicians. Opposition groups, including several prime ministers, lambasted the diversion of funds from education, health, sanitation, and welfare programs to building bombs. Perkovich interweaves the complex relationships among India, the United States, Pakistan, and China regarding nuclear bombs, pointing out that none remained steadfast to principles. The work concludes with sets of principles that are then applied to other nuclear programs. Essential for any library concerned with nuclear issues.ADonald Johnson, Univ. of Minnesota Lib., Minneapolis
Copyright 1999 Reed Business Information, Inc.
See all Editorial Reviews
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Inside Another Edition of this Book Citations: This book cites 63 books | 33 books that cite this book Explore: Citations | Books on Related Topics | Concordance | Text Stats Key Phrases - SIPs: nuclear explosive project, nonproliferation activists, nuclear explosives project, peaceful nuclear explosives, nonproliferation treaty negotiations (more) Key Phrases - CAPs: United States, Soviet Union, Indira Gandhi, New Delhi, Atomic Energy Commission (more) Browse Sample Pages: Front Cover | Copyright | Table of Contents | Excerpt | Index | Back Cover | Surprise Me! |
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