Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice (Paperback)

by William A. Galston (Author) "This book brings together and develops themes that have occupied me over the past decade of scholarly and public life..." (more)
Key Phrases: liberal pluralist state, expressive liberty, general public principles, Cambridge University Press, Isaiah Berlin, United States (more...)

Editorial Reviews

Review
"This is an important task, which Galston fills with elegance and clarity." Philosophy in Review

"Recommended for upper-division undergraduates and above." Choice

"Galston's ideas concerning the nature of value pluralism as presented in Liberal Pluralism are both interesting and convincing." Perspectives on Politics

"Liberal Pluralism would work well in a course exploring political theory beyond current partisan politics. Galston's classical liberalism, tempered by a rejection of the radical individualism now endemic in much American political discourse, is a fine contribution to the field." - Journal of Church and State, Richard Heyduck, First United Methodist Church

Product Description
William Galston is a distinguished political philosopher whose work is informed by the experience of having served from 1993-1995 as President Clinton's Deputy Assistant for Domestic Policy. Isaiah Berlin first advanced the moral theory of value pluralism in the 1950s and it subsequently was developed by a number of distinguisthed scholars, including Galston. In Liberal Pluralism, Galston defends a version of value pluralism for political theory and practice. Against the contentions of John Gray and others, Galston argues that value pluralism undergirds a kind of liberal politics that gives great weight to the ability of individuals and groups to live their lives in accordance with their deepest beliefs about what gives meaning and purpose to life. This account of liberal pluralism is shown to have important implications for political deliberation and decision-making, for the design of public institutions, and for the division of legitimate authority among government, religious institutions, civil society, parents and families, and individuals. Liberal pluralism leads to a vision of a good society in which political institutions are active in a limited sphere and in which, within broad limits, families and civil associations may organize and conduct themselves in ways that are not congruent with the principles that govern the public sphere. William Galston is Professor, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland and Director at the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy. He is the author of Liberal Purposes (Cambridge, 1991), which won the Spitz Prize. Galston's other books include Justice and the Human Good (Chicago, 1980) and IKant and the Problem of History (Chicago, 1975). He is also a Senior Advisor to the Democratic Leadership Council and the Progressive Policy Institute.

See all Editorial Reviews

Product Details

• Paperback: 150 pages
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press (May 6, 2002)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 052101249X
• ISBN-13: 978-0521012492
• Product Dimensions: 8.9 x 5.9 x 0.5 inches
• Shipping Weight: 6.4 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.5 out of 5 stars See all reviews (2 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #780,840 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

10 of 13 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Quite intelligent coming from such an intellectual, January 7, 2004

By	Graham H. Seibert (Kiev, Ukraine) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

As you soar through billowing clouds of philosophy, five levels of abstraction above the earth without even an artificial horizon to guide you, it is comforting that Galston occasionally provides a peek through the mists to take a bearing from the world of reality. I was pleased to find that even as a non-philosopher I had a general notion of his whereabouts. I do wonder, however, if he couldn't have made his case using somewhat more accessible prose.

Galston's definition of liberalism is closer to the 18th century than today. It is the liberalism of toleration, based on "....two distinct principals, which I shall summarize under the headings of autonomy and diversity. By `autonomy' I mean self-direction.....By `diversity' I mean, straightforwardly, legitimate differences among individuals and groups over such matters as the nature of the good life, sources of moral authority, reason vs. faith, and the like."

John Stuart Mill's Utilitarianism is on the right track, but misguided because he assumes a "sumum bonum", the greatest good for the greatest number. Galston points out that the real world is more difficult. Your values are different than mine. If I have season tickets to the Redskins and you season tickets to the opera, the best of all worlds is not to swap 50:50. Our tastes are different.

There is room for a great deal of diversity in the public, or civic sphere of our lives. Different churches, different restaurants, different types of books. We should each be free to pursue our own interests with minimum interference. Government should intrude as little as possible. Let the market decide whether the town will support a Chinese restaurant, a drag strip or a go-go bar, with the caveat that government can be brought in when there are legitimate conflicts of interest... such as the noise and traffic a drag strip might generate.

Government, because it has the power of coercion, should confine its spheres of interest to the greatest extent possible. Galston lines up with the Supreme Court when it struck down an Oregon law prohibiting private schools and an Iowa law outlawing instruction in the German language. It should stay out of religion except in extreme cases, such as sects that practice human sacrifice, etc. He is more tolerant of religion generally than most contemporary "liberals." He as much as says that he doesn't buy into Christian beliefs but respects the fact that said beliefs form the cornerstone of lives that are examples of virtue and industry.

Education is perhaps the most interesting sphere of investigation because it involves the formation of a new person who belongs in degrees that vary with time to his parents (forgive the gender usage here), the state, and to himself. The state has an interest to see that parents do not deprive a child of education, but parents have an equal right to see that the state does not indoctrinate their children with beliefs (evolution, the virtue of homosexuality) with which the parents disagree. Galston firmly supports the right of parents to choose from a plurality of educational options, even within the public sphere.

The word "libertarian" does not appear in the book, likely because it is more of a political than a philosophical concept. While I doubt Galston would characterize himself as such, his philosophical reasoning appears to me to point in that direction. Looking for a maximum of "liberal pluralism" would appear to mean keeping the government out of as many spheres as possible, and encouraging government to act at the most local appropriate level. He out and says that a law that works in a homogeneous European country is likely not to work in America, with its abundance of minorities and diverse religious sects. The degree to which wealth is redistributed, medicine and socialized, religion is tolerated in the schools can and should vary among places and peoples.

Even democracy is only a value, not an absolute. It is a means to his proposed end, value pluralism, as a consensus rather than a revealed notion of the best type of arrangement that can be made for people to live in comity. Galston points out several aspects of our society (the jury system, Federal Reserve) that do not operate by strictly democratic principles.

I'll stop here. This is a lay interpretation of a book that really belongs to the philosophers. I wish one would review it. As a footnote, Galston worked in the Clinton White House from 1993 to 1995. That is to say, for the guy I voted for instead of for the lying hypocrite I came to wish Congress had the guts to throw out. "Liberal Pluralism" is consistent with the story Mr. Clinton was telling in 1992.

(Added in 2005) I had the pleasure of taking a course from Dr. Galston at U of Md. last year. Rereading this review, it is quite consistent with the ideas he presented so well in class.

5.0 out of 5 stars LIberal Pluralism in the Style of Isaiah Berlin, January 4, 2009

By	Kevin Currie-Knight "PhD Student in Education" (Newark, Delaware) - See all my reviews (TOP 500 REVIEWER)

William Galston's liberalism differs from many other visions of liberalism in that it is based on value pluralism in the style of Isaiah Berlin. Galston premises his liberalism on the ideas that (a) there is more than one valid idea of the "good" in any (or most) situations; and (b) there is no single correct way to prioritize values that are, as often as not, competing for attention. Also, a major theme of the book is that, as this is so, we must limit what is political and public and what is private and up to the individual.

Therefore, Galston promotes a view of liberalism that is somewhat libertarian-leaning. Not only should the state avoid promoting a dominant conception of the Good, but should leave citizens as free AS POSSIBLE to pursue their own vision of it so long as it meets a "minimum sense of decency" (which, regretfully, is never well explained).

This leads Galston to several interesting conclusions: most controversially, value pluralism leads Galston to place more emphasis on pluralistic liberalism than on democracy. (Democracy legislates via majority rule while liberalism tries to leave most areas frree for individual liberty).

It also leads to a very pluralistic view on what education in a liberal society looks like (GAlston says many things that lead me to believe he would support a voucher system, as a standardized public ed seems to violate his pluralistic leanings).

If there is an overarching flaw with this book, it is that Galston never quite explains what differentiates his value pluralism and pluralistic liberalism from relativism. He states that it is different, but never explains why; if there are more than one legitimate views on what The Good is, then where is the cut-off line between the 'legitimate' and 'illigitimate'? Galston says the line is objective, but doesn't make clear how we know it is so. (My thoughts are that Galston's liberal pluralism is as consistent with value relativism as with value pluralism).

Also, I can imagine that it will be troubling to some that Galston's liberal pluralism leaves certain areas without any clear rules: his discussions on the judiciary and how moral discussions should proceed in the public arena reach very relativistic conclusions. (His view of jurisprudence in a pluralistic society is very similar to Judge Richard Posner's legal pragmatism, and his pessimism about deliberative democracy may leave some uneasy).

But, as Galston points out, 'neater' theories of political liberalism may be more tidy and secure-feeling, but only at the cost of painting a distorted picture of the real world. We must, he says, live with the fact that values and ways of life often conflict, and the best we can do may be to construct a politics that allows people to choose for themselves (no matter how wrong we think they are). For those who want a very robust and less "theoretical" theory of liberalism, I highly reccomend reading this.