The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure (Paperback)

~ (Author) "If two people cooperate in prisoner's dilemma, each is choosing less rather than more..." (more)
Key Phrases: other stag hunters, hare hunting equilibrium, imitation neighborhood, All Defect, Sender's Strategy Receiver's Strategy, All Cooperate (more...)

Editorial Reviews

Review

"Rousseau's story of a stag hunt illuminates his vision of the social contract. Brian Skyrms emulates the master by using the Stag Hunt Game to illustrate his very different vision. Who would have thought there was so much to learn from such a simple game?" Ken Binmore, California Institute of Technology

"dense but exciting...comrehensive and ambitious in scope...a treasure trove of interesting and intriguing results." - Times Literary Supplement

Product Description

Brian Skyrms' study of ideas of cooperation and collective action explores the implications of a prototypical story found in Rousseau's A Discourse on Inequality. It is therein that Rousseau contrasts the pay-off of hunting hare (where the risk of non-cooperation is small and the reward equally small) against the pay-off of hunting the stag (where maximum cooperation is required but the reward is much greater.) Thus, rational agents are pulled in one direction by considerations of risk and in another by considerations of mutual benefit. Written with Skyrms' characteristic clarity and verve, The Stage Hunt will be eagerly sought by readers who enjoyed his earlier work Evolution of the Social Contract. Brian Skyrms, distinguished Professor of Logic and Philosophy of Science and Economics at the University of California at Irvine and director of its interdisciplinary program in history and philosophy of science, has published widely in the areas of inductive logic, decision theory, rational deliberation and causality. Seminal works include Evolution of the Social Contract (Cambridge, 1996), The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation (Harvard, 1990), Pragmatics and Empiricism (Yale, 1984), and Causal Necessity (Yale, 1980).

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Product Details

• Paperback: 166 pages
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press; illustrated edition edition (December 15, 2003)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0521533929
• ISBN-13: 978-0521533928
• Product Dimensions: 8.3 x 5.5 x 0.6 inches
• Shipping Weight: 7.2 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #230,238 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

3 of 3 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Where does trust come from?, May 19, 2008

By	Garett Jones (Fairfax, VA, USA) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

Skyrms weaves together insights from game theory, evolutionary dynamics, computer simulations, and philosophy to address a crucial question: Where does trust come from? When do the trusting get ripped off? When do the trusting succeed? How can societies be set up so that they're more likely to build trust?

Skyrms walks the reader through the key technical tools, so most college-educated readers should have little trouble following the key ideas. And the payoff is large: You'll think things you've never thought before about the nature of cooperation.

I'd recommend reading this book along with Axelrod's classic Evolution of Cooperation to get a sense of where the serious study of society is heading. Since life in the modern rich countries depends so much on trust--trust within firms, trust across branches of government, and trust within communities--Skyrms's combination of big-picture thinking and cutting-edge rigor provides a great way to learn about this poorly-understood social phenomena.