Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Paperback)

~ Williamson R. Murray (Editor), Allan R. Millett (Editor) "Tanks had appeared in large numbers only at the end of the Great War..." (more)
Key Phrases: army support aviation, close support aviation, amphibious warfare development, United States, Royal Navy, New York (more...)

Editorial Reviews

Review

"Alan Beyerchen's essay on German, British, and American work on radar is alone worth the price of the book and is a splendid demonstration of how a cultural and scientific historian can make a major contribution to military history. The description of how culture, organization, and strategic predicament shape a military's reception of a new technology is simply brilliant." Foreign Affairs

"Alan Beyerchen's essay on German, British, and American work on radar is alone worth the price of the book and is a splendid demonstration of how a cultural and scientific historian can make a major contribution to military history. The description of how culture, organization, and strategic predicament shape a military's reception of a new technology is simply brilliant." Foreign Affairs

"Military Innovation in the Interwar Period offers detailed insights into how to proceed with today's revolution in militray affairs. Those who find themselves today in the same position as Moffett, Towers, Liddell Hart, and Dowding did seventy years ago will want to study this book very closely." E.G.Hoffman, Naval War College Review

"This volume should make a big impact on American military academies and staff colleges, and would also make a good graduate course reader for students who have a reasonable foundation in the otherwise daunting historiography." Brian Bond, The International History Review

Product Description

This study of major military innovations in the 1920s and 1930s explores differences in innovating exploitation by the seven major military powers. This volume of comparative essays investigates how and why innovation occurred or did not occur, and explains much of the strategic and operative performance of the Axis and Allies in World War II.

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Product Details

• Paperback: 428 pages
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press; 1 edition (August 13, 1998)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0521637600
• ISBN-13: 978-0521637602
• Product Dimensions: 8.8 x 6 x 0.9 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.3 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (12 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #59,636 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

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Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

41 of 43 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars A Serious Systematic Look at Military Innovation, June 20, 2001

By	Newt Gingrich (Washington, DC United States) - See all my reviews ("THE")

This may be the one book Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld should read. It is a serious systematic look at military innovation between the first and second world wars and its ten chapters run the gamut from aircraft carriers to submarines to mechanized combined armed warfare (the Blitzkrieg) to the development of radar, the emergence of amphibious landing capability, and the evolution of strategic bombing campaigns. There is a wide divergence of patterns both between topics and between countries. The British led in aircraft carrier development but made a series of organizational and technological choices that left them far behind the Japanese and the Americans. The British also led in the development of the tank but then rejected it as a mobile warfare system and were rapidly supplanted by the Germans who used the 1920s British tests as a basis for their development of Blitzkrieg. The submarine was rejected politically by everyone but was then developed effectively by the Americans and the Germans. The American torpedo failures are a maddening study in bureaucratic rejection of reality and a sober warning to the current peacetime Pentagon.

This book captures the complexity and the lessons of peacetime military innovation as well as any that has been written. It should be required reading for everyone who wants to work on the current problems of transforming the Pentagon.

23 of 26 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars Some good information, but lacking in many areas, August 13, 2006

By	Sci-fi and history reader (NJ, USA) - See all my reviews

The book does provide detailed footnotes as it is a series of essays where the writer of each "chapter" presents their viewpoint and analysis. However, this book provides no tables or charts to support any of the analysis or discussions presented. It would have been very helpful if there were a table or chart comparing each nation's "innovation" in each category described in this book, examples: armored warfare, strategic bombing, carrier development, etc.

What is most lacking in this book it that it focuses primarily on the US, Britain, and Germany, limited on Japan (amphibious assault and aircraft carrier development but nothing on their armor and combined arms tactics) and nothing significant on France, Italy, and Russia, who are mentioned merely in passing. This is the most glaring weakness of this book. Russia developed the T-34 tank, had a sizeable navy, large industrial base, naval infantry, paratroopers, cavalry, and actually trained with the Germans in the 1930's. The Italians were on the winning side of World War One, developed a large navy, their own tanks, and an ambitious goal to dominate the Mediterranean Sea, but they too are not mentioned.

It is important to learn how each of these major combatant nations developed as each had their own policies that led to successes and failures. An example is in amphibious landings, where the writer presents a view that the US was the most developed in the world during the interwar period. If that is the case, then why didn't the US attempt an amphibious assault prior to 1943 and why were the casualties so high in the first assault experienced at Tarawa? If the US was amphibious warfare strategy and doctrine was the most developed, then why did the British conduct the disastrous raid on Dieppe in 1943 as a rehearsal, wouldn't the US have enough experience in northern Africa, Sicily, and Anzio in 1943? The writer's claim is not supported through citing successful battles or numbers of equipment produced.

Another question is why weren't the British, Germans, Italians, and Russians mentioned or compared to in amphibious warfare? If Italy wanted to control the Med, wouldn't they have developed some type of doctrine or equipment? The Germans thought about invading England, what kind of equipment did they have and how would they have executed the invasion? The Russian Naval Infantry, what was their doctrine? The Japanese amphibious landing is well researched and presented, but again, no tables or charts are presented to summarize the writer's viewpoint.

Russia's development during the interwar period is very critical as the equipment developed during the period was superior or at least equal to the German equipment. The T-34 tank's only weakness in 1941 was the lack of radio equipment along with the doctrine of dispersing the tanks instead of massing them into large formations. If one reads other WW2 history books, one learns that the Germans were only able to defeat the T-34 tank in 1941 with better unit maneuver and with greater numbers. German anti-tank weapons had no effect with the German tanks undergunned and under ranged. The largest caliber on a German tank in 1941 being the short barreled 75mm mounted on the Panzer MK IV and the StugIII (which was an assault gun found in anti-tank battalions).

Another glaring omission in this book is there are no discussions on anti-weapons or counter munitions designed to defeat the innovations being developed in the interwar period, the lone exception being the torpedo and US artillery proximity fuses. There are no discussions on the bazooka, anti-tank rifles, anti-tank guns, shaped charges, depth charges, or anti-aircraft guns. Obviously the Germans had planned for anti-aircraft defense, otherwise they would not have developed the 88mm gun nor would have the deployed it so close to the front line troops. Rommel was able to repulse the British armor counterattacks at Arras, France in 1940 only with the 88mm anti-aircraft gun. This experience influenced him to utilize this weapon in a dual purpose anti-tank role in the desert. The British had attacked him in Arras with heavily armored Matilda tanks, armed with a 2-pound anti-tank gun, but no high explosive rounds against infantry. These cases are extremely relevant and important discussions into the interwar period.

Why did the British choose not to equip their tanks with HE rounds? Why didn't the Germans equip their Panzer MKIV and StugIII tanks with long barrel 75mm guns from the start? Why didn't the Russians equip their early T-34 tanks without universal radios (only the platoon leader had a radio)?

How was the Sherman tank developed and doctrinally planned to be utilized, a vehicle with an underpowered 75mm gun, prone to catching on fire, and a narrow track base not suited for cross country mobility (as described in the book Death Traps, Belton Cooper)? At the end of WW2, the US might have gotten directly into war against the Russians? How would the Sherman tank fared in the vast Russian muddy steppes and marshes and no highways? The Germans learned the hard way fighting against the T-34 an incorporated many of the features (wide track base and sloped armor) into the Tiger and Panther tanks. Was the Sherman tank designed to be an infantry support vehicle with anti-tank battalions designed to defeat enemy armor? What calibers of weapons were they equipped with and how were they to be employed? None of these questions are answered in this book.

Overall the book does provide some information that is interesting, such as the German night bombing tactics, use of the Stuka dive bomber to provide precision bombing, and the lack of reliable and powerful aircraft engines that prevented German strategic bomber development. However, the lack of direct comparisons (such as comparing the T-34 vs the Panzer Mark IV vs the Sherman Tank in armor thickness and armament range, penetrating power), lack of tables (such as showing the range and capacity of the Japanese aircraft carrier vs the US and British), charts (comparing the number of tanks and tank regiments fielded by Russia, Germany, England, France, Italy, US, and Japan in 1939), and complete omissions of the Italians and Russians is glaring and detracts to what could have been a well rounded and educational book.

Given the Editors' strong professional and education backgrounds, expected a lot more information from this book. Recommend borrowing this book from the library rather than purchasing it.

11 of 11 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Essential Addition to the Study of the Inter-war Period, January 14, 2005

By	Gregory Canellis "Student of military history... (Tuckerton, NJ USA) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

The acclaimed scholarly team of Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett have edited an anthology of essays encompassing the technological innovations in weaponry during the 1920's and 1930's. These innovations span the research and developments of all the major belligerents that play a major role in the coming global conflict. Each scholar was instructed to compare and contrast his or her topic country with two other countries making this work not only a significant contribution in and of itself, but also a vital comparative study as well. In addition, the researchers were asked to structure their essays around three concepts: the strategic framework of the period, the organizational factors of the institutions under study, and the doctrinal framework of the services. Many of the contributing factors to victory and defeat in World War II are covered within the pages of this important work. Williamson Murray takes a look at "Armored Warfare: The British, French and German Experiences," and "Strategic Bombing: The British, American and German Experiences." Richard R. Muller examines "Close Air Support: The German British and American Experiences, 1918-1941." Geoffrey Till discusses "Adopting the Aircraft Carrier: The British, American, and Japanese Case Studies." But perhaps the most important chapter is Allan R. Millett's "Assault From the Sea: The Development of Amphibious Warfare Between the Wars-the American, British, and Japanese Experiences." Millett compared the development of amphibious doctrine in Japan, Britain, and the United States. The author concludes the U. S. led the way in amphibious warfare doctrine, initiating combined arms operations between air, sea and land that would prove to be a critical advantage in the pacific campaign. According to Millett, Japan started out impressively as was evident by its ever-expanding Pacific empire in the 1930's. Since every landing force became an isolated island garrison, however, Japan's whole amphibious program literally faded away. Great Britain, on the other hand, never had the economic resources necessary to implement a successful amphibious program. Millett concludes that factors such as budget and innovative foresight are vital contributing factors in technological innovation. The author is also quick to point out that in many cases, new weapons become obsolete as soon as hostilities begin. Generally, books of essays are usually disjointed and inconsistent. The guidelines and structure the editors have chosen have tied all the chapters in this book together nicely. This is arguably the best work on the inter-war period to emerge in years. Highly recommended.