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Editorial Reviews
Review
"The Sanctions Paradox is one of the best books written in the field of international political economy during the 1990s. It offers a simple but clever theory that explains when states are likely to employ economic sanctions and when they are likely to work. Since sanctions seem destined to remain a favorite tool of statecraft in the 21st century, this book is likely to be paid serious attention for years to come." John Mearsheimer, University of Chicago
"The Sanctions Paradox is one of the best books written in the field of international political economy during the 1990s. It offers a simple but clever theory that explains when states are likely to employ economic sanctions and when they are likely to work. Since sanctions seem destined to remain a favorite tool of statecraft in the 21st century, this book is likely to be paid serious attention for years to come." John Mearsheimer, University of Chicago
"...there is much of interest in this book, and the case studies, particularly those concerning Russia and its neighbours, break valuable new ground." International Journal
"Drezner is nothing if not innovative." Jrnl of Ritual Studies
Product Description
The conventional wisdom is that economic sanctions do not work in international affairs. If so, why do countries wield them so often? Daniel Drezner argues that, paradoxically, countries will be most eager to use sanctions under conditions where they will produce the feeblest results. States anticipate frequent conflicts with adversaries, and are therefore more willing to use sanctions. However, precisely because they anticipate more conflicts, sanctioned states will not concede, despite the cost. Economic sanctions are thus far less likely to be effective between adversaries than between allies.
See all Editorial Reviews
"The Sanctions Paradox is one of the best books written in the field of international political economy during the 1990s. It offers a simple but clever theory that explains when states are likely to employ economic sanctions and when they are likely to work. Since sanctions seem destined to remain a favorite tool of statecraft in the 21st century, this book is likely to be paid serious attention for years to come." John Mearsheimer, University of Chicago
"The Sanctions Paradox is one of the best books written in the field of international political economy during the 1990s. It offers a simple but clever theory that explains when states are likely to employ economic sanctions and when they are likely to work. Since sanctions seem destined to remain a favorite tool of statecraft in the 21st century, this book is likely to be paid serious attention for years to come." John Mearsheimer, University of Chicago
"...there is much of interest in this book, and the case studies, particularly those concerning Russia and its neighbours, break valuable new ground." International Journal
"Drezner is nothing if not innovative." Jrnl of Ritual Studies
Product Description
The conventional wisdom is that economic sanctions do not work in international affairs. If so, why do countries wield them so often? Daniel Drezner argues that, paradoxically, countries will be most eager to use sanctions under conditions where they will produce the feeblest results. States anticipate frequent conflicts with adversaries, and are therefore more willing to use sanctions. However, precisely because they anticipate more conflicts, sanctioned states will not concede, despite the cost. Economic sanctions are thus far less likely to be effective between adversaries than between allies.
See all Editorial Reviews
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Inside This Book Citations: This book cites 85 books | 13 books that cite this book Explore: Citations | Books on Related Topics | Concordance | Text Stats Key Phrases - SIPs: sustained deadlock, conflict expectations approach, economic coercion attempts, coercion episode, coercion condition (more) Key Phrases - CAPs: United States, North Korea, South Korea, Soviet Union, Jamestown Monitor (more) Browse Sample Pages: Front Cover | Copyright | Table of Contents | Excerpt | Index | Back Cover | Surprise Me! |
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Inside This Book
(learn more)
First Sentence:
On August 6, 1990, the United Nations Security Council voted to impose multilateral economic sanctions against Iraq in response to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. Read the first page Key Phrases - Statistically Improbable Phrases (SIPs): (learn more)
sustained deadlock, conflict expectations approach, economic coercion attempts, coercion episode, coercion condition, military statecraft, carrot option, deadlock outcome, coercion events, domestic politics approach, concern for relative gains, sender country, primary sender, extraterritorial sanctions, sanctions episode, concession size, sanctions success, coercion game, economic statecraft, moderate concessions, target regime, human rights sanctions, pipeline sanctions, human rights concessions, basing issue Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
United States, North Korea, South Korea, Soviet Union, Jamestown Monitor, E
On August 6, 1990, the United Nations Security Council voted to impose multilateral economic sanctions against Iraq in response to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. Read the first page Key Phrases - Statistically Improbable Phrases (SIPs): (learn more)
sustained deadlock, conflict expectations approach, economic coercion attempts, coercion episode, coercion condition, military statecraft, carrot option, deadlock outcome, coercion events, domestic politics approach, concern for relative gains, sender country, primary sender, extraterritorial sanctions, sanctions episode, concession size, sanctions success, coercion game, economic statecraft, moderate concessions, target regime, human rights sanctions, pipeline sanctions, human rights concessions, basing issue Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
United States, North Korea, South Korea, Soviet Union, Jamestown Monitor, E