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47 of 52 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
The slide into a rightist nightmare, February 3, 2005
This exceedingly important book documents the incremental slide into justifying the use of torture by the United States government and is a shocking depiction of just how easily and swiftly the downfall can occur. The various lawyers are shown being pumped for the legal grounds, in case of exposure. The assault on the Geneva Convention is depicted, and it seems the figures involved can't grasp the ominous implications, and don't want to. Their minds are made up. The dates of the various key memos begin shortly after 9/11 and show the onset and then its downhill all the way. It seems that with this administration it was an accident waiting to happen, and the excuse of 9/11 triggered a monster lurking in the predispositions of the Bush regime. This is a massive tome of nearly a thousand pages large size, but is extremely well done, and clear for all its detail. The record now speaks for itself and we have ample proof of the mindset of the Bush gang in action.
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35 of 39 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A recorded history of sadism, incompetence, and cowardice, March 12, 2005
The editors of this book have done a fine job, and the publisher should be commended for bringing this sizable collection to print. Due to the size of the book, long periods of time would be required to read all of the memorandums in it. A great deal of information can be gained however from the perusal of even a small number of these memorandums. They give an inside view of the workings of a collection of individuals who are far from the combat sands of Iraq and Afghanistan, and whose goal is to make sure that they will be insulated from any legal consequences of their actions and recommendations. Joshua L. Dratel, one of the editors of the book, states this clearly when he asserts that the implicit message in the memoranda is that the policy makers who wrote them actually detest the American system of justice and find it impractical as a tool for fighting terrorism. This reviewer is in full agreement with Dratel's commentary. Indeed, the memoranda definitely support the notion that its authors consider it axiomatic that the Constitution, the Geneva Convention, and other bodies of law are impotent in the face of international terrorism. They have let the events of 9/11 lower considerably their confidence in rational, legal procedures for the resolution of conflicts. Dratel states it concisely and correctly when he states that the events of 9/11 `cannot serve as a license - for our government in its policies, or for ourselves in our personal approach to grave problems - to suspend our constitutional heritage, our core values as a nation, or the behavioral standards that mark a civilized and humane society.'
Some insight, however limited, can be gained from Memo 11, which is one of the memorandums that Bush put forward regarding the treatment of detainees and the prisoner-of-war status of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. After reading Memo 11, the question immediately arises: Why did the memorandums and discussion continue even after Memo 11 (the Bush memorandum to the Vice President, et al)? After all, in this memo, Bush explicitly states that the Geneva provisions do not legally cover Al Qaeda and the Taliban. But Bush emphasizes that even though he accepts the legal conclusions of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice regarding the inapplicability of the Geneva convention to Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and that he therefore has the "authority under the Constitution" to suspend Geneva, he nevertheless decides to "decline to exercise that authority." However, Bush is careful to note that he "reserves the right" to exercise this authority in future conflicts. In addition, he orders that detainees be treated humanely, according to the principles of Geneva, "including those who are not legally entitled to such treatment." Thus it appears that any further legal argumentation by anyone in the administration regarding the use of torture should be viewed as purely academic. But as this book clearly shows, there was still much discussion on these matters after Memo 11 was sent (February 7, 2002). The need for further discussion is not clear even after reading the memorandums that were sent between various individuals after Memo 11.
Torture has been practiced by many different individuals, political and religious groups, and regimes throughout history. Whether it is the Catholic Church in the Inquisition, the Chinese government under Mao ZeDong, or American military personnel in Iraq, the practice of torture is not exclusive to "leftist" or "rightist" political groups. The use of torture though to gain information is an implicit admission of the inability to collect real intelligence, either because of laziness or incompetence. Those individuals who practice torture for this reason no doubt understand this. They fully understand that torture is useless in gaining helpful information from prisoners. Therefore their decision to engage in the torture of prisoners is no doubt a result of their sadistic nature, which can be brought out not only in the theatre of war but also under the protection of religious and governmental institutions. These institutions, despicable and contemptible as they are, deserve every legal penalty available against them. Of course, legal penalties presuppose the existence of institutions that have the legal authority to carry them out. Considering the status and jurisdiction of international law in the last few years, the number of these institutions is in rapid decline, leaving the practical application of torture open to any country that desires to carry it out.
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17 of 18 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A Valuable Compilation, March 2, 2005
Karen Greenberg, Joshua Dratel and the Cambridge University Press have produced a valuable resource for anyone interested in the controversy surrounding the United States' detention and interrogation of terrorists, suspected terrorists and other combatants in the War on Terror.
The introduction by Anthony Lewis and essays by Ms. Greenberg and Mr. Dratel argue that the memorandums, legal briefs, reports and interviews compiled in this volume conclusively prove President Bush and his administration systematically sought to circumvent US and international laws, conventions and treaties, with the ultimate goal of actively sanctioning and engaging in activities that any reasonable person would view as torture. As stated in the preface, "...this volume document[s] the systematic attempt...to authorize the way for torture techniques and coercive interrogation practices, forbidden under international law..." While strictly true, this statement is also misleading. It's clear that some of the interrogation techniques extensively documented and admitted by the military and administration violate some "international" laws, such as human rights conventions adopted by the member states of the European Union. That these techniques violate international treaties and conventions to which the US is signatory is somewhat less clear. This book provides no new information to bring that debate to a close, although the documents will reinforce the opinions of those driven by ideology to the presumption of guilt.
Messrs. Lewis' and Dratel's essays are direct and somewhat vitriolic in their criticism. Mr. Lewis labels the US prosecution of the War on Terror as "the cause of evil", firmly establishing the ideological prism through which he views the torture controversy. Mr. Dratel, who is representing detainees at Guantanamo, makes the arguments you would expect from a lawyer attempting to paint his client in the best light (and, by extension, their antagonist in the worst light). He makes an interesting point when he refers to the "[un-American]...antipathy and distrust of our civilian and military justice system..." Clearly, many in the Bush administration share a concern that the courts could be abused to the detriment of US national security, and are wary of the judiciary encroaching into what they feel is the realm of the executive, although whether you feel such scepticism is "un-American" will depend largely on your political leanings. Ms. Greenberg is more circumspect in her language, if no less direct in her criticism. There are flaws in the arguments of all three essays, including extensive innuendo, assumptions, and quotes taken out of context. However, the essays are thankfully brief, and the reader has the benefit of access to the source material in the same volume.
The extensive compilation of documents related to the controversial interrogation techniques approved for use by the Bush administration makes this book a truly valuable resource. Here you'll find the tortured legalese of the infamous Bybee memo, the Gonzales memos, Secretary Rumsfeld's direction to combatant commanders on the treatment of detainees in Afghanistan, the transcripts of MGen Tugaba's interrogation of the main players at Abu Ghraib and his ensuing report on the abuses, the Schlesinger report and reports on treatment of detainees from the ICRC and other humanitarian groups. Even though, with a little searching, all these resources can be found for free on the internet, the editors have done an outstanding job in compiling them into an easily readable format. The documents are provided in a chronological order that lays out, in a way individual news reports can't, how American leaders wrestled with fighting a new type of war that couldn't be neatly reconciled with existing conventions and treaties governing the conduct of armed conflict. The information is presented for the reader to study and draw their own conclusions. Anyone interested in the cause of justice and human rights, especially an American concerned that injustice may have been committed in their name, owes it to themself to become familiar with this record.
This book does not present, except in the legal memos from within the administration, any arguments that Pres Bush's decision not to apply the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War to the Taliban and Al Qaeda shouldn't be considered controversial, either by precedent or a common sense reading of the convention. Despite the title, you also won't find a clear chain of causation between the administration's decisions and what went on at the prison, unless you've already decided Pres Bush bears ultimate culpability for the travesty. However, you will get to see BGen Karpinski, the brigade commander at Abu Ghraib, throwing barbs up and down her chain of command in her deposition to MGen Tugaba. It's left to the reader to decide where the breakdown in command occurred.
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