Most Helpful Customer Reviews
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16 of 16 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
analysis vs. history., July 7, 2004
This is a good book for readers who are already familiar with the history of the period. The author offers a more or less cogent analysis of the period while assuming that the reader is familiar with the facts, and omitting a thorough description of them. As such, it makes for a rather dry reading. This is a great book if you would like to know what Dr. Anasari thinks of the history of Iran since 1921, but not a great book if you would like to form your own opinions on the subject.
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2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Iran in 20th Centuty, December 8, 2007
The book is a brave, if concise attempt to provide a history of Iran during the twentieth century and beyond. It is base on mostly secondary sources but also includes some archival and other primary research. The author's starting point is 1921, when a military coup put Cossack Colonel Reza Khan (Pahlavi) on his path to become king and attempt to modernize the Iranian society from above.
The book's strong point is the author's methodical attempt to dispel pro-monarchy myths, put forward by some Iranians (including the shah himself), to portray the revolution as an attempt by the US and Britain to undermine the shah. By going through the shah's reign step by step, the author once more shows how the shah's own mismanagement and the nature of his despotic rule, and not any plot by foreigners, were the cause of his regime's demise. Another strong point of the book is the author's ability to provide a context, chronology, and analysis for the thirteen months of revolutionary upheaval leading to toppling of the shah's regime.
However, Ali M. Ansari's book should not be considered an in-depth analytical study of Iran in the twentieth century but an overview of a turbulent century in Iran's long history.
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11 of 17 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Iran the crucible, October 9, 2006
The shah was committed to `modernize' Iran (whatever the word `modernize' could mean).
Perhaps his mistake was that he tried to do that in quick strides and bounds. (Emulating the Russian Peter the great by using force to get things done)
The grass roots of the Iranian population could not assimilate, in a short time, the Shah's stoutheartedness, but his actual decline began when three events occurred at the same time.
1) When he wanted to enforce the institution of Land Reforms to distribute excess tracts of barren land to the resident villagers without due consideration, and in defiance, to the Mullahs who actually claimed they're the real owners of the land.
2) When he began to play a wider role in OPEC and, at times, became the `ought to be heard' mouthpiece of the Oil Countries, relegating to second place Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Against USA counsel the Shah was the key player in influencing the price of petrol across the board.
3) The Big Powers, USA in particular, were afraid that his oratory and self poised determination might weaken resistance among the waverers in the Arabian (Persian) gulf emirates and so they failed to persuade him that it would not be wise to allow his Savak units - his intelligence units founded with the assistance of the Israeli Mossad and the CIA, to gain too much insight into Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Iraq (in particular) internal affairs
The Shah was actually the archenemy of Communism and Marxism and the news of his `give in' seemed to infuse them with a perverse sense of pleasure, short lived though, because in this tangled story whereby the `elite' were at loggerheads until the Islamic Revolution took it over and they all sank into oblivion.
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