Objectivism and the Corruption of Rationality: A Critique of Ayn Rand's Epistemology (Paperback)

by Scott Ryan (Author)
Key Phrases: tabula rasa mind, natural kinds, direct realism, The Objectivist Ethics, Ayn Rand, Leonard Peikoff (more...)

Editorial Reviews

Product Description
Ayn Rand presented Objectivism as a philosophy of reason. But is it? That is the question Scott Ryan seeks to answer in this careful examination of the Objectivist epistemology and its alleged sufficiency as the philosophical foundation of a free and prosperous commonwealth. Sorting painstakingly through Rand's writings on the subject, Mr. Ryan concludes that the epistemology of Objectivism is incoherent and debases both the concept and the practice of rationality.

About the Author
Scott Ryan has been a musician, a mathematics teacher, a writer, a database production editor, a husband and father, and a libertarian gadfly. He holds a master's degree in mathematics and has had a lifelong interest in philosophy. At the time of this writing (2003) he is working toward a professional law degree, intending to specialize in intellectual property law, cyberlaw, and alternatives to litigation. He lives in Silver Lake, Ohio, with his family.

Product Details

• Paperback: 432 pages
• Publisher: IUniverse (January 27, 2003)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0595267335
• ISBN-13: 978-0595267330
• Product Dimensions: 8.8 x 6 x 1.1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.4 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.8 out of 5 stars See all reviews (11 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #921,619 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

63 of 82 people found the following review helpful:

2.0 out of 5 stars Passionate but flawed., May 6, 2003

By A Customer

Unfortunately, I will be condemned by the general readers of this book for disagreeing with it. The truth of the matter, however, is that this book is simply opinion backed up by the will to believe, and is not rational.

Ryan attempts to insert a metaphysical argument into the thematic countering of Rand's philosophy, which is akin to violating the "Rule of Negation." Simply put, since Ryan's own definitions of rationality, reason, and objectivism can not be "disputed" by rational argument, they can not be used to judge anything.

Summed up, Ryan is just saying "Man, I don't like libertarians or what they stand for, so let me tell them how their beliefs don't fit MY definitions." No [kidding], Jack. You may as well choose to define words such as kind, good, nice, and bad, then tell readers how certain acts do not qualify as one or the other because they do not fit your definition.

The book is very well written, very well studied, very well researched, unfortunately the premise is simply flawed. Mr. Ryan's personal definitions are created to serve his purpose.

88 of 117 people found the following review helpful:

1.0 out of 5 stars Ryan's Corruption of Objectivity, September 7, 2004

By	Alan Tucker, [e-mail] (Miami, FL USA) - See all my reviews

I bought this book with the hope of descovering an interesting and innovative view of Ayn Rand. But after reading it, and researching Ryan on the web, I can find no reason to recommend this book to anyone, novice or advanced practioner.

Rather than a critical analysis of the work of a great author and philosopher, Ryan seems intent on anihilating every aspect of her life, or as a previous writer coments, deconstructing Ayn Rand. Even more, I found his mocking, disrespectful tone toward Ayn Rand to be unnecessary and childish, and his use of the omniscient voice--in replication of Rand--to be without the requisite talent, ability, and great experience she had in the world.

Further more, he attempts to defeat Rand by use of the negative, which I find very revealing in a psychological sense--one choosing to spend so much time trying to expose negatives rather than creating a positive vision of one's own. Also, by not identifying with her fight against the prevailing culture, he doesn't seem to understand what she was trying to do in the world, and doesn't understand the entirely hostile culture she had to fight against and the enormity of the battle, something that would effect anyone at anytime.

Yes, Ayn Rand made mistakes, and when you accept that, one can appreciate the world-moving vision she gave the world, and her unrelenting defense of the individual's right to live his or her life by their own rational vision. Like many libertarians, Ryan refuses to accept the need for a philosophical foundation for a free society, and his attempted defense of altruism by defining it, as helping others, shows a reluctance to understand what Ayn Rand was saying in regards to altruism as the foundation for communism, fascism, and religious fanaticism, as we see with Al Queda.

One of the big problems with this book, is that Ryan is very hard to understand. Unlike Ayn Rand, who writes clearly and distinctly, Ryan lacks a concrete and graphic style, and tends to use abstract terms that are open to different interpretations so as to leave the reader, many times, not sure of what he is referring to.

Then, too, ironically like many orthodox Objectivists to whom he refers to contemptuously, he tends to conceptualize, not from the facts of reality, but from his own need to prove Ayn Rand or wrong, and thus misinterprets much of what she says. This comes to light with his treatment of Ayn Rand's essay, "The Metaphysical Versus The Man Made." Here, Ryan misinterprets what she says, offers his own version of her words, and then goes on to argue his point, using his misinterpretation rather than what Ayn Rand was saying.

Along with this Ryan states that Ayn Rand often reified her views of the world, meaning she transformed abstracts into concretes--one's conceptualizations of events into metaphysical concretes. I find no problem with this assessment, but then so what?--Ryan repeatedly does the exact same thing in his writings, especially with Ayn Rand, going as far as to refer to her as a "looter and a speed freek" in one of his comments on Amazon, as well as to make undeserved and contemptuous comments about people associated with the traditional school of Objectivism.

Furthermore, I have to be skeptical of anyone who leaves out the benevolent and very positive aspects of Ayn Rand's life and philosophy. She was a giant of a women who achieved great things in the world, and blazed a frontier path for all those who want to live in the world. To Ryan, it is all negativity, and he oftens falls into the trap of comparing the philosophy of Objectivism with some of the less than positive behavior of people who practice the philosophy of Objectivism, two very different concepts. As with all great social movements that challenge the world, people make mistakes, and people are wounded and damaged, and Objectivism is no exception. Yet, in Ryan's view there is no room for acclaim and respect, nor does he give space to the great amount of independent people, who live their own lives in the way they see fit, but yet have enormous respect and admiration for Ayn Rand.

13 of 16 people found the following review helpful:

1.0 out of 5 stars Epitome of ungracious, February 17, 2009

By	merjet "merjet" (IL) - See all my reviews

Mr. Ryan says he admires Brand Blanshard. In an online article he chides Ayn Rand fans to learn about graciousness from Blanshard. He does not emulate Blanshard with this book. He is the opposite of gracious to Ayn Rand. The book is full of derisive remarks like "Rand failed to consider ... ", "she carelessly thought ...", "she wasn't entitled to think ...", and all her ideas simply stem from a "fear of religion." He regularly and ungraciously misrepresents her, e.g. having her perceive an abstraction (p. 48). Witness the title. It's not 'Objectivism and Rationality'.

Much of the book is about the theory (or problem) of universals. Ryan brings up the topic repeatedly, beyond annoyance. He claims it is an ontological, not an epistemological problem. Wrong, it's both. He asserts Rand is a nominalist in ontology but a moderate realist in epistemology. How can that be if the theory of universals is only ontological? I offer two reasons. First he confuses the two aspects. Second, he portrays her that way to try to make her look ridiculous. He calls Ayn Rand's solution an "optical illusion."

He claims Rand didn't understand the problem. Given what Ryan writes about it, the opposite is true. She understood it better than Ryan. He says he agrees with Blanshard on universals. However, Blanshard's position is far from Ryan's own confused one he calls "realist." For example, Blanshard rejected the Platonic theory and the Aristotelian theory, both realist, regarding "generic universals" (Reason and Analysis, IX, 28, 29, 34). He endorsed specific, qualitative universals, based on identity (sameness). He largely agreed with John Locke about generic and nonspecific qualitative universals, based on resemblance (RA, IX, 34). Locke's theory is usually regarded as a conceptualist, resemblance one. It is anti-realist (contra Plato and Aristotle and Ryan). Indeed, it is much like Rand's. Strongly related to universals in nearly all accounts except Ryan's is essence, which he barely mentions.

Ryan's use of "generic universals" and "specific universals" does not match Blanshard's. I think Ryan fails to understand Blanshard's theory. Blanshard rejected generic and (non-specific) qualitative universals based on sameness (RA, IX, 14). Ryan does not. Blanshard: "By a generic universal, I mean one whose instances are individual things or persons, for example, man, horse, or stone. By a qualitative universal I mean one whose instances are qualities or characters of one kind, for example, colour, sound, or shape. By a specific universal I mean a quality or character that is incapable of sub-division into kinds, for example, this shade of red or this degree of loudness in a sound" (RA, IX, 14). Note that Blanshard's distinction rests on different instances -- entities and generic attributes (like color or number, but not red or three) versus specific attributes (like red or three, but not color or number). Ryan's does not.

Chapter 8 is about two views of reason. He starts with some quotes from Rand. Included are two versions:
1. Reason is the faculty that perceives, identifies and integrates the material provided by his senses.
2. Reason is the faculty that identifies and integrates the material provided by man's senses.

Ryan exploits this difference. I believe Rand was a bit sloppy including "perceives" in the first one. Her perceptual/conceptual division and other common ones like senses/intellect and sensation/reflection justify its exclusion.

He describes Blanshard's view of reason and judges it far better. He says somebody may judge the two views have a lot in common, but Ryan insists such a judgment is far amiss. His arguments are flimsy. One is that Blanshard wrote more than 200 pages on perception and Rand very little! The key element in Blanshard's view is to grasp necessary connections. Ryan sees hardly anything in common between Blanshard's "grasp necessary connections" and Rand's "identify and integrate". Indeed, Ryan's book barely recognizes Rand's frequent use of "integrate" (and its cognates) and the great importance she gave to integration.

Ryan devotes Chapter 11 to "primacy of existence" versus "primacy of consciousness." Throughout he treats it as only an ontological question -- the existence of God, idealism versus materialism, and the mind-reality connection. But Rand also presented it as a choice regarding a person's mental functioning, as a person's epistemological orientation. Ryan even extensively quotes Rand to that effect on p. 267. Even more can be found in Rand's writing to support said orientation that Ryan does not include. Ryan's commentary evades all of them.

Contra the evidence that Rand's position on primacy of existence is far more than atheism versus theism, Ryan claims it is simply "fear of religion." I suggest the reader consider the opposite -- Ryan's philosophical motivation is simply "fear of atheism."

One more awful attribute of this book is it lacks an index. This is compounded by Ryan often referring to what he writes elsewhere without saying where or even indicating what he allegedly said.

I reluctantly say I did agree with Ryan infrequently, e.g. on measurement omission and some on the analytic-synthetic dichotomy. Most of the latter is based on an essay by Leonard Peikoff, not Rand herself, but I guess they pretty much agreed.